



Passions before Passivity, Actions after Self-Certainty 














Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the 
Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy, Kingston University 
for the award of Doctor of Philosophy. 

 Page 3 of 240 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the turn to affect in both philosophy and neurobiology beginning in 
the 1990s. Both fields shared themes of a return to emotional aspects of the body; a 
rapprochement between natural sciences and humanities; and rethinking of causality, 
intentionality, identity and temporality. Yet the field remains contentiously divided. Disputes 
arise mainly from differences in understanding of key terms (notably between affect and 
emotion) and the place of the intentional subject within expanded, flattened conceptions of 
agency, causality and the animate/inanimate, differences ultimately between implications in 
and overcomings of past metaphysics of coupled opposites and the philosophy of the subject. 
Implication because conceptions of affect have been historically dominated by the active and 
passive understood as a doing and being done to; affects then become quantitative, external 
impositions disrupting purely self-present subjects requiring philosophies of defence that 
privilege sameness over difference. Whereas overcomings posit a pure activity or passivity, 
simultaneities of active and passive, or a non-temporal ‘before’ prior to activity/passivity. 
This thesis explores the alternative possibility that ‘active/passive’ never really translated the 
Greek ποιεῖν/πάσχειν that is its root and root of affect as translation of πάθος. 
The thesis is in two parts: in philosophy, I uncover a broader sense of πάσχειν as bindings 
of implicit differences prior to any explicit separation of agent and patient. Meanwhile, in 
contemporary neuroscience, action is being redefined through ‘prediction processing’ 
theories where error as the difference between world and an organism’s implicit models of 
that world motivates action. Affective neurobiology then describes this radical contingency of 
expectation and actuality in specifically affective terms as the organism in its self-difference. 
I conclude by binding the radical transformations in active and passive each turn effects to 
understand affect still as a pairing of active/passive but where these terms signify not an 
oppositional agent acting on patient, but as the binding of contingent, implicit differences 
with their making explicit through the affections of error in the organism’s necessary 
difference and togetherness with world.
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INTRODUCTION 
Today fields as diverse as philosophy, aesthetics, anthropology, history, neurobiology, and 
archaeology all agree that we need to be affected, whether that ‘we’ is the brain, the body, or 
materiality itself: body and world touch each other and themselves in reciprocally affecting 
encounters while world affects itself in an existence unaffected by thought.1 But few can 
agree on what this ‘to affect’ means. This thesis examines the recent turn to affect in the 
humanities and neurobiology. Despite these turns occurring independently, in different 
disciplines, three themes became common to both: a return to the emotional body; a 
rapprochement between humanities and natural sciences; and a renewed engagement with 
materialist philosophies and questions of simultaneity, causality and temporality. Throughout 
the varying use of affect, what remains consistent is a concern with relationality and 
reciprocity, of affects as a ‘between,’ simultaneities, entanglements or bindings and not 
simply a synonym for the inner emotional experience of a purely self-present human subject. 
Instead, affect lies at the heart of material change as the means by which space-time-matter 
relations differentiate. 
The thesis makes three main claims: first, that affect has been historically understood as 
perturbing, quantitative, external intrusions which need to be mechanistically discharged. 
This leads to a privileging of identity over difference and to philosophies of defence that 
achieve this discharge through reversals to privileged poles of coupled opposites (from 
passivity to activity, recipient to giver, slave to master). This serves to reduce disturbances of 
otherness by recognising them in advance of any possible affection as movements on a 
known scale from what is present to its opposite, hot to cold, orderly to disorderly. Affect is 
then reduced to quantity so that any affect is merely increase or decrease in some pre-existing 
something (such as energy) rather than any radical qualitative transformation. The ‘active’ 
often becomes identified with reason that must ‘master’ its affects, often by comparison to a 
‘purely active’ entity such as a God or a transcendental. Passivity becomes something to be 
avoided, or at least mastered and reversed, and philosophy becomes a desire for sameness 
arising from fear of separation that ultimately results in it being understood as the preparation 
for the ultimate separation, death. Irigaray identifies this move as a ‘masculine auto-affection’ 
and shows how this metaphysics had produced a place for woman in advance of her speaking, 
                                               
1 Notably Meillassoux: ‘the discovery that the world possesses a power of persistence and permanence that 
is completely unaffected [n’affectait] by our existence or inexistence [...] a world that is essentially unaffected 
[inaffecté] by whether or not anyone thinks it.’ After Finitude, 116. 
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with and through her silence, as merely the opposite of man, aligned with matter, passive, 
body in their inferiority to the privileged ‘masculine’ poles of form, active mind.2 
Second, that the turn to affect presented an alternative to this economy: in philosophy in 
the positing of a non-temporal ‘before’ that precedes active/passive and other binaries or 
bindings of digital with analogue. Within neuroscience it tends to be an exclusion of the 
passive – for example, perception is now conceived as purely active – or a radical collapse of 
cause and effect and the simultaneity of active and passive. The alternative explored here, 
however, is whether we would do better to uncover a meaning and economy of affect, still 
understood as a binding of active/passive, but where these terms are radically reconceived 
and not as simple opposites. Specifically, the philosophy section traces the roots of this 
binding to the ancient Greek coupling ποιεῖν/πάσχειν. Affect is then located as the latter half 
of this coupling through its Latin translation of the deverbative noun πάθος. In this 
translation, this verb and noun becomes dominated by a sense of ‘passivity’ understood as 
being-acted-on from an external agent. I instead uncover a broader sense of the verb as 
bindings of implicit differences prior to the separation of agent and patient. As to the other of 
the coupling, ‘activity,’ in contemporary neuroscience actions are today being reconceived as 
the felt experience of differences between organismal expectations and world. 
Finally, these two transformations are combined in a conclusion that aims toward a 
conception of affect understood as the togetherness of bindings of implicit differences with 
the errors that manifest such bindings. The aim is to further manifest this alternative, less 
violent discourse on affect that can accommodate both philosophical and neurobiological 
perspectives as well as rethink the relation between the two. 
COMMON THEMES IN THE AFFECTIVE TURN 
The turn to affect in philosophy can be read as an attempt, in Neurobiology, of 
overcoming the perceived neglect of emotions and affective phenomena of behaviourism and 
cognitive science; in philosophy, to return to the body after the perceived privilege given to 
language and neglect of the biological by social constructionists. Different causes, although 
similar neglects, led to shared themes and a turning toward one another. 
                                               
2 Irigaray, In the Beginning, She Was, 148ff and Chapter 2. 
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Return to the body 
The renewed interest in the body included a rethinking of all aspects of the body’s 
immanence in the world, its ‘entanglement’ as Hodder calls it, ‘compounded by conceptual 
abstractions and bodily resonance, a reverberation between mind, body and the world of 
things.’3 It sought to understand how the ‘outside’ realms of the pre-/extra-/para-linguistic 
intersected with the ‘lower’ or proximal senses (such as touch, taste, smell, rhythm and 
motion-sense, or, alternately/ultimately, the autonomic nervous system). Neurobiology also 
sought to extend the work of ethology to include the ‘black-box’ of the neural systems which 
partook in the social and ethological. 
There was also the emergence of the category of the ‘nonconscious’ body, differentiated 
from the unconscious and often working to critique Freudian psychoanalysis. As Massumi 
argued, unlike the unconscious, the nonconscious is not subject to repression and could 
equally apply to nonorganic matter. The nonconscious was also foundational to the 
neurobiologist Damasio’s account of the homeostatic affects that comprise the nonconscious 
‘proto-self’ on which conscious and unconscious selves are built. 
The body in its relation to its environment will be consistently affirmed as plastic, a 
concept reinvigorated by both Malabou’s philosophy and Neuroscience’s continuing 
discoveries of the extent of neural plasticity.4 This plastic body was then taken up by 
historians who no longer considered the body ‘as an “instrument” used by an agent in order to 
act,’ but as the place where ‘mental, emotional, and behavioural routines are inscribed.’5 
Smail’s Deep History and the Brain affirmed the fact that bodies or physiologies changed 
less frequently than desired by social constructivists: ‘civilisations did not, could not, invent 
new forms of body chemistry. Instead civilisations, found new devices for exaggerating 
existing neuro chemical states.’6 Smail therefore introduced the concept of the autotropic or 
teletropic to show how the ways in which we alter bodily states is itself a reaction to the 
environment. This provided the necessary link between the social and physiological. 
This new body also produced radical new perspectives on the relation of emotion to 
reason, most notably from neurobiology. Damasio’s Descartes Error, for example, argued 
that emotion is central to rational decision-making, evidence for which was provided by 
                                               
3 Hodder, Entangled, 206. 
4 See Malabou, Future of Hegel, What Should We Do with Our Brain? 
5 Speigel, Practicing History, 19. 
6 Smail, Deep History, 200. 
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experiments with brain damaged patients. The necessity of an emotional intelligence was 
foregrounded in the humanities too. The archaeologist Chris Gosden, for example, proposed 
‘a conception of human intelligence which includes thought and the emotions, and the links 
the body has with material culture.’7 
But this ‘body’ was not solely a human or animate body: there was a radical redrawing of 
the boundaries of bodies. No longer merely anthropomorphic, neurobiology’s claims of the 
evolutionary structures of the brain that share similarities with all mammals, as well as the 
focus on the molecular transmission of chemical flows radically challenged the distinction 
between human and animal and animate and inanimate. Bodies became redistributed bindings 
of human/machine/inorganic with affect implicated as their interaction and affect took its 
place in posthumanism and ‘the nonhuman turn.’8 
Rapprochement between humanities and natural sciences 
In humanities, the redefinitions of bodies and their interactions came from a renewed 
enthusiasm for the natural sciences, no doubt a result of its shift toward a paradigm of 
plasticity and epigenetics, ending the period of enmity during its deterministic genetic 
paradigm. Neuroscience’s essentialism of plasticity and epigenetics allowed for collaboration 
between disciplines on the reciprocal relation between culture and the biological. It proposed 
necessary limits to the wild ‘absolute plasticity’ of social constructionists and offered a way 
out of the aporetic alternative of homogenizing binaries or trivializing infinities: the body 
became a more stable site of inscription around which change occurs. 
Neuro-plasticity was central to Smail’s ‘deep history of humankind’ that bundled together 
the Paleolithic and the Neolithic together with the ‘Postlithic’ through a focus on ‘biology, 
brain and behaviour.’9 He argued that ‘the new science of the brain cannot make sense 
without history.’ 10 What made deep history intelligible, Smail argued, is the brain because 
‘many features of the brain and brain-body chemistry are deeply rooted in our evolutionary 
history and were put there by natural selection.’11 The brain then becomes as much a cultural 
artefact as a biological entity, ‘a dynamic co-evolutionary process of deep enculturation and 
                                               
7 Gosden, Aesthetic, Intelligence and Emotions, 33. 
8 Seigworth, Gregg, Affect Theory Reader, 6. 
9 Smail, Deep History, 2. 
10 Ibid., 200, 202. 
11 Ibid., 7. 
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material engagement.’12 This was a reciprocally affecting engagement: ‘by bringing the 
neurophysiology into history, we also bring history to neurophysiology.’ 
Renewed materialisms 
Finally, this concern with renewed bodies as differently distributed plastic composites of 
human/inhuman, inanimate/animate, and cultural/biological necessitated a renewal of 
materialist philosophies that penetrated not just philosophy but art/aesthetics, archaeology, 
anthropology, and history. These ‘renewed materialisms’ affirmed Raymond Williams’s 
necessity of always ‘moving beyond one after another “materialism” ’13 and sought to 
continue the arguments of post-structuralism and social constructionism whilst insisting that, 
as Coole and Frost in their summary of new materialisms put it, ‘the material realm is 
irreducible to culture or discourse and that cultural artefacts are not arbitrary vis-a-vis 
nature.’14 Such a move aimed to avoid ‘dualism or dialectical reconciliation by espousing a 
monological account of emergent, generative material being.’15 Materiality thus conceived is 
‘always something more than “mere” matter: an excess, force, vitality, relationality, or 
difference that renders matter active, self-productive, unpredictable.’16 In neuroscience, the 
search was for a new field, that of ‘affective neuroscience,’ that would combine the evidences 
of ethology, anthropology with that of neurobiological understandings of emotions against 
the ever-present straw man of ‘Cartesian dualism.’ 
In these renewed materialisms the question of temporality re-presented itself. 
Neurobiology’s affirmation of fragmented, nervous organisms of differential networks gave 
rise to the problem of how an organism successfully affects the world and itself, how it 
manages to effect a simultaneity and work in it to achieve its goal. A key role for 
emotionality as integrative occurs in theories of keeping time in the neural that leads the likes 
of Damasio, LeDoux and Panksepp to develop their own conceptions of brain-body-world 
simultaneity. For Sedgwick and Frank, drawing on Tomkins, affects draw ‘a boundary line or 
barrier, the “introduc[tion] of a particular boundary or frame into an analog continuum.” ’17 
Similarly, Massumi, citing Whitehead, argues: ‘affect is not in time, it makes time, it makes 
time present, it makes the present moment, it’s a creative factor in the emergence of time as 
                                               
12 Smail, Deep History, 45. 
13 Williams, Problems in Materialism and Culture, 22. 
14 Coole and Frost, New Materialisms, 27. 
15 Ibid., 8. 
16 Ibid, 9. 
17 Sedgwick and Frank, Shame, 520. 
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we effectively experience it, it’s constitutive of lived time.’18 Affect is thus often thought 
prior to time and space, or as that which produces time and space, to enable a greater 
attention to the transformations involved in the dynamics of materialization that the 
dependence on space and time often occluded. Within many past thinkers, time acted as the 
silent differentiator of affects but today the question is posed: what if it is the reverse, what if 
affects differentiate time? 
AIM, METHOD, STRUCTURE 
The task of this thesis is therefore to further develop the difference the turn to affect in 
both neuroscience and philosophy produces and the reasons for its resistance and critique by 
manifesting residual dependencies on past metaphysics. 
The thesis is split into two sections governed by the two main fields in the ‘affective turn’: 
philosophy and neurobiology. These sections can be read in either order and do not refer to 
each other. The aim was to draw out their specificity and independence from each other as 
well as question the extent to which science and philosophy can remain independent. The 
philosophy section begins with the contemporary to trace its key concepts backwards to a 
time before a metaphysics of coupled opposites and uncover a broader sense of πάθος and 
hence affect. The neurobiology section goes in the reverse direction by starting with the 
foundations of neurology in Galen to draw out its dependence on past metaphysics and the 
challenges contemporary neurobiology poses to this foundation. The reasoning for this 
reverse chronology was to present a kind of circular narrative: read linearly, in whichever 
order, the trajectory would be from modern to ancient, ancient to modern. This also aimed to 
better manifest the simultaneous dependence on past metaphysics with the challenge, implicit 
or explicit, to that metaphysics. 
From my own perspective, I found it easier to exclude the biological from the 
philosophical, the physical from the metaphysical, no doubt mainly because my field is 
philosophy, but also perhaps because it is easier to show an implicit dependence of 
neuroscience on past metaphysics rather than the reverse (is there an implicit dependence on 
the biological in philosophy yet to be manifested?). One reason for this might be that the 
biological is subjected to the conceptual, a purely passive nature awaiting the active 
formation by cultural concepts imposed on it.19 Indeed, one aim of the thesis is to show how 
                                               
18 Massumi, Politics of Affect, 61. 
19 Malabou of course recognises this in her One life only: Biological resistance, political resistance. 
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neurobiology actually manifests a resistance in the biological that necessitates another 
relation of culture to biology other than the traditional active/passive of hylomorphism. 
Whilst humanities scholars cite and critique much neuroscience – even if a relatively small 
and consistent subset – the same is less true in neuroscience: despite their interest in 
epigenetic and plastic bindings of culture and biology, the extent of their engagement with 
cultural perspectives is typically with other scientists rather than any critical engagement with 
the anthropological discourses or the critiques of, say, Ruth Leys. 
Given the diverse range of texts and materials, there is a heterogeneity of methods, 
particularly in part one and the jump from hermeneutic readings of contemporary philosophy 
to linguistic and literary analyses of ancient Greece. Whilst this ultimately continues to be 
hermeneutic, etymology is brought in for support due to the difficulties of ancient languages. 
Any rooting in etymology, however, given its ‘probable’ status, is not meant as any 
‘authentic’ or ‘hidden’ history of affect, but it is to assume something left a trace in the 
history of language which can assist in differing the discourse surrounding affect. As Austin 
argues, ‘a word never well, hardly ever shakes off its etymology and its formation. In spite of 
all changes in and extensions of and additions to its meanings, and indeed rather pervading 
and governing these, there will still persist the old idea.’20 
As regards the selection of texts, the literature on affect and emotion is vast which 
necessarily led to omissions – particularly in the jump from post-structuralism to the moment 
of Latin translation and from Galen to 19th century neuroscience – that might mean diverse 
transformations in the concepts may have been missed. My defence is that, during this period, 
‘masculine auto-affection’ still largely prevailed due to the continued influence of Greek 
philosophy and so the space was best used by attempting to trace thought prior to the 
establishment of Greek philosophy. Furthermore, my intention was to give an outline of an 
object that could be examined in more detail within a problematic of philosophy and 
neurobiology bound through a renewed understanding of affect as radically reconceived 
bindings of actions after self-certainty and passions before passivity. 
Chapter one presents a survey of contemporary affect theory in philosophy. Two main 
streams are identified: affect as difference (exemplified by Sedgwick and Frank) and affect as 
continuous variation (exemplified by Massumi). This chapter argues that, while both 
acknowledge the challenge critiques of the philosophy of the subject presented to traditional 
                                               
20 Austin, ‘Plea for Excuses,’ 149. 
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metaphysic couplings of subject/object and active/passive through the positing of a non-
temporal ‘prior’ or originary difference, subsequent affect theorists tended to neglect this 
overcoming by reinstating the active/passive in treating emotions themselves as causal rather 
than differential. At root is an insufficient acknowledgement of the radically different 
concepts of affect in play in Massumi, Sedgwick and Frank. 
Chapter two therefore manifests this radically different affect by arguing the focus on 
affect arose from its use in the concept of auto-affection introduced by Heidegger and taken 
up by Derrida, Deleuze and Irigaray but where the affect of auto-affection had radically 
different conceptions than merely human emotion. Chapters one and two could then be taken 
together as an interrogation into the extent to which the attempt to overcome the self-certain 
subject of past metaphysics succeeds or fails in contemporary affect theory. 
Chapter three then goes into more detail as to what the affect of the turn to affect and auto-
affection means through a genealogy of ‘affect’ and its semantic field. The chapter locates the 
key moment in this history in the translation of Greek philosophy into Latin; specifically, the 
translation of the Greek noun πάθος (from the verb πάσχειν) as affectio, passio, or 
perturbatio. The privileged treatment given to πάσχειν is justified by its choice of translation 
but also because of its use as pro-verb to verbs of activity: while these verbs of activity 
pluralise and differentiate (ποιεῖν, δρᾶν, ἔργα, ἐνέργεια, ago, facio, etc.), πάσχειν (and patior) 
remains the same. I argue that, as a result of these couplings, πάθος comes to be dominated 
by its sense of passivity (understood as a being-acted-on by an external agent) and affect as 
translation of πάθος becomes implicitly bound up with this active/passive. Furthermore, this 
opposition governs the other key terms of emotion, perturbation, perception and sensation. 
To unfold and loosen this binding, chapter four interrogates the meaning of the verb 
πάσχειν prior to the privileging of its sense of passivity as opposite to activity. This requires a 
diachronic study of the changing senses of the verb to derive its broadest sense prior to the 
dominance of a metaphysics of opposites. This is achieved through an interrogation of early 
Greek literature of Homer, the philosophy of the Pre-Socratics, its invocation in grammar as 
well as its ‘probable’ Proto-Indo-European roots in the era of the ‘pre-pre-Socratics.’ The 
result is a broad sense of πάσχειν as bindings of implicit differences prior to any extraction of 
external agent / internal patient. 
Turning to Neuroscience, chapter five examines the roots of contemporary neuroscience in 
Greek philosophy, specifically Hippocrates and Galen to draw out the already conflictual 
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relation between medicine and philosophy in the differing attitudes of Hippocrates (medicine 
must be separated from philosophy) and Galen (the two can reciprocally influence each 
other). The difference in these two will structure the argument for ‘two neurosciences,’ one 
aligned with unstable, uncertain knowledge more akin to the navigator, politician and sophist 
(Hippocrates) and one more associated with philosophy and Platonic truth (Galen). The 
Galenic model with the admiration for Plato and Aristotle and rejection of the Stoics 
permeated early conceptions of the nervous organism that would remain relatively 
unchallenged for the next 1500 years to the neglect of the ‘other neuroscience.’ The central 
concept is again πάθος as that which binds the physical discourse of medicine (πάθος as 
diseases) with the metaphysical (πάθος in its opposition to ποίημα). 
Chapter six then examines 19th century neuroscience for the challenge it finally presents to 
Galenic frameworks and the early beginnings of the return of a Hippocratic neuroscience. 
The concepts affect and emotion, like πάθος, again unite the physical and physiological and 
the active/passive continues to influence the field through the naming of key concepts such as 
neuron and synapse using Greek and the privileging of mechanistic, successive flows of 
energy. This focus on flow and succession neglects the radical contingency at the heart of the 
organism that the ‘second neuroscience’ will manifest. 
Chapters seven and eight then turn to contemporary neuroscience. Chapter seven focuses 
on the more mainstream computational theories that currently dominate neuroscience, 
particularly theories of predictive processing and their invocation of free energy and Bayesian 
probability. In these theories, action is reconsidered as the experience of error in the 
difference between the organism’s expectations of its binding with world and itself and 
actuality in the effects of its actions. This chapter also draws out the implications of 
plasticity, where any pure mechanistic, activity-dependent plasticity is undermined by the 
radical contingency of non-Hebbian plasticity. 
Chapter eight focuses on the turn to affect in neurobiology for the radically new 
understanding of key concepts of affect and its semantic field they present. The argument 
here is that affective neuroscience similarly manifests this radical contingency 
conceptualising it as an auto-affective binding of differences that are felt. What affective 
neuroscience adds, therefore, is that the privileging of mechanism is lessened for a focus on 
how mechanism is bound with contingency, bindings that are specifically conceptualised 
using affect, emotion and feeling. With the reconceived actions of predictive processing 
theories, and passivity as describing some of this non-Hebbian plasticity, these radically 
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transformed understandings of the active and passive actually signify the binding of 
mechanism and contingency in their coupling. 
The conclusion then considers these separate turns together, bound by the transformed 
concept of affect as the πάθος of early Greek thought with the actions of contemporary 
neurobiology. The turns to affect in neuroscience and philosophy thus together effect a 
strange time and place: that of a pre-pre-Socratic Neurology in which one is only affected to 
the extent one manifests the implicit difference between oneself and/or the environment in 
the felt difference between expectation and actuality.
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1 
THE AFFECT OF THE TURN TO AFFECT 
The turn to affect in the humanities is commonly held to originate in two papers of 1995: 
Sedgwick and Frank’s ‘Shame in the Cybernetic Fold’ and Massumi’s ‘The Autonomy of 
Affect.’ These took place within a more general return to the body and its emotionality, to 
non-linguistic, material practices and to a re-engagement with natural sciences as a turn from 
the sedimented doxa of post-structuralism. Fields as diverse as anthropology, archaeology, 
history, cultural studies, philosophy, aesthetics and economics interrogated how previous 
attempts at discussing emotions relied on binary oppositions of emotion/reason, material 
body/immaterial mind, private/public, internal/external and inauthentic/authentic. Political 
motivations from queer studies, feminism and post-colonial studies identified the gendered 
and racialised violence contained in these binaries and their closed metaphysical systems. 
Different conceptions of emotionality were therefore sought that accommodated the critiques 
of the subject in post-structuralism but enlarged them from a perceived over-dependence on 
representation, language and discourse to include other aspects of the body, a body 
considered as any assemblage of organic and non-organic, animate and inanimate. Such an 
expansion continued the challenge to traditional conceptions of intentionality, causality, 
agency and sociality. The two works exemplify the two main approaches in this project: 
Sedgwick and Frank’s engagement with Silvan Tomkins’s psycho-biological theory of affect 
as self-differentiating bindings of analog and digital and Massumi’s Deleuzian account that 
separates affect as pre-linguistic intensities from its partial capture as emotion. 
1990S THEORISM: POST-STRUCTURALISM, ANTI-ESSENTIALISM 
The ground motivating the turn was an exasperation in the early 1990s with post-
structuralism and its emphasis on language, discourse and culture that in turn had partly 
arisen in opposition to universalizing anthropologies and the genetic paradigms of the natural 
sciences. This had led to polemic separations between humanities and natural sciences. 
Sedgwick and Frank characterised the theory of their day (1995) by three aspects: the 
centrality of language as ‘the most productive if not the only possible models for 
understanding representation’; the concern for dismantling dominant organizing tropes of the 
‘bipolar, transitive relations’ of active/passive, subject/object, self/other using ‘symbolisation 
through binary pairings of elements, defined in a diacritical relation to one another and no 
more than arbitrarily associated with the things symbolised’; and where the distance from 
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biological basis correlates with its potential for doing justice to difference.’21 In short, 
Sedgwick and Frank argued that ‘“theory” has become almost simply coextensive with the 
claim (you can’t say it often enough), it’s not natural.’22 This retreat from the ‘natural’ 
sought to oppose the violence of a perceived deterministic essentialism, biologism or 
scientism in the sciences with an alternative strong constructionism. But Sedgwick and Frank 
argued that ‘theory’ itself had become a kind of scientism as its alternative to perceived 
essentialist scientific theories of emotions had become so widely sedimented as to be 
considered common sense: 
The fact that one sounds cockamamie and the other virtual common sense – or that 
one sounds ineluctably dated and the other nearly as fresh as print – may reveal less 
about the trans historical rightness of ‘theory’ than about the dynamics of consensus 
formation and cross-disciplinary transmission.23 
Massumi argued that social constructionist ideas had dead-ended because they bracketed 
the nature of the process. Gender race and orientation, he argues, are ‘interactive kinds,’ 
‘logical categories that feed back into and transform the reality they describe (and are 
themselves modified by in return).’24 Constructivism tends to lead to cultural solipsism where 
nature either appears ‘as immanent to culture (as its construct)’ or is neglected entirely to 
become ‘transcendent to culture (as its inert and meaningless remainder)’; this lost the idea of 
nature as having a dynamism of its own, of nature naturing, and 
theoretical moves aimed at ending Man end up making human culture the measure 
and meaning of all things in a kind of unfettered anthropomorphism precluding—to 
take one example—articulations of cultural theory and ecology. It is meaningless to 
interrogate the relation of the human to the nonhuman if the nonhuman is only a 
construct of human culture, or inertness.25 
Massumi’s project focused on the conceptual schema ‘body – movement/sensation –
change’ to argue cultural theory had tended to ignore the middle terms and their unmediated 
connection. This arose from a fear of falling into ‘a “naive realism,” or reductive empiricism 
that would dissolve the specificity of the cultural domain in the plain, seemingly 
unproblematic, “presence” of dumb matter.’26 Culture instead occupied the place between 
                                               
21 Sedgwick and Frank, ‘Shame,’ 496-7. 
22 Ibid., 513. 
23 Sedgwick and Frank, 'Shame,' 497. 
24 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 12. 
25 Ibid., 39. 
26 Ibid., 1. 
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matter and systemic change, as ideological apparatuses that mediated and structured the 
dumb material interactions of things. The body in this theory was a thoroughly mediated 
body, a ‘discursive’ body with signifying gestures in which sensation becomes utterly 
redundant or, worse, destructive because it appeals to unmediated experience and to a ‘naive 
subjectivism.’ It instead became all about subjectivation, a subject constructed by power, 
discourse and culture, ‘a subject without subjectivism.’27 The body was then thought in terms 
of ‘positionality’ or ‘coding’ on a grid conceived as ‘as an oppositional framework of 
culturally constructed significations: male versus female, black versus white, gay versus 
straight, and so on. A body corresponded to a ‘site’ on the grid defined by an overlapping of 
one term from each pair.’28 The problem with this is that all possibilities for a body are then 
coded in advance by the ideological master structure. The potential for change is diminished 
and movement, as qualitative transformation, becomes ‘entirely subordinated to the positions 
it connects.’29 
This strong or ‘pure’ constructivist position that posited no essentialised components, that 
everything is cultural and constructed, was characterised by Reddy as assuming an ‘absolute 
plasticity of the individual’30 and that ‘human nature is entirely variable (and therefore cannot 
be studied in a lab), entirely reshaped by every culture humans devise for themselves.’31 But 
Reddy argued this made understanding historical change and ethical questions of liberties and 
rights difficult: if human experience and emotion are entirely malleable, ‘then why concern 
ourselves with the suffering of others or the liberty and dignity of the individual? Suffering, 
in distant times and places, becomes just another by-product of a cultural context and liberty 
becomes a purely modern Western preoccupation, of local significance only.’32 If everything 
is cultural, from what position do you critique culture? In response, Reddy aimed to elaborate 
a theory of emotion as ‘largely (but not entirely) learned’: 
‘Largely’: the theory leaves plenty of room for cultural variation. ‘But not entirely’: 
the theory establishes a core concept of emotions, universally applicable, that allows 
one to say what suffering is, and why we all deserve to live in freedom. With 
reference to this concept of emotions, historical change again becomes meaningful; 
                                               
27 Ibid., 2. 
28 Ibid., 2. 
29 Ibid., 3. 
30 Reddy, ‘Against Constructionism,’ 327. 
31 Reddy, Navigation of Feeling, xi. 
32 Ibid., xi. 
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history becomes a record of human efforts to conceptualise our emotional makeup, 
and to realise social and political orders attuned to its nature.33 
Reacting against this led to many theorists returning to the life sciences for their 
perspective on human nature. Connolly, for example, in his development of a ‘neuropolitics,’ 
defended his re-engagement with neurobiology against hostile critiques of consensual 
constructivists: 
By neuropolitics I do not mean that politics is reducible to genetically wired brain 
processes or that scientific observation of body/brain activity captures the actual 
experience of those observed. Reactions in cultural theory against such reductions are 
well taken [...] But, unfortunately, those very reactions often issue in arid conceptions 
of thinking, culture, ethics and politics. To escape the curse of reductive biology, 
many cultural theorists reduce body-politics to studies of how the body is represented 
in cultural politics.34 
The result, he argued, is that ‘in their laudable attempt to ward off one type of 
reductionism too many cultural theorists fall into another: they lapse into a reductionism that 
ignores how biology is mixed into thinking and culture and how other aspects of nature are 
folded into both.’35 It is worth also noting that while Connolly was initially repelled by ‘a 
reductive model of science,’ which was ‘unappreciative of the need to enter into 
communication with phenomenological experience,’ he recognised this situation had changed 
around the mid 1990s.36 
Similarly, Smail tried to show how culture gets wired into human physiology as ‘a key to 
appreciating human sameness as well as cultural difference’ from hypotheses that ‘the 
neurochemicals associated with feelings, moods, and emotions are highly susceptible to 
cultural input.’37 Whilst post-structuralism, he argued, offered ‘a ready riposte to the 
essentialism of biological differences postulated by pop sociobiology,’ biology now agreed 
with this anti-essentialism: ‘natural selection does not homogenise the individuals of 
species.’38 As evidence, Smail cites the phenomena of spandrels and exaptation – for 
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35 Ibid., 2. 
36 Ibid., xii. 
37 Smail, Deep History, 8. 
38 Ibid., 124. 
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example, the large cognitive brain that evolved for one purpose but became available for 
other, different purposes.39 
But perhaps the most sustained analysis of the situation is in Sedgwick and Frank. To 
understand Sedgwick and Frank’s ‘turn to affect’, it is necessary to understand their 
motivation for reading the psycho-biologist Silvan Tomkins. Their turn did not aim at a 
‘truth’ of affect, nor to argue for the rightness of one theory over another (something critics 
of the paper often neglect), but was an attempt to find a way out of the ‘conceptual impasse’ 
they found themselves in. Sedgwick identified the structure of this ‘conceptual impasse’: 
‘where it is possible to recognise the mechanism of a problem, but trying to remedy it, or 
even in fact articulate it, simply adds propulsive energy to that very mechanism.’40 Attempts 
to critique something (essentialism, repression, etc.) often remained, unknowingly, within 
that economy rather than overcoming it or producing an alternative. 
Sedgwick and Frank identified two main manifestations of this. First was the claimed 
opposition to essentialisms, particularly biologisms. The theory of the day, influenced by 
Foucault, had sedimented into claims that demonstrating how something is not ‘natural’ or 
‘essential’ was always a powerful act. The reflexive antibiologism and rejection of the 
‘natural’ arose in part through an identification of the essential and natural with the biological 
and in part through a rigorous adherence to digital models of on/off representation and the 
erroneous identification of the machine with the digital and the analog with the animal. The 
digital was privileged because of a fear that analogic, qualitative differences risked 
reproducing a biologizing essentialism with the consequence that the space between n>2 and 
infinity became voided because of ‘some strong adhesion between the specification finitely 
many (n>2) values and that conversation stopping word, innate.’ Sedgwick and Frank 
acknowledged it was difficult to conceptualise, say, eight or thirteen different kinds of 
anything important ‘without having a biological model somewhere in the vicinity.’41 Whilst 
not minimizing the necessity of opposing ‘continuing histories of racist, sexist, homophobic 
or otherwise abusive biologisms,’ they feared that ‘with the installation of an automatic 
antibiologism as the unshifting central tenet of “theory” we will lose conceptual access to an 
entire thought realm, the analogic realm finitely many (n>2) values.’42 Access to this realm 
                                               
39 Ibid., 125. 
40 Sedgwick and Frank, ‘Shame,’ 635. 
41 Ibid., 511. 
42 Ibid., 512. 
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was necessary, they argued, for, among other things, ‘enabling a political vision of difference 
that might resist both binary homogenization and infinitizing trivialization.’43 
They acknowledged the reoccupation of the conceptual space between two and infinity 
may indeed make some kind of biologism necessary, but this risk was not obviated by any 
scrupulous digitalization. There is an essentialism of the digital as much as the analog, one 
that is perhaps more dangerous because it is not recognised as essentialist. In the digital 
model, essence is displaced from finite multiple qualitative differences to ‘some prior place 
where an undifferentiated stream of originary matter or energy is being turned (infinitely) on 
or off’; to see this as less essentialist only reflects ‘the habitual privileging of digital models 
wrongly equated with the machine over analog models wrongly equated with the 
biological.’44 
Secondly, the concept of an ‘undifferentiated stream’ was developed further in a critique 
of Ann Cvetovich’s Mixed Feelings, which exemplified several theoretical currents and 
conceived affect as ‘discursively constructed.’ Cvetovich’s theory of affect had no feelings in 
it, no specific affects, no room for differentiation between, say, being amused, being 
disgusted or ashamed. Sedgwick and Frank argued this was because ‘it would risk 
essentialism to understand affects as qualitatively different from each other.’ Affect was 
therefore treated as a unitary category, with a unitary history and politics that meant little 
differentiation between specific affects or differentiation between things by the kinds of 
affect they may provoke. Far more simply, differentiation occurred ‘by the presence or 
absence of some reified substance called Affect.’ Anti-essentialism’s dependence on an 
erroneously machine-identified model of digital, on/off representation meant that ‘insofar as 
they are “theorised,” affects must turn into Affect.’45 
But this theory of affect was actually congruent with Schachter's cognitive psychology 
theory of emotion that proposed ‘different emotional experiences arise out of the same 
visceral background’ with cognitive appraisal determining the quality of the emotion.46 This 
was amenable to current theory because an undifferentiated visceral state of arousal presents 
no danger of encountering the fallacy that ‘a representation might bear any nonarbitrary 
relation to the thing represented.’ Discursive construction of affect was guaranteed by the 
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idea that ‘the raw material of our arousal is infinitely malleable by a fully acculturated 
cognitive faculty.’47 Regardless of whether this account is ‘true’, the point Sedgwick and 
Frank wished to make is that this was no less essentialist than Tomkins’s theory: whilst 
differentiating emotions for Tomkins was located in the body, in Cvetovich it lay in 
cognition. 
Sedgwick and Frank therefore argued it cannot be a question of essentialism or no 
essentialism. Rather it must be a question of ‘differently structured residual essentialisms.’48 
In this choice of essentialisms, they asked, why limit oneself to the digital model? Why not 
have ‘a periodic table of the infinitely recombinable elements of the affect system, a complex, 
multi-layered phyllo dough of the analog and the digital?’49 
TWO VECTORS OF AFFECT THEORY: SEDGWICK AND FRANK, MASSUMI 
The turn to affect can thus be read as a turn against the hackneyed essentialism versus 
constructionism debates for differently structured essentialisms that would affirm the 
interweaving of the biological and cultural without falling back into reductive biologisms, 
subjectivism or naive realism and retain post-structuralist insights into the interweaving of 
discourse, power and culture. As Plamper characterised the turn, tiring of an ‘absolute 
plasticity’ or trivializing infantilizations of constructed entities without limit based on a 
restless ground of arbitrary differences, they instead asked themselves, ‘how much longer 
must identities remain fluid, borders porous, discourses shifting, without knowing why 
something has shifted?’ The search was therefore for new foundations: ‘a more solid anchor 
in the world: a more robust conception of reality and much clearer causal relationships.’50 
Similarly, Massumi argued that ‘the “postmodern” was an image of communication out of 
control. Seeming to have lost its mooring in objective conformity or correspondence, it 
appeared uncaused, unmotivated, in endless, unguaranteed “slippage.” ’51 Affect (or emotion) 
provided a way out. For example, Reddy claimed ‘emotions are the real-world-anchor of 
signs’: 
in post-structuralist terms, there is a feeling that goes with every sign; emotion 
generates parole against the backdrop of langue. Philosophers and researchers have 
not been able to find language’s anchor in the world when regarding signs or language 
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as referring or pointing to a world and have wrongly concluded that signs and 
language must therefore float free of any possible world. But the world they belong to 
is the world in which feelings occur, in which utterances and texts grow directly out 
of feelings. One does not need a questionable Western-style subject to provide the 
link between them.52 
Affect offered a ground firstly by displacing the centrality of language and discourse for 
all other aspects of the body such as emotions, sensations and movements, conscious, 
unconscious or nonconscious. Secondly, with the paradigm shift in the biological sciences 
toward epigenetics and plasticity and a corresponding turn to affect occurring there in 
‘affective neuroscience,’ affect also provided a rapprochement with the natural sciences and 
its redefinition of the ‘natural’ that challenged reductive biologisms. This shift offered 
alternative relations between biology and culture other than the reactionary binary of 
absolutely plastic, cultural constructionist or genetically determined mechanism; it permitted 
a new consideration of the mutual influence of each in their interrelation. Thirdly, through its 
rich philosophical heritage, the concept affect reopened the question of what affects what, 
whether only like affects like, or unlike affects unlike, and to what effect. Rather than what is, 
affect permitted a focus on process and change and, for Sedgwick and Frank, offered a way 
out of conceptual impasses by differentiations through affects of 2<n< ∞. 
Let us now turn to Sedgwick/Frank and Massumi who exemplify two main streams in this 
turn to affect. 
Sedgwick and Frank: affect as self-differentiation 
Sedgwick and Frank engaged with the work of Silvan Tomkins who, they argued, 
implicitly challenged contemporary theorism from the period before its installation as theory: 
in the moment of cybernetics and structuralism that preceded post-structuralism. 
Tomkins produced a list of qualitatively differentiated affects, a basic set of affects as 
shame, interest, surprise, joy, anger, fear, distress, disgust, and, later, contempt (or 
‘dissmell’). These were then placed in polarities such as ‘shame-interest’ that suggested ‘the 
pulsations of cathexis around shame, of all things, are what either enable or disenable so 
basic a function as the ability to be interested in the world.53 Many anti-essentialists of course 
reactively rejected this ‘basic’ list as an essentializing biologism. Sedgwick and Frank’s 
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closer, ‘reparative’54 reading, however, revealed a Tomkins who actually undermined any 
biological essentialism. Firstly, Tomkins blended the contingent with identity in his 
taxonomies of emotions so that Sedgwick and Frank likened him to Proust as Tomkins 
countenanced ‘both the Proustian fascination with taxonomies of persons and the Proustian 
certainty that the highest interest of such taxonomies is ever in making grounds for 
disconfirmation and surprise’55: 
The suggestion of sheer, unlimited extent marks all possible outcomes as radically 
contingent. Yet the items on the lists, far from random, are always carefully chosen to 
open and indicate new vistas, to represent new kinds of possible entailments involved 
in any generalization. They can be read as either undoing or suggesting new 
taxonomic work. Tomkins’s lists probably resemble most the long sentences in Proust 
where a speculation about someone's motive is couched in a series of long parallel 
clauses that begin “Whether because ...; or because ...; or because... .” A postmodern 
syntax that seems to vitiate the very possibility of understanding motive by pluralizing 
it as if mechanically, infinitely, seems with the same gesture to proffer semantic tools 
so irresistibly usable that they bind one ever more imaginatively and profoundly to the 
local possibilities of an individual psychology.56 
Secondly, Tomkins proposed the idea of a ‘co-assembly’ of drive and affect system as 
amplifiers which meant, 
A human being could be, and often is, terrified about anything under the sun. It was a 
short step to see that excitement had nothing per se to do with sexuality or with 
hunger, and that the apparent urgency of the drive system was borrowed from its co-
assembly with appropriate affects as necessary amplifiers.57 
This enabled a thinking of sexuality no longer as a binary of express / repress because 
although ‘sexuality as a drive remains characterised here by a binary (potent/impotent) 
model, yet its link to attention, to motivation, or indeed to action occurs only through “co-
assembly” with an affect system described as encompassing several more, and more 
qualitatively different, possibilities than on/off.’58 Indeed, Tomkins habitually layered digital 
and analog representation and biological with machine or computer models – for example, he 
analogically quantified Hebb’s neural firing as discrete fire/don’t fire events through the 
dimension of time which in turn led to on/off digital activation of several discrete affects. A 
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purely digitalizing schema would have missed the fact that ‘Tomkins’s theory ramified into a 
“many-valued” (and in that sense analogic) understanding of affect: if the on/off of “neural 
firing” is qualitatively undifferentiated, the on/off of affect activation is qualitatively highly 
differentiated.’59 The result was, they argued, citing Tomkins, ‘“the general advantage of 
affective arousal to such a broad spectrum of levels and changes of levels of neural firing is 
to make the individual care about quite different states of affairs in quite different ways.” ’60 
The advantage Tomkins offered Sedgwick and Frank was therefore his capacity to discuss 
how things qualitatively differentiate, ‘how quantitative differences turn into qualitative ones, 
how digital and analog representations leapfrog or interleave with one another’61. And, of 
course, access to the n<2<∞ realm. 
This ability to discuss how things differentiate was then applied to the problem of the 
conceptual impasse they had identified, particularly through reference to Tomkins’s theory of 
shame. Shame and theory, they argued, ‘are partially analogous at a certain level of 
digitalization’ as shame, like theory, is activated ‘by drawing a boundary line or barrier.’62 
This boundary is the introduction of a boundary into an analog and a distinction between 
figure and ground. They cite Wilden’s cybernetics to clarify:  
‘A gestalt . . . is formed by the decision to digitalize a specific difference, so as to 
form a DISTINCTION between figure and ground. There is in effect a decision-which 
may be neural, or conscious, or unconscious, or habitual, or learned, or novel-to 
introduce a particular boundary or frame into an analog continuum.’63 
In order for a system to be open to an environment … the system must be capable of 
punctuating itself as distinct from that environment so as to select messages within it.” ’64 
Such punctuations occur in affects like disgust which punctuates by recognising in the 
spitting out of food the distinction between inside and outside body. But, with shame, there 
must be positive affect too: ‘only something which engages your interest can make you 
blush.’ Similarly, shame is ‘characterised by its failure ever to renounce its object cathexis, 
its relation to the desire for pleasure as well as the need to avoid pain’ and suggests how 
theory becomes Theory and how a critique of essentialism could remain, unknowingly, 
essentialist, because of this simultaneous splitting from yet attachment to its rejected object: 
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critiques are critiques of something that affect us and in their negative form we need to be 
attentive to what in the object actually attracts us.65 
Anti-essentialists separate themselves from perceived essentialisms yet cannot renounce 
this object so remain implicitly essentialist. Sedgwick and Frank’s sustained engagement with 
Tomkins’s affect theory was then not so much a search for which affect theory was ‘true’ but 
a more strategic engagement with an outside perspective to manifest one’s own affects and 
effect a way out of a conceptual impasse. 
Massumi: affect as continuous variation 
The second vector of affect theory is exemplified by Massumi’s paper The Autonomy of 
Affect also published in 1995. There he describes an experiment designed to test the 
responses of children to three versions of a TV advertisement that had scared children: the 
original silent version, a version with accompanying ‘factual’ narration and a ‘emotional’ 
version with added emotional descriptions.66 Responses were recorded on three levels: 
verbal-cognitive (using self-report measures of pleasant-unpleasant, happy-sad and verbal 
recall of the film); physiological (using autonomic responses of heart rate, breathing and skin 
resistance); and motoric (analysing recordings of the children’s bodily reactions to the film). 
The findings proved to be ‘extremely complex’: the factual version produced the highest 
physiological recordings of heart rate and skin conductance; the verbal level showed the 
factual to be more unpleasant than the other two with the original the most pleasant. Dividing 
the film into scenes, the results showed the children rated sadder scenes as more pleasant and 
the more pleasant scenes were the ones that were best recalled. 
Massumi claims the experiment demonstrated ‘the primacy of the affective in image 
reception’ and that there is a gap between content and effect with no seeming logical 
connection between the two.67 He links ‘strength or duration of the image’s effect’ to 
intensity to claim ‘there is no correspondence or conformity between qualities and intensity. 
If there is a relation, it is of another nature.’68 Sadness is rated pleasant, so image reception is 
at least bi-level, a bifurcation that means both are embodied, but in two different 
embodiments, two systems, and that 
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the level of intensity is organised according to a logic that does not admit the 
excluded middle. This is to say that it is not semantically or semiotically ordered. It 
does not fix distinctions. Instead, it vaguely but insistently connects what is normally 
indexed as separate. When asked to signify itself, it can only do so in a paradox. 
There is disconnection of signifying order from intensity—which constitutes a 
different order of connection operating in parallel.69 
This ‘intensity’ is then posited as ‘a nonconscious, never-to-be conscious autonomic 
remainder.’70 Massumi equates intensity with affect although affect is elsewhere variously 
defined: as a ‘so pure and productive receptivity that it can only be conceived as a third state, 
an excluded middle, prior to the distinction between activity and passivity’;71 as ‘a critical 
point, or a bifurcation point, or singular point, in chaos theory and the theory of dissipative 
structures’;72 as ‘the simultaneous participation of the virtual in the actual and the actual in 
the virtual, as one arises from and returns to the other’;73 as ‘synesthetic, implying a 
participation of the senses in each other: the measure of a living thing’s potential interactions 
is its ability to transform the effects of one sensory mode into those of another’;74 ‘Affect is 
the whole world: from the precise angle of its differential emergence.’75 Affect thus seems to 
signify almost everything but what is common is, like Sedgwick and Frank, vast permutations 
of combinations and bindings that effect differentiations. These differentiations, the 
punctuation of an analog continuum are marked by the difference Massumi makes between 
affect and emotion: 
An emotion is a subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an 
experience which is from that point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified 
intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically 
and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into 
function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognised.76 
Massumi appropriates the results of another experiment to bolster his theory. He discusses 
an experiment by Libet that required subjects to move their finger and note the position of a 
clock hand when they felt aware of the intention to move. By measuring brain activity using 
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an EEG machine, Libet showed that, although the conscious intention to move preceded the 
actual movement by about 200 milliseconds, significant brain activity was recorded 550 
milliseconds before the finger moved. Massumi claims this ‘missing half second’ showed 
sensation involves ‘a “backward referral in time,” ’ i.e. that ‘sensation is organised 
recursively before being linearized, before it is redirected outwardly to take its part in a 
conscious chain of actions and reactions.’77 Massumi interprets this as implying will and 
consciousness are ‘subtractive,’ ‘limitative, derived functions that reduce a complexity too 
rich to be functionally expressed’ and that 
what we think of as ‘free,’ ‘higher’ functions, such as volition, are apparently being 
performed by autonomic, bodily reactions occurring in the brain but outside 
consciousness, and between brain and finger but prior to action and expression. The 
formation of a volition is necessarily accompanied and aided by cognitive functions.78 
Massumi clarifies that to speak of affect as intensity in this way, is not to appeal to ‘a 
prereflexive, romantically raw domain of primitive experiential richness – the nature in our 
culture’ because something happening outside the mind in the body cannot be said to be 
experienced.79 Such a complex rethinking requires a rethinking of the body and its 
inexperienced experience. Massumi invokes the concept of the ‘virtual’ to describe 
‘something that happens too quickly to have happened, actually’, a ‘lived paradox’ where, 
‘what are normally opposites coexist, coalesce, and connect; where what cannot be 
experienced cannot but be felt—albeit reduced and contained.’80 The ‘autonomy of affect’ to 
which Massumi’s title refers is then described as ‘its participation in the virtual’: ‘Affect is 
autonomous to the degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular body whose 
vitality, or potential for interaction, it is.’81 Emotion is therefore the expression of the capture 
of affect and the escaping of something, something that remained unactualized. This is why 
emotion has been classically understood as being outside oneself, ‘at the very point at which 
one is most intimately and unshareably in contact with oneself and one’s vitality.’82 This 
escape of affect ‘cannot but be perceived, alongside the perceptions that are its capture.’83 
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Thus Massumi, like Sedgwick and Frank, exhibits the shared themes of a return to the 
body and its non-linguistic aspects, a reengagement with science that does not lead to any 
reductive biologisms, and an intense focus on how things differentiate. All the while 
continuing the post-structuralist critiques of the subject by avoiding any self-identity of 
subjectivity through the escape of affect. 
DEVELOPMENT OF AFFECT THEORY 
These vectors have been developed and diversified by a wide range of affect theorists that 
continue the reengagement with science, with the body and non-linguistic and materialist 
questions of what affects what to what effect, how things differentiate and how things do not. 
For example, Scheer, influenced by Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, develops a concept of 
‘emotional practices’ defined as ‘practices involving the self (as body and mind), language, 
material artefacts, the environment, and other people’ to emphasise that ‘the body is not a 
static, timeless, universal foundation that produces ahistorical emotional arousal, but is itself 
socially situated, adaptive, trained, plastic, and thus historical.’84 Practice ‘offers a way to 
integrate the material, bodily facets of emotional processes without having to resort to the 
ahistorical, universalist assumption that the body is conditioned only by evolution.’85 She 
adds, emotions change over time because the practices in which they are embodied and 
bodies themselves undergo transformation. Scheer engages with the question of the causality 
of emotions. Instead, of viewing emotions as causing or caused by something, she argues that 
emotions are this very act of establishing causal relations: 
Instead of searching the historical record for the “trigger” to explain the emotion that 
followed, the emotions can be viewed as the meaningful cultural activity of ascribing, 
interpreting, and constructing an event as a trigger.86 
Meanwhile, Hodder’s Entangled investigated the body in all aspects of its immanence to 
the world, ‘compounded by conceptual abstractions and bodily resonance, a reverberation 
between mind, body and the world of things.’87 It sought to understand how the ‘outside’ 
realms of the pre-/extra-/para-linguistic intersect with the ‘lower’ or proximal senses (touch, 
taste, smell, rhythm and motion-sense, or, alternately/ultimately, the autonomic nervous 
system) while also arguing for a much wider definition for the social or cultural. In this work, 
Hodder focuses on ‘things’ rather than, say, ‘objects’ because of its sense from the Old High 
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German meaning ‘a gathering’ or ‘to deliberate on a matter under discussion,’ a reading he 
takes from Heidegger’s analysis.88 Ingold also invoked Heidegger’s view in his work on 
Making to stress the importance of the ‘with’: 
the object, he argued, is complete in itself, defined by its confrontational ‘over-
againstness’ – face to face or surface to surface – in relation to the setting in which it 
is placed. We may look at it or even touch it, but we cannot join with it in the process 
of formation. However metrically close our interaction with the object may be, it 
remains affectively distant. But if objects are against us, things are with us.89 
In this vein, we can also mention Sparrow’s project that seeks a new concept of sensation 
as ‘the basic material of subjectivity’ by arguing that ‘sensation is responsible in a non-trivial 
way for the subject’s power to exist.’90 Rooted in phenomenology, Sparrow seeks a ‘post-
phenomenology’ that would challenge the first-person perspective as well as enlarge 
sensation to both animate and inanimate. 
The archaeologist Gosden also criticised the frequent absence of emotions from studies of 
how social relations are created through material relations, arguing we respond emotionally 
to people and things, and ‘if this is true in the present, so it must also have been in the past.’91 
His claim is not to understand the emotions of prehistoric people, but that ‘we might start to 
look at the overall emotional texture of people’s lives and how this was manifest through 
objects.’92 
This focus on entanglements, ‘with,’ and bindings as establishment of causality conceives 
specific affects as configurations. For example, Berlant describes ‘cruel optimism’ as ‘a 
relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose realization is 
discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic.’93 This 
conception means the affect of ‘cruel optimism’ can describe specific situations or 
phenomena to understand their circular logic that ensnares to destructive effects such as 
‘obsessive appetites, working for a living, patriotism, all kinds of things,’ anything where ‘the 
very vitalizing or animating potency of an object or scene of desire contributes to the attrition 
of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first 
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place.’94 Such configurations take into account more than just language, discourse and power 
for a focus on the very aspects of relations of body to world, culture to biology, in short the 
affects. 
Furthermore, the ‘bodies’ of affect theory are not just human or animate bodies: bodies 
become redistributed bindings of human/machine/inorganic and affect becomes implicated in 
posthumanism, ‘the nonhuman turn’95. This expanded concept of body meant there was an 
accompanying expansion in such concepts as the social, agency and intention. 
On the social, Appadurai argued that, as economic exchange creates value, and value 
resides in the commodities that are exchanged, a focus on these things rather than the forms 
or functions of exchange shows that what links exchange and value is politics and therefore 
that ‘commodities, like persons, have social lives.’96 
The expansion of agency is notably addressed in Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter which 
attributes an agency to things: ‘thing-power.’97 Similarly, Connolly argues it is ‘plausible to 
construe human agency as an emergent phenomenon, with some nonhuman processes 
possessing attributes bearing family resemblances to human agency and with human agency 
understood by reference to its emergence from non-human processes of proto-agency.’98 But 
the archaeologist Malafouris raises the critique that, if the agentic field is to be 
reconceptualised, the problem then arises of where to draw the boundary as everything could 
be implicated in the spreading agency. What was once delimited by an easy inside/outside 
boundary of the human ego needs redrawing. As a result, Malafouris argues we should not 
ask what is an agent but ‘when is an agent?’ as ‘what’ implies a universal property or 
substance whereas ‘when’ implies a distributed agentic property. 99 
Rethinking of intentionality led from the fact that intention, traditional conceived, 
differentiated the mental and physical because intentional states were always of or about 
things. The problem with this, however, was that things seemed not to actively participate in 
this thinking nor shaped it in any real sense. Nor can things themselves have intentional 
states. Ingold identifies the root of the problem as a dependence on a hylomorphic ontology 
                                               
94 Ibid., 94 
95 Seigworth and Gregg, Affect Theory Reader, 6. 
96 Appadaurai, Social Life of Things, 3. 
97 Bennett, Vibrant Matter. 
98 Connolly, World of Becoming, 23. 
99 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind, 147. 
 1 – The Affect of the Turn to Affect 
Page 37 of 240 
of active mind over passive matter.100 So some seek different ontologies. Ingold draws on 
Deleuze and Guattari to replace this hylomorphism with an ontology that ‘assigns primacy to 
the processes of formation as against their final products, and to the flows and 
transformations of materials as against states of matter.’ Malafouris argues for an ‘intention-
in-action’ which is differentiated from a ‘prior intention’ and that the intention is now in the 
action.101 This means the activity and the intentional state are inseparable together with the 
boundary between the mental and the physical. A view shared by Smail who argues for a de-
privileging of human intentions in making history, noting how great changes often emerge 
unintentionally, a process described by the concept of exaptation – for example, an 
unintentional effect of census-makers was to consolidate a focus on identity as they were 
required for the census completion.102 
These greatly expand the field of affect from merely the felt emotions of an intentional 
subject to the vast realm of materiality that generates ‘renewed materialisms.’103 Malafouris 
argued that archaeology, specifically cognitive archaeology, is the discipline that should carry 
the main burden of this transformation in materialism with its concern for the material object. 
The goal of cognitive archaeology was ‘to incorporate mental, ideational, symbolic and other 
such elements into theories about prehistoric peoples.’104 Inscriptions on ancient tablets are 
not records of mental states but are extensions of those states: material facts like clay’s fast 
drying time and inalterability once dried shaped the cognition as much as the cognition 
shaped the tablet. Cognition and action arise at the same time and human thinking is not 
something that occurs inside a brain, body or thing but something that ‘emerges from 
contextualised processes that take place “between” brain, bodies and things.’105 This 
materialism is combined with the redefined body so that objects get transformed into 
‘emotional anchors’ that ‘help people to construct a material order of emotions and feelings 
that gradually forms an ecology of relationships and expectations about the self and 
others.’106 
These renewed materialisms also foreground questions of temporality. Gosden’s Social 
Being and Time (1994) focuses on the long-term past, on deep history, which is 
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conceptualised as layers of habitualities both material and temporal. But a single linear notion 
of time is inadequate for understanding this long-term human past. Instead, Gosden sees the 
present as ‘a point of oscillation between past styles of action and thought and the potentials 
held by the future.’107 Similarly, Hodder’s book Entangled, is fundamentally about time. He 
analyses Heidegger’s discussion of the jug stating there is a hint it’s being might be defined 
by temporality, by its duration. Things endure over different temporalities and the temporality 
of things is central. Hodder argues, ‘things are organised into sequences and humans get 
drawn into these chains, waiting for one thing to happen before another step can be taken.’108 
Perhaps the potential of affect theory lay not in a reified ‘Affect’ but in this identification 
and renewed understanding of immanent being in the world that is manifested by the affects 
defined now as interactive configurations of materiality prior to traditional separations of 
body/mind, subject/object, cause/effect, etc. What is sought is a binding ‘before’ or ‘prior’ to 
such separations in order that different separations could be effected. Such configurations 
open to different possibilities of analysing such bindings and understandings of the 
enmeshments of biology and culture after a period of enmity between these two fields. Such 
an approach is perhaps most powerful when it manifests those circular bindings where 
attempts to extricate oneself merely enmesh one deeper or the very thing that allures and 
binds is the thing which kills the allure, like Sedgwick and Frank’s analysis of conceptual 
impasses or Berlant’s ‘cruel optimism.’109 
CRITIQUES 
The question arises, however, of whether there are finite, ‘basic’ entanglements or whether 
they are all individual, so sui generis as to preclude any synchronic or diachronic 
comparison? Can we think bindings within a set of 2<n<∞ and not as reductive binaries or 
trivializing infinitizations? Is there some bond that remains the same across differences that 
would allow non-reductive cross-cultural comparison and permit questions of ethics and 
history? These questions give rise to some of the main themes of critiques of the turn to 
affect. First that affect, particularly in the Massumi vector, came to signify almost anything. 
For example, Lawrence Grossberg argued 
[affect] has come to serve, now, too often as a “magical” term. So, if something has 
effects that are, let’s say, non-representational then we can just describe it as “affect.” 
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So, I think there is a lot of theorizing that does not do the harder work of specifying 
modalities and apparatuses of affect, or distinguishing affect from other sorts of non-
semantic effects.110 
The result, he argued, particularly in those who used Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology in 
concrete work, is ‘a leap from a set of ontological concepts to a description of an empirical 
and affective context.’111 What this fails to do, is ‘analysing the articulations between (and 
hence, the difference between, as well as how one gets from) the ontological and the 
“empirical.” ’112 
Another criticism is affect theory’s rapprochement with life sciences often remains at the 
popular science level, citing popular science books by a few prominent scientists, rather than 
engaging seriously at the wider level of journal papers. As Reddy has argued: 
my principal frustration with reading popularisers is that they offer a candidate theory 
to explain the trends in research as if this candidate were already recognised as the 
unchallenged, new explanation of brain and mind functioning. They systematically 
downplay the diversity of the research, in order to extrapolate dramatic answers from 
a select number of recent, fashionable breakthroughs.113 
And, as Plamper notes, most affect theorists, 
draw upon a small number of popularizing texts: counting generously, in Connolly’s 
A World of Becoming it is eleven, in Bennett’s Vibrant Matter eighteen. Most of these 
references are not articles, but books by the popularisers, and they are all based on 
LeDoux’s hypothesis of the two roads to fear, on Damasio’s Somatic Markers, on 
mirror neurons, and also sometimes on the Libet experiment.114 
But perhaps the most vocal critic of the turn to affect is Ruth Leys. Her main complaint is 
that most affect theorists conceive affect or emotion (Leys questions the distinction between 
the two) as ‘inherently independent of meaning and intention.’115 Affects then become ‘a set 
of innate, automatically triggered brain-body behaviours and expressions operating outside 
the domain of consciousness and intentional action.’116 Leys then sets these ‘non-intentional’ 
or ‘non-cognitivist’ theorists of affect (exemplified by Silvan Tomkins and his student Paul 
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Ekman) against her preferred cognitivist-intentional theorists that concentrate on ‘one’s 
intentions with regard to objects or of the meanings those objects might have for one.’117 For 
example, Lazarus, who argued ‘viewing stressful films could induce powerful emotional and 
physiological responses that depended crucially on the viewer’s appraisals, beliefs, and 
coping styles.’118 Her personal favourite (who will become even more central to her book The 
Ascent of Affect) is Alan J. Fridlund who made intentionality central to his account of the 
emotions in his ‘behavioural ecology’ theory. This argued ‘humans and nonhuman animals 
produce facial behaviours or displays when it is strategically advantageous for them to do so 
and not at other times, because displays are dynamic and often highly plastic social and 
communicative signals.’119 As a result, 
facial movements should not be viewed as expressions of hard-wired, discrete internal 
emotions leaking out into the external world, as Tomkins and Ekman claim, but as 
meaningful behaviours that have evolved in order to communicate motives in an 
ongoing interpersonal or interindividual context or transaction.120 
This intentionalist interpretation of affect forces ‘thick descriptions of life experience of 
the kind that are familiar to anthropologists and novelists but are widely held to be inimical to 
science.’ Leys adds one is therefore obliged ‘to engage with an array of very difficult 
questions about the nature of intentionality, including the intentionality of nonhuman 
animals, which have traditionally belonged to the domain of philosophy.’121 
But are these not exactly the kind of questions the turn to affect were concerned with? Do 
Sedgwick and Frank not produce, in their reading of Tomkins, ‘thick descriptions’ of life 
experience even comparing Tomkins at one point to the novelist Proust? And is it not unfair 
to criticise scientists for not producing ‘thick descriptions of life experience’ that 
anthropologists and novelists do? Would this not be like criticising novelists for not 
experimenting on rats? Furthermore, when one closely examines Leys’s ‘alternative’ in 
Fridlund, their proposal starts to appear not that different from those she critiques. For what 
ultimately is the difference between a set of behaviours, movements and relations labelled 
‘fear,’ and a behavioural ecology view of this same behaviour as ‘readiness to submit or 
escape’? Is not fear a readiness to submit or escape? Of course, the difference is not just 
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terminological, in question is the possibility of the contribution of any understanding of this 
behaviour from a biological perspective and the elements that can be included in this 
behaviour. It is a question of who or what can contribute to bindings that, unfortunately, 
seems to be based more on disciplinary myopia and boundary policing. And, in privileging 
the anthropological, the same problem nevertheless arises of whether there are ‘basic 
behaviours’ that have evolved to communicate basic motives. Are these configurations of a 
shared materiality so individual as to obviate any attempt at biological study of the 
neurological components, so different as to limit any cross-cultural comparison? Perhaps 
what is missing here is an account of how behaviours are named and bound to their 
configurations of materiality, how words are bound to series of bodily movements and 
feelings in a changing external environment. That displays are highly plastic has not been 
contested by either Sedgwick and Frank or Massumi, the only question is to what extent this 
plasticity obtains. 
Moreover, Leys is perhaps too quick to group Sedgwick and Frank and Massumi and most 
other affect scholars into this all too neat binary of intentional/non-intentional where 
intentionality or cognition become reified such that there is a digitalization: either there is 
intention/cognition or there is not. It does most violence, perhaps, to the nuance and 
intentional self-reflection of Sedgwick and Frank, but to both, moreover, it neglects their 
insistence on relationality, entanglements, intermixtures and interweaving of affect. Instead, 
pushed to an extreme, Leys characterises these thinkers as effecting an absolute separation 
between affect and cognition/intentionality. Is it possible to think both the union and 
distinction of affect and cognition? To ignore this question puts us back in the familiar 
territory of essentialism versus constructionism and the n=2 or n=∞ in the choice between 
intentional/anti-intentional where the intentional can only be conceived as a trivializing 
infinitizing of all the combinable elements of a solely anthropological or novelistic world. 
A final problem in this debate is that key terms like cognition, affect, emotion, agency and 
intention become so differently defined as to make comparison and critique of positions 
difficult.122 The diffusion of agency in affect theory throughout the organism and its 
environment (such as Bennett’s Vibrant Matter), and affects as bindings prior to any 
separation of agent and patient, need not be anti-intentional but a differently conceived, 
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distributed agency and intentionality that opens to the possibility of conceiving agents other 
than the traditional substantial, ego pure to itself. Leys seems to aggrieve this loss of the 
traditional emotional subject purely present to itself. 
OVERCOMING, IMPLICATING OR NEGLECTING PAST METAPHYSICS? 
Ultimately, the reasons for the debate arise from a difference in concepts and underlying 
philosophies. For Leys, affect is equivalent to emotion and emotions are of a purely self-
present ego with its intentionality acting in the world that depend on active ego/passive 
matter rather than any complex, mutually affecting enmeshment of the two. This overlooks 
most affect theorists’ heritage in post-structuralist critiques of the subject. And yet in some 
affect theorists, there seems to be a residual implication in past metaphysics that critiques of 
the subject tried to overcome. Implicated because much of the discussion of affect is still 
dominated by bindings and blendings that can only be conceived as relations of active and 
passive and where the expansion of the concept of affect in its distinction to emotion from 
merely human emotions of a purely present self-ego to more general (re-)configurations of 
materiality that would equally apply to assemblages of animate and inanimate has yet to fully 
permeate conceptions of affect. As we will see, this ‘expansion’ will actually turn out to be a 
‘return’ to the πάθος of ancient Greek philosophy after its narrowing by Latin translations of 
the term. 
Evidence of such active/passive is in Tomkins, quoted in Shame and the Cybernetic Fold 
where a series of pairs such as ‘If you like to be looked at and I like to look at you’ represent 
a pairing conceived as active/passive with the problem I am reduced to merely the opposite of 
the other and not qualitatively different.123 Meanwhile, Scheer, despite her attempt to thing 
emotions as the establishing of causality, writes ‘like thoughts, emotions are active and 
passive in that they can be a more or less voluntary sentiment, but they can also emerge from 
the receptiveness that dispositions create.’124 Or Solomon, ‘we are not merely passive victims 
of our emotions but quite active in cultivating and constituting them.’125 Probyn seems to 
ascribe an agency and causality to affects as active that then risks understanding ‘us’ as 
passive: 
a general gesture to Affect won’t do the trick. If we want to invigorate our concepts, 
we need to follow through on what different affects do, at different levels. The point 
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needs to be stressed: different affects make us feel, write, think and act in different 
ways.126 
If affects are to be thought as bindings that precede separations of agent/patient, is it true 
to say affects act? Perhaps this continued prevalence of active/passive stems from the 
influence of Spinoza who is read as saying affect is a capacity to affect or be affected, 
expressed in the active/passive voice. Although, as we will see, this coupling has a much 
older heritage. This conceptualisation persists throughout the introduction to Gregg and 
Seigworth’s Affect Theory Reader: ‘Affect arises in the midst of in betweenness: in the 
capacities to act and be acted upon’;127 ‘affect as potential: a body’s capacity to affect and to 
be affected.’128 Such a persistence overlooks the attempt by Sedgwick and Frank and 
Massumi to overcome the dominance of this active/passive: in Sedgwick and Frank by the 
blending of analog and digital; in Massumi, with the positing of affect as that which 
ontologically precedes the distinction between active/passive. 
What is required, therefore, is to manifest why the active/passive so doggedly haunts the 
discourse on affects as well as the difference of affects to emotions, passions, sensations or 
feelings. The task requires a genealogy of the concepts to better manifest their implication in 
the past metaphysics that continues to haunt the debate. The next stage in this journey will be 
to show how the roots of the turn to affect can be located in three key thinkers of post-
structuralism that link it to previous philosophies: Deleuze’s source in Spinoza, and Derrida 
and Irigaray’s source in Heidegger’s concept of auto-affection which in turn derives from 
Affekt as translation of πάθος.
                                               
126 Probyn, ‘Writing Shame,’ 74. 
127 Gregg and Seigworth, Affect Theory Reader, 1. 
128 Ibid., 2 

 2 – The Affect of Auto-Affection: Derrida, Deleuze, Irigaray, Heidegger 
Page 45 of 240 
2 
THE AFFECT OF AUTO-AFFECTION: DERRIDA, DELEUZE, 
IRIGARAY, HEIDEGGER 
The previous chapter understood the turn to affect as reacting against a sedimented 
theorism inherited from post-structuralism; in particular, the perceived centrality of language 
as the only model for understanding representation, bipolar transitive relations that can only 
be arbitrarily paired and anti-essentialisms that opposed any notions of a biological body. 
But, at the same time, as a project that sought to continue the critique or deconstruction of the 
self-certain subject. Balibar summarises how this critique united disparate philosophical 
projects: 
the ‘critique of the philosophies of the subject’ (or, more precisely, ‘the originary 
subject, referring to an ideal lineage that connects statements from Descartes, Kant, 
and Husserl) constituted the point of intersection (but also of friction) between the 
discourses of phenomenological (or post-phenomenological) deconstruction of the 
‘metaphysics’ of foundation, the structuralist ‘decentring’ of the immediate data of 
consciousness, and the Marxist, Freudian, or Nietzschean critiques of the ‘illusions’ 
that beset the claims of consciousness to truth.129 
The turn to affect continued this critique by attempting an account of the affects, emotions 
and feelings of this deconstructed or decentred, error-prone subject. For Sedgwick, Frank and 
Massumi it was a question of conceptualizing an affective non-coincidence with self whether 
through the self-difference of affects or the separation of affect and affections. 
But why affect? Of all the concepts around that time, why does affect emerge as the 
concept around which the turn revolves? We saw in the last chapter how affect enabled a 
return to the body and its non-linguistic aspects, a reengagement with natural sciences and a 
challenge to the dominance of arbitrary binaries for a focus on how things bind and 
differentiate. But why not emotion or sensation? And why the confusion over the identity or 
difference of affect to these other terms? 
This chapter argues that affect emerged because of its central importance to three key 
thinkers of the critique of philosophies of the subject. Whilst this is most clearly evidenced in 
Deleuze and his reading of Spinoza, affect is also central to Derrida and Irigaray through the 
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concept of auto-affection introduced by Heidegger. Whilst there are many differences 
between these three thinkers – notably Derrida and Irigaray’s continuance of the 
Heideggerian theme of the ‘end of metaphysics’ and its overcoming whereas Deleuze sees 
himself as a ‘pure metaphysician’ interested in the as yet undiscovered metaphysics of 
modern science130 – all three authors will understand auto-affection as, most generally, a 
binding of difference between a ‘one that is two’ often described using the Greek term 
heteros meaning other but other specifically as one of two not one of many (allos). In 
question will be what binds this heteros in its difference. 
ORIGINS OF AUTO-AFFECTION 
The term auto-affection was introduced by Heidegger in Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics.131 He coined it to describe Kant’s split in subjectivities that co-exist: the 
transcendental, logical ‘I think’ and the empirical, intuitive form: the ‘I that I think,’ pure 
apperception, differs from the ‘I that intuits itself’.132 Communication between the two is 
through affect: ‘we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected.’133 The form of this 
inner sense is time which leads Heidegger to state ‘time as pure self-affection forms the 
essential structure of subjectivity.’134 Kant says ‘the standing and lasting I (of pure 
apperception) constitutes the correlate of all our representations’135 and ‘time itself does not 
elapse, but the existence of that which is changeable elapses in it.’136. Heidegger glosses this 
as it is only on the basis of this transcendental ‘abiding and unchanging’ that ‘an object is 
capable of being experienced as remaining the same through change,’137 this experience of 
change arising through empirical intuition. The subject perceives itself through the way in 
which it remains the same through change, the way change affects the unchanging. Auto-
affection is thus the temporal difference within the self and the self is temporal self-
difference. 
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But before being named as such the idea of auto-affection had a long and privileged place 
in philosophy as spontaneity and self-enclosure, the ‘noble’ auto-affection privileged over 
any causation by something other or external, any ‘hetero-affection.’ As Nietzsche remarked: 
everything of the first rank must be causa sui. Origin in something else counts as an 
objection, as casting a doubt on value. All supreme values are of the first rank, all the 
supreme concepts [...] all that cannot have become, must therefore be causa sui.138 
DERRIDA: AUTO-HETERO-AFFECTION 
Derrida links directly the question of auto-affection with the analysis of the touching-
touched relation in Husserl that binds myself to myself as toucher and touched and which 
ensures the passage to meaningful sensations, emotions and the very experience of self itself. 
Derrida characterises this experience as ‘auto-affection’ which he describes as: 
a universal structure of experience. All living things are capable of auto-affection. 
And only a being capable of symbolizing, that is to say of auto-affecting, may let 
itself be affected by the other in general. Auto-affection is the condition of an 
experience in general. This possibility – another name for ‘life’ – is a general 
structure articulated by the history of life and leading to complex and hierarchical 
operations.139 
An example of such auto-affection is given in Derrida’s analysis of Husserl on ‘hearing-
oneself-speak.’ Derrida characterises this as ‘an auto-affection of an absolutely unique type’ 
because Husserl claims that, through this auto-affection, 
the subject is able to hear himself or speak to himself, is able to let himself be affected 
by the signifier that he produces without any detour through the agency of exteriority, 
of the world, or of the non-proper in general. Every other form of auto-affection must 
either pass through the non-proper or renounce universality.140 
Derrida will deconstruct this ‘pure’ auto-affection for an originary auto-hetero-affection in 
which in affecting myself, I affect something other in myself; I do not coincide with myself 
but actually require a detour through an exteriority internal to me as the other in me. To 
further understand this deconstruction, let us consider another example in Derrida’s reading 
of Husserl’s phenomenological approach on the question of intersubjectivity in Cartesian 
Meditations. There, Husserl argued that I differentiate myself from others through a self-
founding in ‘a peculiar kind of epoché’ where we ‘disregard all constitutional effects of 
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intentionality relating immediately or mediately to other subjectivity’ and limit ourselves to a 
‘sphere of peculiar ownness’ that we constitute within ourselves. This yields a primary 
‘founding stratum,’ a ‘unitarily coherent stratum of the phenomenon world’ in which nothing 
other exists.141 In this reduction, my own body proper [Leib] is ‘uniquely singled out’ as the 
only body [Körper] that is ‘not just a body but precisely an animate organism [Leib].’ It is the 
‘sole Object within my abstract world-stratum to which, in accordance with experience, I 
ascribe fields of sensation’ and in which I ‘“rule and govern” immediately.’142 I rule and 
govern because I am perceptually active and can experience ‘all of Nature, including my own 
animate organism [Leiblichkeit]’ because my Leib is ‘reflexively related to itself’ – I can 
touch one hand with the other, touch my eye with my hand, see my hand with my eye, etc. It 
is this broader self-reflexivity that gives ‘the ownness-essence of the Objective phenomenon: 
“I, as this man.” ’143 In this reduction, I obtain my animate organism [Leib], my psyche and 
my psycho-physical unity in which ‘my personal Ego who operates in this animate organism 
and, “by means of” it, in the “external world.” ’144 
Derrida shows how this reflexivity actually necessitates a ‘detour by way of the foreign 
outside,’145 a detour through this Körper that implies a ‘spacing’ between me and myself, 
which enables ‘me’ to say this is ‘my’ Körper, a unity of ‘my’ psychic and physical which 
makes it my Leib. Given this spacing, Derrida asks ‘shouldn’t a certain introjective empathy, 
a certain “intersubjectivity,” already have introduced an other [...] to give rise to an 
experience of the body proper allowing one to say, “it is I,” “this is my body”?’146 If so, we 
should therefore reintroduce ‘the inanimate, “material nature,” as well as death, the non-
living, the nonpsychical in general, language, rhetoric, technics and so forth’ into this 
phenomenological sphere of ownness.147 Because auto-affection is self-enclosed yet requires 
a detour through an outside within the self-enclosure, it introduces an alterity right into the 
very place it was most thought to be excluded, inside for-itselfness. Any pure auto-affection 
is therefore always already an auto-hetero-affection, the affection of something other in me. 
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Derrida can thus be read as continuing Husserl’s phenomenological analyses but where the 
analyses turn toward this paradoxical auto-hetero-affection in all its maddening guises: as a 
one that is two in difference, often exemplified through language and its contranyms such as 
pharmakon or the supplement.148 Now this ‘one that is two’ has historically been conceived 
as bound together by the active and passive – for example, active toucher, passive touched – 
in which the active is privileged. This leads to the positing of purely active entities that can 
only act on something else but cannot be acted on (God, Plato’s Ideas, Authentic 
Temporality, etc.) and/or purely passive entities (matter). In Husserl, this took the form of a 
purely active ego acting in the world or, on itself which was split into an active toucher and 
passive touched. Derrida also includes past conceptions of time within this critique of pure 
auto-affection in a discussion of early Heidegger, where this pure activity became primordial 
temporality: 
The extraordinary trembling to which classical ontology is subjected in Sein and Zeit 
still remains within the grammar and lexicon of metaphysics. And all the conceptual 
pairs of opposites which serve the destruction of ontology are ordered around one 
fundamental axis: that which separates the authentic from the inauthentic and, in the 
very last analysis, primordial from fallen temporality.149 
But what is the affect of auto-affection? It seems able to describe the touching-touched, 
hearing-oneself speak, self-reflexivity in general even though Husserl does not use the term 
affect (Affekt) in Cartesian Meditations, Logical Investigations, Ideas I or II. Or it 
characterises the relation of time to itself. So is touch an affect? Speaking? Time? The affect 
of auto-affection would then seem to function as the most general, capacious term that can 
signify all these things in their relation to something other. If Derrida’s On Touching 
described a shift from logocentrism to haptocentrism (the privileging of touch over all the 
other senses in the metaphysical tradition) does Derrida’s work therefore manifest an 
affectcentrism? But an affectcentrism that remains implicit and in which affect remains 
largely unconceptualized and relatively undifferentiated from related terms like emotion and 
passion. 
Let us turn then to where Derrida explicitly speaks of emotions and passions to see if it 
can help clarify these terms from affect and, in so doing, clarify Derrida’s understanding of 
affect. In Of Grammatology, Derrida discusses Rousseau's theory of the origin of 
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metaphorical and literal language. In this discussion, the problem of activity and passivity 
appears again in the question of whether passions are active and causal and the question of 
the metaphorical and the literal. Rousseau writes: 
Upon meeting others, a savage man will initially be frightened. Because of his fear he 
sees the others as bigger and stronger than himself. He calls them giants. After many 
experiences, he recognises that these so-called giants are neither bigger nor stronger 
than he. Their stature does not approach the idea he had initially attached to the word 
giant. So he invents another name common to them and to him, such as the name 
man, for example, and leaves giant to the fictitious object that had impressed him 
during his illusion. That is how the figurative word is born before the literal word, 
when our gaze is held in passionate fascination; and how it is that the first idea it 
conveys to us is not that of the truth.150 
The active and passive is, therefore, already on the scene as Rousseau writes: ‘because of 
his fear he sees the others as bigger and stronger than himself’: fear is attributed a causal role. 
Derrida glosses this as: ‘fear makes me see giants where there are only men.’ ‘Fear’ is thus 
something which makes (me see giants) or is made (in me by the first sight of other men). 
The passions are attributed a causal role that bind self to world in a binding of active/passive. 
No doubt this arises from ‘passion’ itself which conceptually denotes a ‘passivity’ often in 
opposition to action. 
But Derrida challenges such a reading by interpreting Rousseau using the discourse of 
Saussurean linguistics and metaphor: 
Before it allows itself to be caught by verbal signs, metaphor is the relation between 
signifier and signified within the order of ideas and things, according to what links the 
idea with that of which it is the idea, that is to say, of which it is already the 
representative sign. Then, the literal or proper meaning will be the relationship of the 
idea to the affect that it expresses. And it is the inadequation of the designation 
(metaphor) which properly expresses the passion. If fear makes me see giants where 
there are only men, the signifier – as the idea of the object – will be metaphoric, but 
the signifier of my passion will be literal. And if I then say, ‘I see giants,’ that false 
designation will be a literal expression of my fear.151 
An expression of fear is thus a simultaneity of literal and metaphorical, of giant and man, 
as well as a relation to time or at least repetition in the fact that it is only with repeated 
exposure that the ‘giants’ are finally acknowledged as ‘men.’ As Terada clarifies in her 
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reading of emotion in post-structuralism, this ‘inadequation of the designation’ ‘properly 
expresses’ the passion because: it is ‘the difference between the sign’s falseness with respect 
to its object and its accuracy with respect to its idea that represents the passion.’152 Passion, 
then, is self-difference, a difference of true, literal expressions of false designations. 
Derrida therefore challenges the simple active//passive binary of past metaphysics and the 
question of the causality of the passions through a focus on difference. Differences between 
literal and metaphorical, self and world, subject and object become no longer differences of 
active and passive but more originary, prior to the distinction between active and passive and 
produced by what Derrida calls différance (combining senses in French of differing and 
deferring): ‘differences, thus, are ‘produced’ – deferred – by différance.’ But shifting agency 
to différance merely raises the question of  ‘what defers or who defers? In other words, what 
is différance?’153 It is again a question of causality and identity: does différance act? Derrida 
recognises that to shift causality onto différance would mean that 
différance has been derived, has happened, is to be mastered and governed on the 
basis of the point of a present being, which itself could be something, a form, a state, 
a power in the world to which all kinds of names might be given, a what, or a present 
being as a subject, a who.154 
Within this alternate conception, passions are no longer ‘passive’ in opposition to an 
active entity, nor causal in themselves, but, differential, differences between literal and 
metaphorical that are ‘produced’ (the verb is in quotations for reasons that will shortly 
become apparent), differed or deferred by différance that manifest the metaphorical in the 
literal. 
Derrida further explains how différance evades the binding of active/passive through 
reference to the grammatical ‘middle voice’ (something that will become significant to 
Chapter 4): 
We will see why that which lets itself be designated différance is neither simply active 
nor simply passive, announcing or rather recalling something like the middle voice, 
saying an operation that is not an operation, an operation that cannot be conceived 
either as passion or as the action of a subject on an object, or on the basis of the 
categories of agent or patient, neither on the basis of nor moving toward any of these 
terms. For the middle voice, a certain nontransitivity, may be what philosophy, at its 
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outset, distributed into an active and a passive voice, thereby constituting itself by 
means of this repression.155 
Yet within Derrida’s analysis of Rousseau, the signifier of fear is nevertheless ‘the 
signifier of my passion’? How is this ‘my’ produced, this sense of ownership? Through 
difference with différance as its dynamic centre that displaces the centrality of the subject as 
a purely self-present entity. I am only able to say my fear to the extent that this fear is not 
strictly causal but an ‘effect’ of différance, an auto-hetero-affection that produces a sense of 
ownership. These ‘effects’ don’t find their cause in a subject or a substance, in a thing in 
general or a passion, a being that is somewhere purely present that would elude the play of 
différance.  
Whilst the system of différance no longer tolerates the opposition of activity and passivity, 
or cause and effect, and treats consciousness not as ‘the absolutely central form of Being but 
as a “determination” and as an “effect,” ’ Derrida continues to use these terms (in quotation 
marks) because ‘one continues [...] to operate according to the lexicon of that which one is 
de-limiting.’156 
It is thus not fear that makes me see giants but a more originary différance that ‘produces’ 
the difference between me and world, giants and men, metaphorical and literal which is the 
passion. Différance, remaining in endless differing and deferral, and not an originary identity, 
nevertheless leaves a trace of itself in the world. Fear is a supplementary structure 
(augmenting and replacing simultaneously) in which it gives the subject as the subject 
exceeds itself. 
Others, particularly Lacan and Zizek, have argued it is precisely this discontinuity or 
decentring that is subjectivity. Responding to this view, Derrida argues 
Some might say: but what we call ‘subject’ is not the absolute origin, pure will, 
identity to self, or presence to self of consciousness but precisely this noncoincidence 
with self. This is a riposte to which we'll have to return. By what right do we call this 
‘subject’? By what right, conversely, can we be forbidden from calling this ‘subject’? 
I am thinking of those today who would try to reconstruct a discourse around a 
subject that would not be predeconstructive, around a subject that would no longer 
include the figure of mastery of self, of adequation to self, centre and origin of the 
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world, etc. … but which would define the subject rather as the finite experience of 
non-identity to self.157 
Derrida resists this move as it would not deconstruct the historical binding of subjectivity 
with the human and preclude ‘subjectivity’ being broadened again to the animal, vegetal the 
inorganic, ‘nothing should be excluded’: 
Why have I rarely spoken of the ‘subject’ or of ‘subjectivity,’ but rather, here and 
there, only of ‘an effect’ of ‘subjectivity’? Because the discourse on the subject, even 
if it locates difference, inadequation, the dehiscence within auto-affection, etc., 
continues to link subjectivity with man. Even if it acknowledges that the ‘animal’ is 
capable of auto-affection (etc.), this discourse nevertheless does not grant it 
subjectivity – and this concept thus remains marked by all the presuppositions that I 
have just recalled.158 
We see that, for Derrida, the critique of the subject takes the form of positing a non-
temporal ‘before’ the subject-object (and active/passive, cause-effect, etc.) divide and seeks 
to deconstruct the narrowing of subjectivity to the human. 
DELEUZE’S SPINOZA: ONTOLOGICAL AFFECTS 
If affect remains relatively unconceived in Derrida, with Deleuze this is less the case. He, 
perhaps more than most, has exhibited what he means by affect through his engagement with 
Spinoza. Throughout Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza as well as his own philosophy, it is 
again essential to keep in mind the seemingly paradoxical two that is one, separate yet unified 
and is perhaps where most criticisms of Deleuze’s affect as pure, as absolutely separate from 
cognition arise. This might give the impression of a dualism, but the important point is that 
for difference at least two are required: ‘there must be at least two multiplicities, two types, 
from the outset. This is not because dualism is better than unity but because the multiplicity is 
precisely what happens between the two.’159 But Deleuze’s difference is more radical than the 
difference between two pre-existing identities. Deleuze argued difference had always been 
subordinated to identity and, as with Derrida, Deleuze inverts this so that identity becomes 
something produced by a more originary difference. 
In his lectures on Spinoza in 1978, Deleuze argues the two most important concepts in 
Spinoza are affect and power. Let us begin with affect. Deleuze first highlights the distinction 
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Spinoza makes between affectus (affect) and affectio (affection) criticising those who fail to 
respect this difference or who translate affectus as feeling [sentiment]. For Deleuze (and 
Massumi), affectus is not feeling [sentiment] and would be better translated by the French 
(and English) ‘affect.’ Spinoza defined affectus thus: ‘By affect [affectus] I understand the 
affections [affectiones] of the body by which the body’s power of activity is increased or 
diminished, assisted or checked, together with the ideas of these affections [affectionum]’160. 
Deleuze explains: 
I would say that for Spinoza there is a continuous variation – and this is what it means 
to exist – of the force of existing or of the power of acting .... An affect is a 
continuous variation of the force of existing, insofar as this variation is determined by 
the ideas one has.161 
Affect is a mode of thought that in itself represents nothing. For example, with love, there 
is the idea of the loved thing but love itself represents nothing. Ideas determine the variation 
but ‘determined’ here does not mean that variation is reducible to the ideas one has, nor is it a 
question of comparison. It is a fall or rise in the power of acting, a continuous variation which 
defines affect ‘in its correlation with ideas and at the same time in its difference in nature 
from ideas.’162 This understanding of affect will remain consistent throughout Deleuze’s 
work. 
Affection, affectio, meanwhile, is ‘a state of a body insofar as it is subject to the action of 
another body.’163 For example, in feeling the sun on me, this affection of the body ‘is not the 
sun, but the action of the sun or the effect of the sun on you’; ‘a mixture of two bodies, one 
body which is said to act [agir] on another, and the other receives [recueillir] the trace of the 
first. Every mixture of bodies will be termed an affection.’164 The active/passive thus belongs 
to the realm of affections, not affect. Affection envelops affect not as a comparison of mind 
but as a lived passage: ‘every affection envelops the passage by which we arrive at it, and by 
which we leave it, towards another affection, however close the two affections considered 
are.’ Deleuze gives the example of being in a dark room and someone turning on a light: ‘the 
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affection is the dark state and the lighted state. Two successive affections, in cuts. The 
passage is the lived transition from one to the other.’165 
The difference between affect (affectus) and affection (affectio) is not that one refers to the 
body and the other to the mind but that between ‘the body’s affection and idea which 
involves the nature of the external body, and the affect, which involves an increase or 
decrease in the power of acting, for the mind and body alike’166. This helps clarify those 
critiques like Leys who argue Massumi, in his Deleuzian distinction between affect and 
emotion merely repeats a dualism of body/mind.167 
A further split (and one without which Deleuze says we can understand nothing of Ethics) 
is the two registers Spinoza works in in discussing bodies. A body for Spinoza is 
‘permanence of a relation of movement and rest through all the changes which affect all the 
parts.’168 But here Spinoza is working in two registers at the same time. First kinetic where 
each body ‘is defined by relations of movement and rest, of slowness and speed between 
particles.’169 This understands each living individuality, not as a form or through functions, 
but as ‘a complex relation between differential velocities, between deceleration and 
acceleration of particles.’170 Second, dynamic where each body is defined by its power of 
affecting or being affected. If kinetic means you cannot define a body by its form or function, 
dynamic means it can neither be defined as a substance or subject. For Spinoza, bodies and 
minds are modes, not substances or subjects. Hence you define, say, an animal by the affects 
of which it is capable, of what it can do and what it can undergo. Spinoza can alternate from 
dynamic to kinetic definitions because an affection destroys a relation and a body is known 
by its power of being affected. Whereas kinetic power is defined as differential relations, 
dynamic power is characterised by the active and passive, yet it is always both kinetic and 
dynamic at the same time. 
The key difficulty will be how these splits (between affect and affections, kinetic and 
dynamic powers) are bound together, how difference is bound. For, contra Leys and other 
critics of Deleuze via Massumi, there is not an absolute separation between the two in their 
difference but a separation and a determining. This determining is based on Spinoza’s 
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naming the determination of an action ‘association.’ Deleuze explains that association is ‘the 
link that unites the image of the action with an image of a thing. That is the determination of 
the action. The determination of the action is the image of a thing to which the image of the 
act is linked.’171 Deleuze gives the example of two acts: hitting his mother and hitting a bass 
drum; these are the same action in terms of bodily movements but different because of their 
associations. Every action can then be analysed along two dimensions: ‘the image of the act 
as power of the body, what a body can do, and the image of the associated thing, that is to say 
the object on which the act bears. Between the two there is a relation of association. It’s a 
logic of action.’172 It is worth remark that this association is no longer merely a binding of 
active/passive, this coupling only features in dynamic power. It is a binding of the 
active/passive dynamic and the kinetic. 
What Sedgwick and Frank admired in Tomkins and his split between object and drive, we 
can similarly see what Deleuze’s finds in Spinoza for the critique of the self-certain subject in 
the confusion of cause and effect in the passions. Given this possibility for error at the heart 
of subjectivity, it will be the goal of reason to gain adequate knowledge of the causes and 
make these passions ‘active affects.’ Spinoza does this by separating action and passion to 
argue affects as passions can be determined by reason as action: 
all the actions to which we are determined from a feeling which is a passion, we can 
be determined to do them without it (without the feeling), we can be determined to do 
them by reason. Everything that we do when pushed by passion, we can do when 
pushed by pure reason.173 
To become rational, therefore, you must first discover your affects through passions: 
the first effort of reason, you see, exactly, it is to do everything in my power in order 
to increase my power of acting, that is in order to experience passive joys, in order to 
experience the joys of passion. The joys of passion are what increase my power of 
acting according to still equivocal signs in which I don't possess this power.174 
It is through this direction toward ‘active affects’ that Deleuze introduces auto-affection to 
characterise ‘essence ideas’ in Spinoza. Deleuze discusses Spinoza’s concept of an idea, ‘a 
mode of thought defined by its representational character’ such as ‘the idea of a triangle is the 
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mode of thought that represents the triangle.’175 It has an objective reality insofar as it has a 
relation to the object it represents (extrinsic character) and a formal reality insofar as the idea 
itself is something which means I can form an idea of an idea (intrinsic character). 
There are three kinds of idea. First, affectio ideas, representations of effects without 
causes. These are inadequate ideas as they indicate the nature of the modified body not 
modifying, they are passions. Second, notion ideas. These represent ‘the internal agreement 
or disagreement of the characteristic relations of the two bodies’;176 for example, knowledge 
of arsenic and body relation: it would poison me. There are common notions such as motion 
and rest which are common to all bodies. This knowledge is a vital enterprise in which one 
begins to leave passions behind and gains power of acting. And finally, essence ideas. 
Deleuze adds, 
Ideas of the second kind and [those] of the third kind are affections of essence, but it 
would have to be said following a word that will only appear quite a bit later in 
philosophy, with the Germans for example, these are auto-affections. Ultimately, 
throughout the common notions and the ideas of the third kind, it’s essence that is 
affected by itself.177 
In essence-ideas all essences are ‘internal to one another and internal to the power called 
divine power’ and ‘since all essences are internal to one another, an essence that affects me is 
a way in which my essence affects itself.’178 Deleuze exemplifies them in reference to 
Pantheism and the sun. The first involves us saying ‘oh the sun, I love that!’ and are external 
relations act on my external relations of corpuscles. The second is a kind of communion with 
the sun. But the third is a mystical union, an intrinsic distinction which the distinct essences 
‘distinguish themselves on the inside from one another. So much so that the rays by which 
the sun affects me are the rays by which I affect myself, and the rays by which I affect myself 
are the rays of the sun that affect me. It’s solar auto-affection.’179 
Deleuze maintains there is no difference between auto-affection and active affect: ‘auto-
affections or active affects assume that we possess our power of acting and that, on such and 
such a point, we have left the domain of the passions in order to enter the domain of 
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actions.’180 When my power of acting increases or decreases, I am still separated from it, I am 
not the cause of my own affects, they are produced in me by something else and I am 
therefore in the realm of passions. But in auto-affection, ‘the power of acting is conquered 
instead of passing by all these continuous variations.’181 
We see again throughout Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza the insistence on separation and 
distinction, of the one-that-is-two and here the auto-affection, this union of the third kind is 
conceptualised through this togetherness of same/different, inside/outside. If ‘the rays by 
which the sun affects me are the rays by which I affect myself, and the rays by which I affect 
myself are the rays of the sun that affect me’ I am and am not, at the same time, of the 
essence of the sun and of the essence of myself.182 This complex identity and separation 
arises from the ontological privilege of difference, not sameness. 
IRIGARAY: MASCULINE AND FEMININE AUTO-AFFECTION 
Let us turn finally to Irigaray for her understanding of auto-affection. Her work can be 
approached through three aspects: the critique of past patriarchal thinking, how to elaborate a 
feminine subjectivity, and how to think the relation between this feminine subjectivity and 
masculine subjectivity. Crucial to this project will be manifesting a specifically feminine 
auto-affection in distinction to a masculine auto-affection. 
The critique of masculine philosophy is the critique of how ‘the paradigms of masculine 
transcendency, which is sometimes considered neutral or bisexual, must be modified in order 
to establish a feminine transcendency.’183 This involved a critique of past metaphysics, 
particularly the logic of coupled opposites and quantification, which had produced a place for 
woman in advance of her speaking, with and through her silence, as merely the opposite of 
man, the other of the same, or as the ‘sex which is not one.’ Woman was aligned with matter 
in the form/matter opposition, the passive in the active/passive, the body in the body/mind, 
each being inferior to the privileged ‘masculine’ pole. Irigaray demonstrates an example of 
such privileging in the primacy accorded to the intellect over the senses: 
Philosophy teaches the eyelids to close tighter and tighter to bar anything still 
presented by the senses, teaches the gaze to turn inward to the soul, that screen for the 
projection of ideal images. The horror of nature is magicked away: it will be seen only 
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though the blind of intelligible categories, and the weaknesses that ultimately will lay 
man low will be laid at the door of an insufficiently lofty point of view.184 
But Irigaray will not seek to reverse these oppositions or collapse them into simultaneities 
by showing how both apply to both sexes. As Judith Butler has summarised, the feminine 
must be elaborated from outside this closed system of coupled opposites as its ‘constitutive 
outside’: 
Irigaray’s task is to reconcile neither the form/matter distinction nor the distinctions 
between bodies and souls or matter and meaning. Rather, her effort is to show that 
those binary oppositions are formulated through the exclusion of a field of disruptive 
possibilities. Her speculative thesis is that those binaries, even in their reconciled 
mode, are part of a phallogo-centric economy that produces the ‘feminine’ as its 
constitutive outside. [...] The economy that claims to include the feminine as the 
subordinate term in a binary opposition of masculine/feminine excludes the feminine, 
produces the feminine as that which must be excluded for that economy to operate.185 
Irigaray pursues this critique in readings of key texts from the history of philosophy, 
notably Freud and Plato in Speculum of the Other Woman. With this critique of masculine 
philosophy, Irigaray then embarks on elaborating a female subjectivity by a woman without 
and apart from the oppositionality ascribed to her by men. For example, her work Elemental 
Passions 
offers some fragments from a woman's voyage as she goes in search of her identity in 
love. It is no longer a man in quest of his Grail, his God, his path, his identity through 
the vicissitudes of his life's journey, it is a woman [...] Between nature and culture, 
between night and day, between sun and stars, between vegetable and mineral, 
amongst men, amongst women, amongst gods, she seeks her humanity and her 
transcendency.186 
Irigaray founds this subjectivity through a self-affection which she argues is different in 
woman because of the difference of the lips of the vagina to the penis of man: 
So, when she touches herself (again), who is ‘she’? And ‘herself’? Inseparable, ‘she’ 
and ‘herself’ are part the one of the other, endlessly. They cannot really be 
distinguished, though they are not for all that the female same, nor the male same . . .. 
And even if ‘to touch oneself,’ for the masculine gender, is defined as that which 
begins to set up the distinction subject-predicate, subject-object, in the most archaic 
fashion, i.e., in the relation of attribution: x is (to, in, . . . ) y – which still allows 
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passivity to have a place in auto-affection, or else a suspension between activity and 
passivity in the attribution of being – it will never be known who/what is x, who/what 
is y in the female.187 
This conception of self-affection in feminine thus presents a challenge to the past 
masculine metaphysics coupling of opposites, especially the active/passive as it relates to the 
relation of oneself to oneself. As Irigaray writes, woman’s autoeroticism remains outside this 
active/passive: 
for woman, she touches herself in and of herself without any need for mediation, and 
before there is any way to distinguish activity from passivity. Woman ‘touches 
herself’ all the time, and moreover no one can forbid her to do so, for her genitals are 
formed of two lips in continuous contact. Thus, within herself, she is already two but 
not divisible into one(s)-that caress each other.188 
Again, it is a question of a binding, of the two that is an indivisible one in the binding of 
the lips, doubled, but which precedes or evades the couplings of active and passive. What 
then holds them together? What is this one, at once same and different? Whilst in the 
masculine, the touching-oneself would set up the active/passive, the subject/object, it is not so 
in the female. 
The difference between masculine and feminine self-affection and its consequences for 
philosophy is most clarified in In the Beginning She Was. Admitting she is not a man and 
therefore can only analyse culture in the masculine, the effects of masculine, she argues 
masculine subjectivity did not become differentiated enough from the maternal world. 
Thus the total relation that the male child has with his mother – the first other for him 
– has not been cultivated as such and, one could add, has not been submitted to a 
dialectic process.189 
This has entailed several consequences: it is by establishing a logic of coupled opposites 
that the masculine tried to emerge from the undifferentiated link with its first other, that of 
the mother. To the extent man sees his mother as merely his opposite, he has not 
differentiated from her, merely remaining the opposite of the same. Such opposites separate 
masculine subjectivity from its ‘natural and affective origin’ and become ‘substitutes for 
difference between humans belonging to the two sexes and, first, between the mother and the 
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male child.’190 Particularly in relation to the couplings central to relational life 
(active/passive, love/hatred, male/female, I/other) these impact the possibility of a reciprocity 
between people and the definition of a sexuate masculine subjectivity. Relations between 
subjects become relations between ‘“ones” or “somebodies” who are neutralised and can be 
substituted for one another.’191 
A further consequence is that affect is then seen as troubling, perturbing or disordering, 
‘imposed on the subject from the outside and … more a source of imbalance than of 
harmony, or of enriching becoming.’192 This leads to philosophies that defend against affect, 
against perturbation to become philosophies of defence against otherness and difference. One 
has to remain the same, unperturbed, unseparated, affect must be ‘reduced by a turning back 
to homeostasis.’193 This results in closed metaphysical systems where everything is reduced 
to known-in-advance positions on networks of coupled opposites that in turn leads to a 
‘closed mental world in order to protect oneself against affects.’194 
Finally, this defence against difference, particularly subjective sexuate difference, leads to 
a quantification, where difference and affect are reduced to more or less of the same, as 
increase or decrease of some pre-existing thing that takes one away from homeostasis and to 
which one must return. 
By contrast, auto-affection in the feminine is different because ‘a girl does not form a 
‘dyad’ with the mother but a real duality’ due to ‘the similarity of their bodies and their 
psyches in their relational dimensions.’195 This, however, is not enough for it risks 
perpetuating the original situation of a dependence on the mother. The duality, not dyad, of 
mother and daughter continues with the importance of the morphology of woman’s two lips 
doubled. Both mother and daughter therefore require the elaboration of another culture and 
the keeping of a transcendental dimension that cannot be overcome between the other and 
herself. A transcendental that is not deferred to 
an absolute ‘you’ of a God – who, in fact, substitutes himself for the mother, the first 
other’ as with masculine subjectivity. This allows ‘turning the sensible immediacy of 
the relation into a cultivation of affect which can save the irreducibility between the 
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other and myself, the insuperable difference between the two – the ‘you’ and the 
‘I’.196 
Yet Irigaray argues that the masculine can achieve a different auto-affection because the 
man too has lips of the mouth. This different practice of self-affection, she writes in To Be 
Born, can be further enhanced through a cultivation of breath, something she discovered in 
traditions other than those of the West with its traditional derogation of the body, in practices 
of yoga and meditation. She writes, 
Self-affection has nothing to do either with auto-eroticism or with narcissism, which 
are more familiar to us. Contemplating Buddha in meditation can lead us to glimpse 
what it is about. The matter consists of calmly staying in oneself, being silent, 
preferably with one’s eyes closed, trying to perceive and concentrate in this way one’s 
own inner energy. To succeed in this, I suggest focussing, at least in the first instance, 
one’s attention on the perception of one’s lips, one’s hands and one’s eyelids touching 
one another. Such a gesture—that I call ‘re-touch’—contributes to realizing what our 
limits are and the thresholds between the inside and the outside of the space that is 
ours, something which favours a repose in ourselves.197 
It is through such practices that a repose in or ‘return’ to oneself can be achieved. A return 
that is absent from much of Western culture which corresponds to a culture of the outside 
without suitable cultivation of the interiority of the self. This lack of interiority arises from 
the privilege of thought and intellect that prevents any cultivation of sensible immediacy. It is 
no coincidence, Irigaray argues, that the earliest reference of Greek culture, the Odyssey, tells 
both of the departure of Odysseus and his eventual return home. But, she argues, this return is 
not a return to himself and certainly not a return to any sexuate relation with his wife. She 
writes, 
With this first epic of Greek culture, love is already becoming an institution bound to 
the πόλις. And lovers already obey external public rules as much as, if not more than, 
their own affects. They are moving away from nature, from the body, from the 
economy of affects, and are becoming subjected to external laws.198 
Nevertheless, she argues, Odysseus still manifests a self-affection: he is moved, weeps, 
worries and these are expressed in the form of the middle voice, ‘a morphological form which 
expresses that he is affected in himself, with himself, outside of the economy of the pair of 
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opposites: active-passive.’199 The middle-voice is again invoked, as with Derrida, as 
linguistic exemplar of this binding that precedes the active and passive. But Odysseus’s self-
affections often happen in secret, with a certain loneliness and without an other to share the 
affect. It will be through a cultivation of self-affection not as conceived by masculine 
philosophies but by a feminine subjectivity, and in the relation of one to the other, that 
Irigaray will present an alternative to this masculine metaphysics. 
With this sexuate difference, Irigaray then moves on to the relation between the sexes. If 
the heteros can be related to forms of the body, at once the same and other, of the lips, hands 
and eyelids, it can also be applied to the relation between the sexes, the one as one of two. 
The relation between the two is significant because 
these forms are necessary for passing from the solitary self-affection that can happen 
with the lips, the hands, the eyelids touching one another to the self-affection that can 
exist between two sexuate bodies in kissing or embracing. This represents a crucial 
stage in going from oneself as individual to community without losing the possibility 
of staying in oneself that self-affection grants.200 
To encourage this separation yet union of two that is one, we must practice a sort of 
‘negative ontology’ in meeting the other so that 
the matter is no longer one of learning how to integrate each being into an already 
existing totality, but of lingering on it, posing wondering about it and deconstructing 
what it represents for ourselves until we return to its living singularity, the one which 
exists before any human making and which develops with forms of its own.201 
This can be achieved when two self-affections that are not that of traditional masculine 
auto-affection meet. Writing of this encounter, Irigaray suggests the advantages it entails: 
If, in affecting you, I affect myself, the body instrument opposition no longer holds. 
For the instrument which I am in order to affect you is itself affected as a body, just as 
your body, which I affect, is an instrument which affects me. In that exchange of 
affection the producer and the product become one, the organ and the body can no 
longer be divided, myself and yourself are no longer embodied as distinct and rival 
universes. That is not to say that the irreducible no longer exists. For what affects me 
is what affects you. As well. […] Experiencing you, experiencing me, espousing you, 
espousing me, we are more than one. And two. The accounts overflow, calculation is 
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lost. If neither I nor you are appropriated by the one or the other. But simply, for the 
one or the other.202 
It is a question again of bindings of implicit differences, of bindings that are precede any 
active/passive, do not seek to reduce the other to the opposite but instead achieve a relation 
that respects the difference of the other, as open to the different divisions and separations and 
does not seek to incorporate this difference into a pre-existing totality or conceptual schema. 
Nor seeks to quantify this difference or idealise it into some God-like status that would only 
be a substitute for the undifferentiated mother. 
A NEGLECT OF THE BIOLOGICAL BODY? 
Auto-affection thus appears in each of these writers as the process by which the same is 
different to itself (passion, body, sexuate beings, etc.), a simultaneous union and distinction, a 
heteros as one-that-is-two. In question throughout are bindings of implicit differences that are 
prior or other to the active/passive. For Derrida, it is through the positing of the non-temporal 
‘before’ of différance, non-temporal because it ‘produces’ the difference between time and 
space and that precedes or produces the active/passive as ‘effects.’ For Deleuze, the 
active/passive is only one power, the dynamic, in the heteros of dynamic and kinetic. There is 
then a difficult logic of association and determination that binds these together in their 
irreducible difference. For Irigaray, this binding of difference is taken up as the relation 
between two sexuate human subjectivities, masculine and feminine. 
All three thinkers continue the critique of the originary subject as self-certain, self-present 
and introduce error and difference into the heart of this subject and, for Irigaray, a non-
transcendable difference between sexuate beings. But in both Derrida and Deleuze this seems 
to require a neglect of the biological body, a neglect that, as we saw, became sedimented into 
a theorism that was one target of the turn to affect. The neglect of biology in these thinkers 
has notably been taken up by Malabou. She writes, ‘to bring to light the originary process of 
heteroaffection, Derrida and Deleuze need to delocalise the natural body’ and ‘the thought of 
heteroaffection in Derrida always require the thought of a heterobody, that is, of a nonorganic 
body or of body without organ.’203 This neglect of natural sciences in Derrida and Deleuze 
risks a kind of immaterial affect and Malabou asks whether they dematerialise the process of 
affects the way the phenomenological body was dematerialised: ‘When I clasp my hands, is it 
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two planes that I join? [...] Why put the body at a distance, a distance from its own 
organs?’204 She continues, ‘is it necessary to transcend biology to articulate a concept of 
affects that is not related to subjectivity or to its self-touching?’205 
Furthermore, with Derrida, the lack of clarification of the affect of auto-hetero-affection 
means affect itself risks becoming reified and specific affects replaced with Affect or, 
moreover, with Difference. This risks neglecting the process of differentiation, of how things 
differentiate and matter, another accusation levelled at post-structuralism in the turn to affect. 
For example, writing in 1990, Sedgwick argued, 
Deconstruction, founded as the very science of différ(e/a)nce, has both so fetishized 
the idea of difference and so vaporised its possible embodiments that its most 
thoroughgoing practitioners are the last people to whom one would now look for help 
in thinking about particular differences.206 
One needs to focus not only on difference but on the bindings of implicit differences, of 
what can bind and how and to what effect but without any metaphysical abstraction that 
would neglect the biological body or its limits. 
With Irigaray, these criticisms do not hold. In her insistence on the sexuate body, on its 
morphology and the difference capacities for affects, Irigaray perhaps provides a better 
resource for thinking through differences and affects and manifests most the economy of 
affect produced by past metaphysics as well as possibilities for an alternative. 
ROOTS OF AFFECT 
If, then, the concept of affect is central to these thinkers (in the auto-affection of Derrida 
and Irigaray and in Spinozistic affect in Deleuze) and all maintain the necessity of 
manifesting an alternative binding to that of active and passive (as continuous variation of 
differential velocities, or différance, or a feminine auto-affection), why is it that the 
active/passive continues to haunt contemporary discourses around affect? 
Perhaps it is the lack of clarity of exactly what the affect of auto-affection signifies. 
Despite Deleuze’s extensive differentiation of affect as continuous variation from 
active/passive affections and feelings, their conflation continues to dog the field. What seems 
to underlie the debate, particularly around intentionality, is the question of causality: who or 
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what causes a passion? Are passions themselves causal? Is it the intentional subject, with its 
beliefs, desires and history, that makes the fear or in which the fear is made, as Leys would 
insist on, or are passions and the sense of ownership of these passions ‘produced’ by 
differential relations that ‘produce’ the subject of, say, fear and its inside/outside as an 
‘effect’? Is this perhaps how Sedgwick uses this theory by deploying affective analyses as 
manifesting differential structures to break out of conceptual impasses? Furthermore, the 
imbrication of active/passive is implicit to the term passion with its sense of passivity. What 
is required, therefore, is a detailed discussion of this conceptual field to attempt to extricate 
the active/passive from these concepts. 
In terms of its use in Heidegger’s auto-affection (SelbstAffektion), affect (Affekt) was 
Heidegger’s choice to translate the Greek πάθος. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes of the 
existential constitution of Befindlichkeit, variously translated as ‘state-of-mind,’ or 
‘attunement,’ the ‘there’ of the ‘being-there’ of Dasein. These states, Heidegger writes, ‘have 
long been well-known ontically under the terms ‘affects’ [Affekte] and ‘feelings’ [Gefühle] 
and have always been under consideration in philosophy.’207 Yet these affects, Heidegger 
continues, have been narrowed to merely psychical phenomena and incorporated into a 
psychological discourse that perhaps gives rise to their conflation with human feeling. 
Heidegger argues this misses the fact that in Greek thought these πάθη or affects 
are not states pertaining to ensouled things but are concerned with a disposition of 
living things in their world, in the mode of being positioned toward something, 
allowing a matter to matter to it. The affects play a fundamental role in the 
determination of being-in the-world, of being-with-and-toward-others.208 
If we are to understand the reasons for Heidegger’s of Affekt to translate πάθος and further 
extricate it from its implication with passivity or activity, we need to produce a genealogy of 
the concept and its purported synonyms of emotion, feeling and passions. This will be the 
topic of the next chapter. 
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3 
AFFECT FOR ΠΑΘΟΣ – LATIN TRANSLATION OF GREEK 
THOUGHT 
The previous chapters identified a problem that affect often remained implicated within a 
past metaphysics of coupled opposites, particularly the active/passive and that affect 
remained difficulty and differently differentiated from other concepts like passion, emotion 
and feeling. As well, the question of whether emotions are causal and to what extent should 
an intentional subject be implicated in this causality. This enmeshment of affect with past 
metaphysics has most been identified with Irigaray’s characterisation of masculine auto-
affection: that affects are seen as quantitative disturbances coming from without leading to 
philosophies of defence or installations of Gods or Ideals. This chapter will therefore further 
this manifesting by interrogating the semantic field of affect in its etymological, 
metaphorical, translational and historically changing usage to manifest this enmeshment and 
to attempt to extricate for the clarification of the field of affect and its critics. The argument 
will be that a broader sense of πάθος gets lost in the translation of Greek philosophy into 
Latin and its sense of passivity as external impositions opposed to activity comes to dominate 
it. 
As the concern is affect’s intertwining with past metaphysics through its roots in Latin and 
Greek philosophy, the focus on Greek and Latin does mean a lack of attention to the often 
radical redefinitions of concepts between this moment and post-structuralism. The 
justification, however, is that, if the economy of affect is still implicitly governed by past 
metaphysics, making this explicit can be most effectively achieved within the space available 
through attention to this moment. 
SEMANTICS OF ΠΑΘΟΣ / ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ 
Let us first try to understand the Greek πάθος which Heidegger translated as affect 
(Affekt). Πάθος derives from the verb πάσχειν meaning, most generally, that which happens, 
i.e. experience, but often with a negative sense as being made to experience by something 
external and so an undergoing, although it can have positive meanings to be well off or 
receive benefits. The noun πάθος (plural πάθη) inherits these senses to mean anything that 
befalls one, what one has suffered, a passion or emotion of the soul, any passive state or 
condition, experience in general. In Aristotle, it becomes the pathetic mode of expression. 
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And in early grammar, it was used to describe one of the ‘voices’ [διάθεσις] alongside 
ἐνέργεια which will be translated as passive and active voice. Let us examine further its wide 
semantic application.209 
As experience 
Most generally, πάθος signifies that which has been experienced. For example, in the 
Apology, Socrates speaks of how, after his death, he imagines meeting Palamedes and Ajax, 
who also died from unjust convictions, and hopes ‘to compare my experiences (πάθη) with 
theirs.’210 This sense of what happens gets applied to inanimate things – in Phaedo, πάθος is 
used to designate that which happens to everything [πάντα].211 
As ‘emotion’ 
Πάθος becomes translated as emotion mainly because of its use with pleasure and pain and 
other ‘emotional’ terms like wonder. For example, Epicurus argues there are two πάθη, 
pleasure and pain and these exist in every animal.212 In the Phaedo, Phaedo says when he 
contemplated that Socrates was going to die, he felt a strange feeling [πάθος], an 
unaccustomed mixture of pleasure and pain. All of them were affected [διεκείμεθα] in the 
same way, sometimes laughing, sometimes crying.213 Socrates also mentions this strange 
mixture of two feelings, pain and pleasure, in Phaedrus where Socrates speaks of desire 
(ἵμερος), which is a play on words deriving from μέρος (“particles”) and ῥεῖν (“flow”); desire 
that arises in receiving the stream of particles flowing from Phaedrus’s beauty.214 Or, in 
Theaetetus, Socrates says to Theaetetus: ‘for this feeling of wonder [τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν] 
shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning [ἀρχὴ] of 
philosophy.’215 This links πάθος with beginning, ἀρχὴ, suggesting to be ‘affected,’ to be put 
in a state of wonder is an ἀρχὴ; with each new πάθος we begin again. 
Aristotle defines πάθος in Book 2 of Rhetoric: 
The emotions [πάθη] are all those affections which cause men to change their opinion 
in regard to their judgements [κρίσις lit. a separating or distinguishing] and are 
accompanied by pleasure and pain; such are anger, pity, fear, and all similar emotions 
                                               
209 Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. πάθος. 
210 Plato, Apology, 41b. 
211 Plato, Phaedo, 72b5. 
212 Diogenes, Lives, X.34, 564-5. 
213 Plato, Phaedo, 59a. 
214 Plato, Phaedrus, 251c 
215 Plato, Theaetetus, 155d. 
 3 – Affect for Πάθος – Latin Translation of Greek Thought 
 
Page 69 of 240 
and their contraries. And each of them must be divided under three heads; for 
instance, in regard to anger, the disposition [διάκειμαι] of mind which makes men 
angry, the persons with whom they are usually angry [of habit, ἔθω], and the 
occasions which give rise to anger [ποίοις]. For if we knew one or even two of these 
heads, but not all three, it would be impossible to arouse that emotion.216 
In this short definition, Aristotle links ποιεῖν, κεῖμαι (as passive to τίθημι) and ἔθος, three 
words that will recur frequently. In his history of emotions, Jan Plamper notes how this 
sentence has been differently interpreted: some have taken it to give a list of ‘basic emotions’ 
while others believe Aristotle’s emphasis on judgements makes him ‘a forerunner of the 
experimental psychology of cognitive appraisal.’ Others still read Aristotle as a forerunner of 
contemporary social psychology with his emphasis on the ‘intersubjective and 
communicative function of emotion.’217 
As attribute, state or condition 
Another use of πάθος is given by Plato in the discussion of Parmenides’s statement Being 
is One, τό ἕν εἶναι, that Being is a unity.218 In this saying, being has had the attribute One 
imposed on it, the One is a πάθος of Being and being will no longer be the same as the One 
because it is absurd to agree there are two names when there is only the one. Thus πάθος not 
only determines what Being is but simultaneously differentiates it from itself and from that 
which is attributed to it. Without such affections we could only speak tautologies: being is 
being. No doubt πάθος applies here because of this ‘reception’ of an attribute. Here lies a 
paradoxical import of πάθος: to avoid tautologies something has to be given (and so receive) 
an attribute, subject is bound to predicate, but this binding means subject is no longer self-
identical and so different to itself. 
This raises the question of whether a πάθος is an attribute of a being or an integral part of 
it. Aristotle tackles this question in Categories where he distinguishes four types of qualities 
[ποιότητα from ποιεῖν]: states (ἕξις) and conditions (διάθεσις, again τίθημι), natural capacities 
(δύναμιν), affective qualities (παθητικαί ποιότητες) and form (μορφή).219 Τhe difference 
between a state and a condition is their relative duration: a condition is a short-lived state, 
arising and passing away again quickly whilst a state is an enduring and difficult to change 
state. But Aristotle also applies this short-livedness to affections (πάθη) which, as a result, 
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cannot be called qualities for we do not attribute the quality of anger to a man if he has been 
annoyed by something, but only if he is often or constantly angry. But if affections are long-
lasting, they become a condition which may in turn become a state. Only affective qualities 
are actual qualities defined as qualities that can produce a sensation in something else; honey 
has the affective quality of sweetness because it can produce sweetness in taste, not because it 
has been affected by something sweet. Heat is an example of both a condition and an 
affection so a πάθος can also be a διαθεσις if it can make the affection in another. Aristotle 
therefore manifests a relation between πάθος, τίθημι and ἕξις: with sufficient repetition or 
duration, πάθος becomes a quality like the sometimes-angry man who, if often angry, 
becomes an angry man: πάθη become conditions become states. 
The sense of πάθος as state is used in medical discourse to describe the state of the patient 
suffering an ailment although, in a long discussion of the different views of other writers, 
Galen makes a distinction between πάθος and νόσημα: 
I apply [the term] “disease” [νόσημα] only to the condition that is opposite to health, 
by which I mean the function is damaged, whether it (i.e. the disease) is of long or 
short duration, or momentary. All other conditions contrary to nature that precede this 
and have the ground of cause, I term causes alone and not affections. I call those 
things that follow these causes, when they are damages of functions, symptoms and 
affections [πάθη] in the same way as I do disproportionate excretions and 
retentions.220 
As Binding 
With its opposition to nouns of ‘action’ - notably ποίημα but also ἔργα, πρᾶξις, and 
ἐνέργεια - πάθος gets implicated in metaphysical discussions. But if this applies also to 
ποιεῖν, this applies more to πάσχειν because, whilst other verbs will be substituted for ποιεῖν 
(δρᾶν, ἐνέργεια, etc.), πάσχειν remains the same. Something that continues into Latin and 
patio. Plato provides us with an ontological example of the coupling in the Sophist. There, 
Plato gives his mark of what is as a δύναμις of active or passive, the ποιεῖν/παθεῖν opposition. 
This mark is offered to overcome the disagreement between those who believe only tactile 
bodies are real, the ‘materialists’ and those who believe only immaterial forms are, the 
‘friends of the forms.’ Plato writes (note also how this παθεῖν is translated as ‘to be 
affected’): 
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I suggest that everything which possesses any power [δύναμις] of any kind, either to 
produce [τὸ ποιεῖν] a change in anything [literally to make other, ἕτερος] of any 
nature or to be affected [τὸ παθεῖν] even in the least degree by the slightest cause, 
though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up [τίθημι] as a 
definition which defines being, that it is nothing else but power [δύναμις].221 
Plato uses ἕτερος to describe the making other – it is a making other but where the other is 
one of two. In a metaphysics of coupled opposites particularly evidenced in Phaedo, things 
can only be made to go from their present state to its contrary, from hot to cold, changeable to 
unchangeable. These opposites form a ἕτερος as one of two. Thus πάσχειν describes being 
made to alternate to the contrary of one’s present state. Plato repeats this definition of a 
δύναμις of ‘active/passive’ three other times in the course of the dialogue using 
ποίημα/πάθημα, δρᾶν/πάσχειν and ποιεῖν/πάσχειν. So while the ‘active’ side changes from 
ποιεῖν to δρᾶν, the ‘passive’ side remains always πάσχειν.222 
As with πάθος, this coupling of affecting or being affected in verb forms is often conveyed 
using other verbs for the ‘active’ pole instead of ποιεῖν, such as δρᾶν, whereas the ‘passive’ 
pole is nearly always παθεῖν.223 The coupling ποιεῖν/παθεῖν was said by Sextus Empiricus to 
have originated with Pythagoras in relation to bodies: ‘some say that Body is that which is 
capable of being active or passive [ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν].’224 He ascribes this view to the 
Pythagorean school: ‘those who conceive body as “what is capable of being acted upon or of 
affecting” (and of these it is recorded that Pythagoras was the leader).’225 
So we can understand Plato as here trying to reconcile the school of Pythagoras (said to be 
a great influence on Plato) with his own theory of Forms through the binding of ποιεῖν and 
παθεῖν that applies to bodies and Forms. A major difference, however, will be that the Forms 
are purely active entities which only affect and cannot be affected. And so, for Plato, πάθος is 
both an empirical and metaphysical concept and binds the two in their difference. What 
delimits beings is what can enter into such communions, a δύναμις κοινωνία.226 
For Aristotle there are many ways of speaking of being and Aristotle lists four in 
Metaphysics: one in relation to categories with the primary category to which all others refer 
                                               
221 Plato, Sophist, 247d-e. 
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being οὐσία; another in accordance with potentiality, actuality and action (δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, 
ἔργον); third in relation to true and not-true; and finally, in relation to accidents. In the 
categorial way, the active and passive are formalised as two such categories: a doing [ποιεῖν] 
and a ‘being-affected’ [πάσχειν]. But these also feature in the speaking of being through 
δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. Whilst Aristotle does not consider how the four ways of speaking 
being are connected and interrelated, it is worth noting that the opposition ποιεῖν/παθεῖν is 
common to at least two (categorial and δύναμις/ἐνέργεια). 
Aristotle defines δύναμις as a ‘starting point [ἀρχή] of change [μεταβολή] in another thing 
or in the thing itself qua other.’227 This is defined first in relation to movement [κίνησις]. 
There are two ways of being acted on: first, the δύναμις to tolerate something from another, 
like water permits being heated [ἡ δύναμις τοῦ παθεῖν]; second, the capacity to resist 
deterioration or annihilation by another [ἡ ἕχις ἀπαθείας τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον].228 In the latter, 
there is resistance to a being-affected, an apathy [ἀπάθεια] whereas in the former there is no 
resistance. This resisting or allowing is then related to another δύναμις, the δύναμις τοῦ 
ποιεῖν, that which does the something to the resisting or allowing. 
Aristotle goes on to discuss whether the ποιεῖν and παθεῖν are one or two. His answer will 
be that they are both one and two at the same time, a unity of the difference of ποιεῖν and 
παθεῖν. To the extent there is δύναμις, that δύναμις is coupled opposites of outward and 
inward directions, what will be called ‘active and passive,’ each of which can also be 
considered as the origin or terminus of a doing or undergoing, ‘agent and patient.’ 
In a separate text, Aristotle tackles the question of whether only like can affect like or 
whether only different things can affect each other. It seems previous thinkers were 
unanimous: like is unaffected by like. Even when a smaller fire is destroyed by a greater fire, 
it is because of the contrariety small/large. But Democritus argued agent and patient are 
identical. If two different things act on each other, it is because they both have an identical 
property [ὑπάρχει]. Aristotle argues the disagreement arises because each treated a part of the 
problem and not the whole. Treating it as a whole, ‘agent and patient must be like (i.e. 
identical) in kind [τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον τῷ γένει] and yet unlike (i.e. contrary) in species 
[εἶδος].’ The agent and patient must be like in genus but contrary [ἐναντία] in species and, in 
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species, the patient must turn into [μεταβάλλω] the agent. This is why fire heats and a cold 
thing cools and things move or are moved between contraries.229 
The disagreement between previous authors is explained by the fact some spoke of the 
hypokeimenon as suffering action, e.g. ‘the man as being healed, being warmed and chilled,’ 
but others of what is cold being warmed or what is sick being healed. The difference is 
grammatically conveyed: the hypokeimenon examples are middle-passive present infinitives 
[ὑγιάζεσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι] while the others are articular adjectives [τὸ ψυχρόν] or 
articular participles (which can function as adjective) [τὸ κάμνον]. The difference ultimately 
arises from a confusion of form/matter: in one sense it is matter, in another it is its contrary, 
matter. Difference is made the same by positing the differences as coupled opposites, 
different in their identity as opposite. 
The pairing of ποιεῖν/πάσχειν is also central to Epicurus and the Stoics. Epicurus uses 
ποιεῖν/πάσχειν to mark a difference between bodies and void: only bodies are capable of 
action and passion. The void merely provides for the motion of bodies through itself and is 
the only thing that is incorporeal and intangible (intactus in Lucretius).230 As intangible, it 
cannot act or be acted on because touch is required for the acting/being acted on.231 The Soul, 
for Epicurus, is thus corporeal and can act or be acted on. Whereas the Stoics differentiate 
between bodies and incorporeal entities. Bodies have tensions, physical qualities, states and 
actions and passions. These states and actions and passions are determined by the mixture of 
bodies. But, for the Stoics, these properties and accidents are as much bodies as bodies 
themselves. These Bodies in relation to each other are all causes but there are not causes and 
effects, merely causes. The effects of these causes lie in a second realm of incorporeal entities 
which neither act nor undergo anything but are merely the effects of actions and passions. 
The Stoics thus reverse Platonism by splitting cause and effect: the ideational or incorporeal 
are thus no longer anything other than inactive and impassive ‘effects.’232 
The impassive 
With the historic privileging of the active, passivity will be derogated such that the search 
becomes for something that is impassive, something that cannot be affected from without but 
is purely active. In Plato this takes the form of the purely active Forms that suffer no 
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passions: whatever participates in the Form is ‘affected by’ the Form but the Form itself is 
never affected, it only affects. Aristotle will apply this ἀπαθῆ to ousia: 
there is some substance which is eternal and immovable and separate from sensible 
things; [...] and moreover that it is impassive and unalterable.233 
Yet although described as immovable, immovable is elsewhere defined as ‘either that 
which is wholly incapable of being moved, or that which is scarcely moved in the course of a 
long time.’ Perhaps a more careful reading of Aristotle might manifest the relation of πάθος 
to time as the means not only by which qualities change but how time itself is generated in 
this affecting or being affected. 
Meanwhile, Augustine transferred Plato’s Forms to a Christian God: 
I kept trying to imagine you—though I was a mere mortal, and such a mortal at that! – 
you who are supreme and sole and true God; and I believed with all my heart that you 
were imperishable and invulnerable and immutable. I did not know from where or 
why, yet I saw clearly and was convinced that what can be corrupted is worse than 
what cannot be; and what cannot be harmed I unhesitatingly preferred to what can be; 
and what allows of no alteration [nullam patitur mutationem] is better than what can 
be changed.234 
Later this impassive or unaffectable takes the form of a transcendental as we saw in 
Derrida’s critique of the early Heidegger’s primordial temporality split into a purely active 
aspect that temporalizes itself into a ‘fallen, inauthentic’ temporality. Or Spinoza’s 
God/Nature or Deleuze’s affect. 
TRANSLATION OF ΠΑΘΟΣ: AFFECT, PERTURBATION, PASSION 
With this understanding of πάθος we can now examine the different choices used to 
translate this term and the effects of the choice. There were three main words used to 
translate the Greek term πάθος: affectus, passio or perturbatio. 
Afficio / affectus 
Gellius chooses affectus: ‘the rest of the emotions [motus animi] which the Latin 
philosophers call affectus or affectiones, and the Greeks πάθη.’235 He uses the verb afficio to 
describe, for example, a mother ‘overwhelmed’ by grief and sorrow or a ‘bodily condition’ 
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[corporibus affectis].236 Both these uses are passive voiced. Quintilian also states πάθος is 
translated by affectus and discusses the difference between πάθος and ἔθος.237 
Why was affectus an apt choice to translate πάθος? Let us examine first its meanings in 
Latin and then the verbs it is cognate with in Greek to find an answer. The roots of affectus 
derive from two Latin words affecto and afficio. Affecto means to strive after a thing, to 
endeavour toward, to pursue, etc. Afficio means to exert an influence on body or mind so that 
it is brought into a certain state together with a sense of furnished with or having.238 There is 
also a sense peculiar to Cicero that Gellius comments on, to describe ‘things which had 
advanced, or been carried, not to the very end, but nearly to the end.’239 Affect as noun 
[affectio] means a state or disposition also of body or mind, a mood, especially produced in 
one by some influence, and also a relation or disposition toward a thing again produced in a 
person by something else.240 
These Latin senses continue into English with the exception of Cicero’s unique sense. 
Affect as a verb in modern English has two main senses. Firstly, the earliest sense, has two 
main meanings: as having a predilection or preference for, disposition to or to be drawn 
toward, to like or be fond of (although most of these are now rare or obsolete) or of assuming 
a false appearance or putting on a pretence (one might affect sincerity or interest). The second 
main sense is, most broadly, to change, to have an effect on, physically or mentally. One can 
affect physical objects or the mind and so be affected with feelings or emotion. As noun, 
affect means a state, mood or emotion again in relation to the mind or body.241 
The Latin ultimately derives from the composite ad- + facio. Ad- in composition signifies 
to, toward, at, by, on, upon or against something whilst facio has a very broad signification 
including to make, build, construct, produce, etc.242 Thus to affect signifies to make on or 
against something and so to have an effect on. 
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Facio is cognate with the Greek τίθημι (to set, put, place, to put in a certain condition) and 
its aorist form ἔθηκα (to accustom, habituate).243 Whilst the differing senses of facio ‘to 
make’ and τίθημι ‘to set’ might not immediately suggest similarity, we should heed 
Benveniste’s warning that ‘in the evaluation of the differences in meaning that intervene 
among the members of a formally bound ensemble, the linguist is always inclined to let 
himself be guided unconsciously by the categories of his own language.’ Even though their 
correspondence is ‘an elementary datum of comparative linguistics,’ we should not assume 
that their common Proto-Indo-European root of *dhe- admits both a sense of ‘set’ and ‘make’ 
but instead understand the sense-relation between ‘set’ and ‘make’ through a precise 
definition of the uses. Benveniste argues ‘set’ ‘properly signifies ‘set down something which 
will last from now on, which is destined to endure’ and this is why it can signify ‘to establish 
in existence, to create.’ This shows that ‘the distinction between “set” and “make” does not 
correspond to Indo-European reality in the settled form it has for us.’244 
It is worth also noting that the verb τίθημι often serves as ‘active’ to the ‘passive’ verb 
κεῖμαι, to be laid. It is from κεῖμαι we get ὑποκεῖμενον signifying a lying under and from 
which we will get subject as translation of this hypokeimenon which we should note for its 
relation to the critique of the subject mentioned in previous chapters. 
Interestingly, whilst Cicero will not translate πάθος with affectio but perturbatio (see 
below), he does use affectio for a ‘disposition of the soul’ (adfectio animi).245 Lewis and 
Short note this use of affectio is equivalent to the Greek διάθεσις and so Cicero observes the 
cognate sense of affectio with τίθημι.246 
Thus we can already see affect’s imbrication in Greek metaphysics as a persisting laying 
down or setting of something. One significance of this choice to translate πάθος is that the 
same verb can signify both affecting or being affected through the active or passive voiced 
form; whereas πάσχειν was only active voiced. But with this choice the difference between 
πάσχειν and τίθημι that existed in Greek is overlooked as affect in Latin seems to signify 
more τίθημι than πάσχειν and privileges the senses of state in πάθος to the neglect of its other 
senses and would also overlook the difference Aristotle introduces between πάσχειν and 
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τίθημι in Categories. What is required, therefore, is to understand what sense is specific to 
πάσχειν in distinction to τίθημι that is lost. 
Perturbatio 
The second choice to translate πάθος was perturbatio mainly by Cicero in Tusculan 
Disputations: 
I might have called them “diseases,” [morbus] and this would be a word-for-word 
rendering: but it would not fit in with Latin usage [consuetudo]. For pity, envy, 
exultation, joy, all these the Greeks term diseases, movements that is of the soul 
[motus animi] which are not obedient to reason; we on the other hand should, I think, 
rightly say that these same movements of an agitated soul are “disorders,” 
[perturbationes] but not “diseases” [morbus] in the ordinary way of speaking.247 
He echoes this in De Finibus: the problem is that ‘the word ‘disease’ [morbus] would not 
suit all instances; for example, no one speaks of pity, nor yet anger, as a disease, though the 
Greeks term these πάθος᾽.248 Cicero opts instead for perturbatio: 
far too much attention is devoted by the Stoics, principally by Chrysippus, to drawing 
an analogy between diseases of the soul [morborum animi] and diseases of the body 
[morbis corporum]. Let us neglect such passages as quite unnecessary and busy 
ourselves only with the pith of their argument. Let it be understood then that, as the 
waves of belief toss in capricious confusion, disorder is in perpetual motion.249 
Perturbatio signifies this confusion. It is formed of per- meaning ‘through, through the 
midst of, throughout, all over, all along’ and turbo meaning to disturb or move disorderly, to 
throw into confusion.250 Through this choice, Cicero intervenes in the reception of Greek 
philosophy by replacing the metaphor of disease with that of physical movement. This shift 
of emphasis takes its impetus from a model of mind in Plato and Pythagoras who divided the 
soul into two parts as Cicero describes: 
to the one they assign a share in reason, to the other none; that which has a share of 
reason they make the seat of peacefulness, that is, a consistent state of quiet and 
tranquillity; the other part they make the seat of stormy emotions [motus turbidos] 
both of anger and desire which are contrary and hostile to reason.251 
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But the replacement of medicine by physics is not a trivial substitution, it has implications 
on the treatment of πάθος. For if diseases suggest the possibility of healing treatments, those 
of physics mean that it is essential to avoid being perturbed in the first place as movement 
once set in motion must run its course until it ends, hence the per- of perturbation and 
perhaps is why Cicero did not consider afficio given his use of it to convey ongoing or 
uncompleted action. Cicero writes: 
He therefore who looks for a ‘limit’ to vice is doing much the same as if he were to 
think that a man who has flung himself headlong from Leucas can stop his fall when 
he will. For just as that is impossible, so it is impossible for a disordered and excited 
soul to control itself or stop where it wishes.252 
Thus, for Cicero, it becomes essential to avoid being moved in the first place and a 
philosophy of defence is required. Such a view of affects may have been influenced by 
Cicero’s circumstances while writing Tusculan Disputations: after the death of his beloved 
only daughter, Tullia, who had died in childbirth. In a letter, he speaks of writing this work as 
a form of therapy, although ‘reading and writing bring me, not solace indeed, but 
distraction.’253 
Passio 
The third choice to translate πάθος was the Latin passio by, for example, Apuleius. In De 
Deo Socratis, Apuleius discusses Plato’s philosophy and chooses passio to describe the 
fluctuations of mind [turbationibus mentis] that Plato’s daimons undergo just like us.254 
Passio comes from the verb pati, to bear support, undergo or suffer from which also derive 
patient, passivity and passive.255 Pati is a deponent verb and so only passive voiced whereas 
the Greek πάσχειν is only active voiced. This choice of translation therefore emphasises the 
sense of passivity when compared to affectio which can be active or passive voiced. 
The modern-day English ‘passion’ has three main senses: those relating to physical 
suffering and pain, those relating to emotional and mental states particularly strong or 
overpowering ones, positive or negative (although mainly understood positively today). The 
notion of strength gives rise to the adjective passionate with senses of ardent enthusiasm, 
zealous devotion or attachment. Finally, senses relating to passivity which denote a being 
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acted on, in opposition to acting, an action produced by an external rather than an internal 
cause and so also an absence of activity, an inertia or unresponsiveness.256 
In Summa Theologica, Aquinas provides a helpful discussion of the meaning of passive in 
Latin, giving its three senses and thus three ways to speak of a passion of the soul [anima 
passionem]. First and most generally, ‘whatever receives something is passive’ but where 
nothing is taken away from it. Secondly, in its proper sense, something must be received 
‘while something else is taken away’ and this happens in two ways: sometimes the loss is 
something unsuitable to the thing as when sickness is healed, other times the contrary occurs, 
i.e. sickness is received, and health lost. This latter is passivity in its most proper sense: 
for a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing 
recedes from what is suitable to it, then especially does it appear to be drawn to 
something else.257 
When the change is for the worse, it has more of the nature of a passion, hence ‘sorrow is 
more properly a passion than joy.’ 258 Aquinas also differentiates sense or intellect [sentire et 
intelligere] from passion: sense and intellect can be a kind of passion in the sense of mere 
reception but passion as the loss of something can only be a bodily change and so passion 
cannot strictly be said to be in the soul. 
Passion and action 
It is worth discussing here the term often opposed to passion, action. This comes from the 
Latin actus, the passive perfect participle of agere, which has literal meanings of to lead, 
drive or conduct, to push forward or move, excite and metaphorical meanings of guiding, 
governing, leading etc.259 In this it bears similar meaning to the Greek ἄγειν which can also 
carry a sense of draw out in length and, in the middle voice, to carry away for oneself.260 It 
can be differentiated from the verb facere that we discussed earlier by time: whereas facere 
tends to signify instantaneous actions, agere signifies ongoing actions of greater duration. 
Translationally, it is often used to translate ἐνέργεια as actuality as compared to δύναμις as 
potentiality. But it is also the preferred choice to translate the παθεῖν in the ποιεῖν/παθεῖν 
opposition. For example, Plato’s mark of what is in the Sophist, as δύναμις of ποιεῖν and 
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παθεῖν, is translated by Ficino as ‘agendum vel patiendum.’261 Or where this opposition is 
made by Plato in Timaeus using δρᾶν and πάσχειν (33c), this is translated by Ficino again as 
agat and patiat;262 but by Cicero as pateretur et faceret.263 We again see the tight imbrication 
of these terms but where differences are lost and gained in the choice of Latin translation. 
Augustine: conflation or clarification of affect, perturbation and passion? 
Augustine takes up the problem of translating πάθος in City of God, again on the topic of 
whether the wise man is affected by πάθος: 
There are two opinions among the philosophers concerning the mental emotions 
[animi motibus], which the Greeks call πάθη, while certain of our fellow countrymen, 
like Cicero, describe them as disturbances [perturbationes], others as affections or 
affects [affectiones vel affectus], and others again, like Apuleius, as passions 
[passiones], which renders the Greek word more explicitly.264 
Augustine divided philosophers into two camps, Stoics and Platonists/Aristotelians, to 
argue the former held disturbances do not assail the wise man whereas the latter do. But 
Augustine goes on to argue that actually the two sides hold the same view: ‘both parties 
defend the wise man’s intellect and reason against enslavement to the passions’; the only 
difference is that the Stoics speak of advantages or disadvantages – such as their life or bodily 
welfare – which the wise man sets store by such that he does not wish to lose them in the face 
of perturbations. The other philosophers call these good or evil. But what does it matter what 
you call them, Augustine concludes, 
so long as Stoic, no less than Peripatetic, trembles and grows pale at the thought of 
being deprived of them? [...] So the mind in which this principle is firmly rooted 
permits no perturbations, however they may affect the lower levels of the soul, to 
prevail in it over reason. No, on the contrary, the mind itself is their master and, when 
it will not consent but rather stands firm against them, upholds the sovereign rule of 
virtue.265 
In both, it is a question of becoming ‘governed by subjection to reason [moderatas 
rationique subiectas], so that his mind as master lays down, as it were, laws for them, 
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whereby they may be held to a minimum.’266 We again see the continuation of the Greek ὕπο 
into the sub- and the necessity of mastering them by laying down laws. 
Yet unlike Cicero’s physical metaphor that sought to avoid becoming perturbed, 
Augustine argued for the necessity of being affected and rejected the Greek concept of apathy 
[ἀπάθεια]: 
if we were to feel no such emotions [affectiones] at all while we still bear the 
weakness of our present life, then rather should we not live a proper life. [...] For 
complete freedom from pain, while we are in this place of misery, surely ‘befalls us,’ 
as one of our worldly men of letters has said, stating his opinion, ‘only at the great 
cost of savagery of mind and torpor of body.’267 
Now some have claimed Augustine does not really choose between the terms affect, 
passion or perturbation but uses the terms interchangeably. For example, Susan James argues 
that 
the view that these terms are all roughly synonymous quickly became fixed, and 
Augustine’s discussion continued to be widely invoked and reiterated. Aquinas cites 
it, and a range of English and French authors of the seventeenth century either 
replicate Augustine’s list or unselfconsciously employ the range of terms it 
contains.268 
But this is not strictly true. Augustine differentiated affections from passions in criticising 
the Stoic view that all passions and affection were wrong: affects [affectiones] ‘attend upon 
right reason when they are shown under proper conditions’ and so we should not therefore 
call them ‘diseases [morbos] or morbid passions [vitiosas passiones].’ For Augustine, our 
affects are a necessary condition of our fallen existence as sinners on earth and it is only 
through them we can proceed to eternal life with God. It is not the affection itself that is 
wrong or right but the affection in combination with the way in which the life to which it 
belongs is lived: 
Among us Christians, on the other hand, in accordance with the holy Scriptures and 
their sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy City of God feel fear and desire, pain and 
gladness while they live in God’s fashion during the pilgrimage of their present 
existence, and because their love is right, all these feelings of theirs are right.269 
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Aquinas, also made a distinction between passions and affections depending on which part 
of the soul they belong: 
it is evident that the passions of the soul [passiones animae] are the same as affections 
[affectiones]. But affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the 
apprehensive part. Therefore passion [passio] is in the apprehensive part more than in 
the appetitive. 
Thus the translation of πάθος intervenes into Greek philosophy through the choice of 
words used, choices that will go on to influence the transition from Latin to English (and 
French). If we consider these choices, of the varied senses of πάθος as emotion, experience, 
attribute, and binder of metaphysical and physical, we see that afficio tended to privilege a 
setting or state through its link to τίθημι and its PIE root of *dhe-. This will become 
significant when we examine the PIE roots of πάσχειν below to mean ‘binding.’ With the 
privileging of a setting instead of a binding, we perhaps see the root of where affect comes to 
be dominated by the active/passive as setting implies an activity and, because afficio can be 
active or passive voiced, can convey both a setting and a being set, something πάσχειν, as 
active voiced only, could not convey. Meanwhile, perturbatio linked πάθος with thoroughly 
disrupting movements and shifted the discourse from one of diseases to one of physics, 
something continued in the rise of ‘emotions’ in the 18th century. Finally, passio, whilst the 
most literal choice of the three, tended to privilege the sense of being imposed on from 
without because of the fact it was only passive voiced verb. Perhaps the problem is that no 
one word can adequately translate πάθος? 
FROM AFFECTS, PERTURBATIONS AND PASSIONS TO EMOTION 
If Cicero’s choice of perturbatio to translate πάθος brought it within a realm of physical 
movement, the modern-day emotion also carries this sense with its literal meaning of ‘motion 
outwards.’ This motion takes us back to the Latin motus and motus animi (literally 
movements of the soul), another choice to describe the phenomena in question. Let us 
examine the rise of the term ‘emotion’ and how it came to supplant perturbations, affections, 
and passions in modern-day English. 
In English, the use of emotion emerged at the beginning of 17th century to mean a 
‘political agitation, civil unrest; a public commotion or uprising’ or more generally, an 
instance of movement; disturbance, or perturbation.270 A key figure in its extension to mean 
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agitations of the mind and strong feelings or passion was Montaigne and the English 
translation of his Essais by John Florio in 1603. For example, 
Nero taking leave of his mother, whom he sent to bee drowned, felt notwithstanding 
the emotion [Fr. l'émotion] of that motherly farewell.271 
In the move from emotion as social disturbance to disturbances of the mind, social and 
political disturbance is transferred to the mental, a move perhaps aligned with the 17th 
century consolidation of philosophies of individualism. The increase in popularity of emotion 
also arose from secularisation that sought to avoid the associations of passion and affection 
with the biblical and theological preferring emotion for its alternative network of relations to 
psychology, law, observation, evolution, etc. This resulted in differing causal explanations for 
the phenomena: 
The assumption, still made by Christian philosophers and psychologists at this time, 
that passions and affections were instances of the soul acting upon or using the body, 
was replaced with the assumption that emotions were instances of the brain and 
nerves acting upon other parts of the body. The mind or soul per se was not given an 
active role.272 
Dixon claims that by 1850, the category of emotion had subsumed ‘passions,’ ‘affections’ 
and ‘sentiments’ in most English-language psychological theorists such as Hume’s Treatise 
of Human Nature (1739-40). The most important, Dixon claims, was Thomas Brown’s 
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1820) who first gave the term ‘a coherent, 
systematic and central.’273 Brown distinguished sensations from emotions through a 
mental/physical difference: where sensations were purely physical in origin, emotions had a 
mental origin.274 Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy (1905) further evidences this split 
between emotion and sensation: 
The use of the word emotion in English psychology is comparatively modern. It is 
found in Hume, but even he speaks generally rather of passions or affections. When 
the word emotion did become current its application was very wide, covering all 
possible varieties of feeling, except those that are purely sensational in their origin.275 
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Etymology derives emotion from e-moveo from the past participial stem of ēmovēre to 
remove, expel, to banish from the mind, to shift, displace. Lewis and Short give the following 
definitions: a literal definition of to move out, move away, remove or disturb citing examples 
from Livy: 
...and after they had attempted to drive that crowd out [emovere] of the Forum...276 
Or, in Silius, to agitate or excite: 
Then Venus, appalled by the sight of the raging [emoti] deep.277 
It also has a metaphorical sense to drive away or expel pain or anguish: 
By these words his cares are dispelled and for a little space grief is driven from his 
anguished heart [lit. his anguish was expelled, emotae].278 
But the Latin usage of this verb was limited and, as a noun, was practically non-existent, 
only occurring in post-Classical Latin to signify an agitation or disturbance in general or an 
agitation or disturbance of the mind, emotio mentis.279 While, in English, it was the reverse: 
its derived verb ‘emove’ to mean ‘to rouse or excite feeling in (a person); to affect with 
emotion’ became obsolete around the middle nineteenth century and now only used in noun 
form.280 
Yet, if passion and affection were discarded, there remains a link from perturbation to 
emotion through motion (turbo/motus). We are still, therefore, in the metaphorical domain of 
Cicero, of physical movement despite the shift in terms. But there is a difference of prefix 
and verb. The main difference between turbo and moveo is turbo has a stronger sense of 
disturbance, disorder and confusion whilst moveo can signify this but can more generally 
signify a more neutral motion or indeed a positive excitement. Emotion seems to add a sense 
of discharge of motion outward rather than an inner perturbing. It also seems to introduce a 
difference in activity and passivity – once perturbed, one can do nothing but wait for the 
movement to cease; but with emotion, there seems to be the possibility for an active 
banishing or driving out. 
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The motion of emotion also more directly links us to the κίνησις of Greek philosophy as 
motus was generally the preferred term to translate it. To understand κίνησις, we can turn to 
Aristotle’s Physics. There, Aristotle defines those things created by nature, [φύσις] as having 
within themselves a ‘principle [ἀρχή] of movement [κίνησις] and rest [στάσις].’281 Aristotle 
also defines κίνησις as μεταβολή, not merely as movement or change of place, this is just one 
species of the genus κίνησις, but also as generation and destruction, alteration and growth or 
diminution.282 
κίνησις cannot occur [ἀδύνατον] except in relation to place, void and time so that these 
four things – movement, place, void and time – become ‘universal conditions common to all 
natural phenomena.’283 This relation, Aristotle adds, is applied either with reference to 
quantity, the more or less, or to the active/passive, ‘to agent and patient’ [τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ 
παθητικὸν]. The active/passive relates to κίνησις as 
that which has the power of producing a change can only act in reference to a thing 
capable of being changed; and that which is capable of being changed can only suffer 
change under the action of that which has the power to change it.284 
But, with the translation of κίνησις using motion, the wider senses of κίνησις have been 
lost in the privileging of movement. This might explain why physical accounts of affect as 
quantitative disruptions of discharge and flow have become so central to the field of affect. 
We have come a long way from the Greek πάθος to affect as active or passive setting and 
emotion as discharge of physical movements. 
OTHER TERMS: PERCEPTION, SENSATION, TOUCH, FEELING 
Whilst the key debate in critiques of the turn to affect often centre around the identity or 
difference of affect and emotion, we should briefly discuss also affect’s identity or difference 
to other terms like ‘perception,’ ‘sensation,’ and ‘touch’ to trace their philosophical use with 
the aim of clarifying how, in Greek philosophy, their roots were differentiated from πάθος yet 
governed by it in its coupling of ‘active and passive.’ Finally, we will turn to ‘feeling’ and the 
difference it introduces as the only word of non-Romance language origin. 
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Perception in English has two main senses derived from the verb ‘to perceive.’ Both 
involve the taking in, apprehending or taking possession of something with the first sense 
being a taking in with the mind or senses and the second a now obsolete taking in of rents, 
profits or spirit and breath. In the first sense, it can mean a becoming aware of conscious of 
things in general and is closely related to sense as it is sensation, sensitivity or sensibility that 
delivers the objects to the faculty of perception.285 
Perception is composed of the prefix per- which, as we saw with perturbation, means 
thoroughly + capere to take, seize, lay hold of, thus to take hold of or seize completely and so 
a taking, receiving, gathering in or collecting. The noun was introduced by Cicero to translate 
the Greek κατάληψις of Stoic philosophy (alongside the more literal translation 
comprehension) in an epistemological discussion of the views of Plato, Aristotle, Stoics and 
Sceptics on whether there can be certain knowledge of objects or merely probabilistic: ‘the 
essential nature of knowledge or perception [perceptio] or (if we wish to give a literal 
translation) ‘mental grasp [comprehensio],’ the Stoic term κατάληψιν.’286 The noun 
κατάληψιν is derived from the verb καταλαμβάνω; λαμβάνω means to take or receive and, in 
the middle voice, to take hold of, lay hands on while the prefix κατά usually adds a sense of 
downwards, in answer to or against in a hostile sense. Cicero describes Zeno’s differentiation 
between assent, comprehension and knowledge: 
Zeno used to demonstrate by gesture: for he would display his hand in front of one 
with the fingers stretched out and say ‘A visual appearance is like this’; next he closed 
his fingers a little and said, ‘An act of assent [adsensus] is like this’; then he pressed 
his fingers closely together and made a fist, and said that that was comprehension 
[comprensionem] (and from this illustration he gave to that process the actual name of 
κατάληψιν, which it had not had before); but then he used to apply his left hand to his 
right fist and squeeze it tightly and forcibly, and then say that such was knowledge 
[scientiam], which was within the power of nobody save the wise man.287 
The relation of this example of perception to the active/passive in the gesture of the hand 
in moving from open, to closed fist, to fist gripped by the other hand (an auto-affection) has 
been drawn out by Auvray-Assayas and Ildefonse: 
the close interweaving of activity in the course of a process that is also a passive 
reception is stressed by Cicero’s translations of phantasia καταληπτική. The adjective 
καταληπτική, generally interpreted as having an active sense, also has a passive sense: 
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Cicero uses not καταληπτικόν but καταληπτόν, which means “grasp” or ‘what can be 
grasped’; he translates this term by comprendibile, so that we understand more 
clearly, thanks to this translation, that representation is what permits grasping, 
because it can itself be grasped.288 
Thus perception takes its place under the economy of the active/passive and also 
incorporates an ‘auto-affection’ as the exercise of an activity on itself. 
The modern ‘sense’ and ‘sensation’ are related to a wide range of other concepts including 
sense, sentiment, sensibility, sensitivity, etc. Deriving from the Latin sensus from sentire ‘to 
perceive, feel, know’ which is probably ‘a figurative use of a literal meaning “to find one's 
way,” or “to go mentally,” ’ its use to describe the external or outward senses (touch, sight, 
hearing, etc.) is first recorded in English around the 1520s.289  The ambiguity in perception 
over whether it applied to the mental or physical also intervenes in the discourse of sense 
such that sense can mean both physical sense as well as intellectual. Added to these two 
meanings is a sense of sense as ‘signification.’ For our purposes we will focus on the first two 
meanings. 
Philosophically, sensus is linked to its translation of αἰσθάνομαι meaning again to 
apprehend by the senses, to understand or to take notice of. In Timaeus, Plato gives an 
etymology of the noun αἴσθησις from αἰσθάνομαι as from ἀίσσω, to move with a quick 
shooting motion as, in the beginning, souls were ‘bound within a mighty river’ in disorderly, 
violent and irrational movements. 
with violence they rolled along and were rolled along themselves, so that the whole of 
the living creature was moved, but in such a random way that its progress was 
disorderly and irrational.290 
These disorderly movements produced collision between bodies which impinged on the 
soul [ψυχὴν] and so, Plato states, ‘for these reasons all such motions were then termed 
“sensations” [αἴσθησις] and are still so termed to-day.’291 
In Aristotle, sensation is one of the powers of the soul [δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς] used to 
differentiate living beings. The powers are nourishment, appetite, sensation [αἰσθητικόν], 
movement in space and thought. Plants have the nutritive faculty only, animals have appetite,  
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sensation and movement, but only man has the power of thinking and intelligence.292 
Aristotle defines sensation in On the Soul: it consists in ‘being moved [κινεῖσθαι] and acted 
upon [πάσχειν] for it is held to be a change of state [ἀλλοίωσις].’293 Sense is ‘that which is 
receptive [λαμβάνω] of the form of sensible objects without the matter.’294 
Sensation is also linked to the discourse of potentiality and actuality. It means ‘both to 
possess the faculty and to exercise it’: sensation (αἰσθητικός) is potentiality but the sense 
object [αἰσθητός] is actuality, it is its potentiality actualised [ἐντελέχεια].295 In the process of 
being acted upon [πάσχει], sensation and sense object are unlike but, just as the patient must 
become like the agent, at the end of the process (conveyed by the perfect tense (per-facio) of 
πάσχειν, πεπονθὸς), sensation has been made like that object and shares its quality.296 The 
identity or difference between sensation and sense object is again conveyed using difference 
of activity and passivity and their completion in ἐντελέχεια, they are what binds us to the 
world in the process of becoming other. 
Next, touch. In English this word (as verb and noun) has three main senses. First, to make 
contact with where the idea of physical contact dominates. Second, where physical contact is 
again present, but the focus is more on the result or effect of contact rather than the contact 
itself such as to injure or damage something. Thirdly in figurative senses that include to relate 
to, to discuss a topic, and to affect a person with feeling or emotion, frequently in the passive 
voice, (gained from the 14th century onward) and to produce an effect on the senses.297 
Etymologically, the verb derives from the vulgar Latin toccare but is also semantically 
related, via ‘tactile,’ to the Latin tangere which also had a sense of to touch, move, affect, 
impress both in relation to the body and to the mind, or to feelings. Tangere is central to 
notions of contingency, this term being formed from con- + tangere, a co-touching.298 
Tangere was the most common choice to translate the Greek ἄπτω. For example, Ficino 
translates ἁπτὸν with tangique.299 This word is invoked by Aristotle to describe the sense of 
touch in On the Soul. Like the other senses, it is again a question of potentiality and actuality: 
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what is capable of touch [ἁφή] is what potentially has these qualities and the tangible [ἁπτός] 
is that which actualises this potentiality. Aristotle raises several aporias of touch: is touch a 
single sense or several and what is the organ of touch: is it flesh or is flesh only the medium 
and the organ is something distinct and internal.300 Secondly, what is the single substrate 
[ὑποκείμενον] of touch that would correspond to sound with hearing.301 Finally, the aporia 
that if, when bodies have a third between them, they cannot touch, this would mean bodies in 
water could not touch because of the water between them.302 So do we touch through contact 
and the other senses through distance? 
This final aporia reveals the importance again of the acting/acted on coupling. Common 
opinion suggests we can touch without separation but actually all sensation according to 
Aristotle requires a medium. The difference between the tangible and the other senses is that 
we perceive the latter because the medium acts [ποιεῖν] on us whereas with the tangible we 
sense at the same time as the medium. So, if air is required for hearing, vision and smell, to 
place a sense object directly on the organ, without air, there would be no sensation. But with 
touch, if it is placed directly on the flesh there is sensation, hence the medium of the tangible 
is flesh. 
Thus we can see that perception, sensation and touch are distinct in Greek philosophy 
from πάθος but πάθος seems to govern the use of these verbs either by being explicitly named 
or through the grammatical voice of the verbs. The active/passive seems to govern these 
fields by accounting for how, in the process of making or being made other, one can both be 
this other and not be the other, how the two that is one locked in a unidirectional movement 
of change can yet be separated into an agent and patient, a perceiving/perceived, 
sensing/sensed, touching/touched. 
Finally, ‘feeling.’ This word stands out in that it is not Romantic in origin. Originating 
from the Old English felan which meant ‘to touch or have a sensory experience of; perceive, 
sense (something),’ it is also the source also of the German fühlen, and Gefühl. In English, 
the word has two main meanings: those relating to sensation or touch and those relating to 
emotion, sentiment, mental sensitivity or awareness. In the former, feeling often describes 
those senses not strictly attributable to the senses of sight, hearing, taste or smell; can apply 
both externally and internally; and, like sensation itself, can refer to the capacity to feel as 
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well as the specific feelings.303 Meanings relating to emotion originated around 1400 in, for 
example, Chaucer’s translation of Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy where Chaucer uses 
felyng to translate the Latin sensus: 
Euery weleful man haþ a wel delicat felyng [delicatissimus sensus].304 
But what seems to be excluded from feeling is any strong signification of intellectual 
feeling. When feeling does relate to an intellection in the form of consciousness or awareness 
of something, it retains a sense of indeterminacy or doubt, a belief or intuition that something 
is about to happen that can be conveyed by the expression ‘to feel out’ or ‘feel one’s way 
through.’ 
One distinction between modern-day feeling and the other terms discussed here may be 
made through determining which of these is most general and substitutable. Passion and 
emotion are now obsolete as verbs and it is more common to say sensations, emotions, 
passions or affects are felt than the reverse; ‘I felt a sensation’ is more common than ‘I sensed 
a feeling.’ 
HAS A SENSE OF ΠΑΘΟΣ BEEN LOST? 
Let us now try to gather together the significance of all these analyses. In the difficult 
moment of translation from Greek to Latin and on into modern languages, we can observe 
several effects. First, the choice of affect to translate πάθος privileges the sense of an active 
or passive setting or being set that would be conveyed in Greek using τίθημι. In this choice, it 
loses the ways in which πάσχειν differed to τίθημι. Furthermore, the same verb, affect, can 
now convey both ποιεῖν or πάσχειν because afficio can be active or passive voiced whereas 
πάσχειν was only active voiced. With the choice of perturbatio, πάθος become wholly 
negative as disruptive movements. What of the πάθος of wonder? Even if it is still disorder, 
as the beginning of philosophy should this initial disorder not be avoided but encouraged? 
Passio too privileges the active/passive sense of πάσχειν given it is a deponent Latin verb, 
only passive voiced. And, with Aquinas’s clarification, passio strictly means an external 
imposition that leads to a change for the worse. Finally, emotion, given its verbal form 
‘emove’ is now obsolete, cannot express a becoming emotional, hence perhaps why affect 
stepped in to enable this – ‘to be affected with emotion’ – which in turn gave rise to the 
conflation of affect with emotion. 
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Moreover, with all these choices of translation, we can see the consolidation of the 
masculine auto-affection Irigaray identified. With the emphasis on passivity and activity, 
passive affects are seen as disturbing, imposed from without, that must be avoided or 
discharged to return to a homeostasis through philosophies of defence or discharge. There is 
little mention of affects as positive except perhaps in Augustine, but this again is a masculine 
auto-affection in the sense that to be affected is to progress toward some Godly life. 
And yet a sense of πάσχειν not dominated by passivity or masculine auto-affection can 
still be glimpsed. The ‘strange mixtures’ of feeling Socrates’s companions described, the 
πάθος of wonder as the beginning of philosophy, the link of πάθος to ἀρχή to beginnings or 
renewals, that breaks tautologies and is the root to change of states and dispositions. Is there a 
sense of πάθος that conceives them, not purely as something negative to be avoided, but also 
positive or at least undecidable as that which changes, makes new, grows, enlarges and are 
necessary if we are to avoid remaining in tautology? This will be the aim of the next chapter. 
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4 
ΠΑΘΟΣ BEFORE ‘PASSIVITY’ 
If πάσχειν, πάθος and affect became dominated by a sense of ‘passivity’ as opposite to 
‘activity’ to the neglect of its other senses (its difference to τίθημι; as that which changes, 
makes new, grows, enlarges; differentiates tautologies) this chapter seeks to draw out these 
other senses by tracking the changing usage of the verb and deverbative nouns in Greek 
writing as well as Proto-Indo European roots in order to produce a broader and more precise 
sense that is neglected in the Latin and subsequent reception of Greek philosophy. 
The methodology applied here can be compared to Benveniste’s discussion of the two 
seemingly unrelated meanings of τρέφω, ‘to nourish’ and ‘to curdle.’ Benveniste examines 
the possibility there might actually be one shared meaning, and that ‘nourish’ ‘is itself only 
an acceptation of both a broader and a more precise sense.’305 The difficulty inherent in such 
tasks arises from the difference in lexical resources of the two languages: because the same 
word τρέφειν requires translation into two different words, nourish or curdle, in asking how 
to reconcile these two, the linguist falls victim to a false problem which arises ‘either by an 
insufficient definition of the terms under discussion or by an unjustified transposition of the 
values from one semantic system to another.’306 Benveniste suggests defining τρέφω more 
broadly as ‘to encourage (by appropriate measures) the development of that which is subject 
to growth.’ Then the particular technical sense of ‘curdle’ can be understood as the idiomatic 
application ‘to encourage the natural growth of milk, to let it attain the state towards which it 
is tending.’307 Similarly, with πάσχειν, there lies the risk of transposing modern 
understandings of activity and passivity as coupled opposites onto an earlier, different 
semantic system that distributed them differently to the neglect of other, broader senses. 
My analysis is largely dependent upon an unpublished thesis by Leonard Boreham, A 
Study of πάσχειν in Greek Literature from Homer to 300 BC which examines the word in all 
its uses, its synonyms or antonyms and its valid and invalid structures (for example, πάσχειν 
is incompatible with ἡ εἰρήνη (peace): one does not ‘undergo peace’ but one does ‘make 
peace’) to show the directions in which it develops to uncover the broadest and most precise 
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sense.308 We begin first with a discussion of πάθος (and related nouns) and its specialised use 
to signify one of the grammatical voices of early grammars. Then we turn to an analysis of 
the root verb πάσχειν and its Proto-Indo-European roots to conclude with a suggestion of the 
broadest and most precise understanding of the term as binding of implicit differences prior 
to separation into active/passive. 
NOUNS: ΠΕΝΘΟΣ, ΠΑΘΟΣ, ΠΑΘΗΜΑ 
The main historical development in noun use is a move from τὸ πενθος in Homer 
(misfortune, misery, grief or sorrow) toward τὸ πάθος and τὸ πάθημα which do not appear in 
Homer at all. Though there is no conclusive evidence that πάθος/πάθημα did not exist in 
Homeric times, the words do not occur in the Iliad, Odyssey, Homerica or Hesiod. Instead, 
πένθος fulfils part of the function of both these later words, in addition to its own specialised 
sense of ‘grief,’ ‘mourning.’ The use of πένθος then declines: only four examples in Plato 
work and only one in Aristotle.309 
Πάθος first appears in the Greek Melic poets (700-500BC).310 It does not occur in Pindar 
or Theognis but emerges suddenly in Aeschylus, still in the sense of ‘suffering.’311 Herodotus 
makes extensive use of πάθος in three distinct senses: for conventional suffering (κακὰ etc. 
πάσχειν), for a somewhat stronger personal calamity (δεινότατα etc. πάσχειν) and, most 
commonly, for a national or military disaster.312 In Plato, πάθος newly denotes an idea or 
notion: 
τὰ δύο μέντοι πάθη περί θεοὺς μείνε 
but the other two false notions about the gods do remain.313 
Another development is the disappearance of the earlier Ionic feminine noun ἡ πάθη that 
is again supplanted by the neuter πάθος. ἡ πάθη never became common in Attic, and, of the 
tragedians, only Sophocles uses it – for example: 
κατὰ δὲ τακόμενοι μέλεοι μελέαν πάθαν / κλαῖον, ματρὸς ἔχοντες ἀνυμφεύτου γονάν 
                                               
308 Boreham, Study. 
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Wasting away in their misery, they bewailed their miserable suffering, the children of 
a mother unhappy in her marriage.314 
One difference between the nouns τὸ πάθος and ἡ πάθη is a general difference in Ancient 
Greek between -ς / -ες- / -ος- nouns and -α feminine nouns.315 The former relate mainly to 
inanimate or abstract objects which express the idea not so much of an ‘active’ force as a 
‘passive’ state. For example, βράδος is that which goes slowly, κάλλος the quality of that 
which is beautiful. Additionally, when the ‘animate’ sense of the -α suffix is placed alongside 
the inanimate, the passive state is often interpreted as the result or effect of the ‘animate’ 
noun. For example, ἡ εὐχή, ‘prayer,’ as active force against εὖχος, ‘a prayer answered.’ Thus 
ἡ πάθη could be understood as the cause of the πάθος. It is worth noting that the feminine is 
here linked to the active, not passive and we may ask why this active feminine state 
disappeared in Attic Greek. 
τὸ πάθημα, which occurs in prose authors from Herodotus onwards, tends to supersede 
πάθος and becomes important especially in the moral works of Aristotle. Herodotus uses 
πάθημα rarely but one of its instances shows the proverbial παθήματα / μαθήματα, perhaps its 
first recorded use in rhyming form: 
τὰ δὲ μοι παθήματα ἐόντα ἀχάριτα μαθήματα γέγονε. 
And disaster has been my teacher.316 
In Sophocles’s Oedipus at Colonus its plural is used internally with πάσχειν in the same 
way as πάθος, ‘to suffer a suffering’ which perhaps marks a kind of auto-affection: 
ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν παθήμαθ᾽ ἄπαθον, πάτερ, / παρεῖσ᾽ ἐάσω: 
The sufferings that I bore, father, in seeking where you dwelt, I will pass by;317 
Nouns with suffix of -μα tended to come from Ionian authors again to indicate the result of 
an action and any verb could produce a derivative of this type, sometimes forming a doublet 
with nouns in -ος, though not always synonymously. Philosophers found these forms useful 
to describe a state rather than an action, for example, τὸ δίδαγμα to indicate what has been 
learnt, in contrast to ἡ δίδαξις, ‘teaching’ or ‘instruction’; ἡ μάθησις ‘the process of learning’ 
to τὸ μἀθημα ‘the thing learnt.’ In Physics, Aristotle uses this distinction to introduce the 
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term ἡ πάθησις, translated as ‘a suffering,’ to denote the ἐνέργεια of the ‘passive’ side 
alongside ποίησις, ‘a doing.’ So, πάθησις is the process of passivity, πάθημα the passive state 
produced. Yet the actuality [ἔργον] and goal [τέλος] of activity, Aristotle states, is, of 
activity, ποίημα, and, of passivity, πάθος, not πάθημα.318 Indeed, Aristotle never uses singular 
πάθημα only plural πάθηματα.319 Whereas, in Plato, ποίημα is joined with πάθημα.320 
A common use of πάθος and πάθημα from Pre-Socratics onwards was to act as pronouns 
in the same way πάσχειν will act as pro-verb. Each new opposition demonstrates the 
expansion in noun’s senses. For example, in Aristophanes, πάθημα gains a positive sense 
akin to ‘fortitude’ through its opposition to τέχνασμα, ‘guile’ or ‘evasion’: 
τὰς συμφορὰς γὰρ οὐχὶ τοῖς τεχνάσμασιν / φέρειν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τοῖς παθήμασιν. 
one must not try to trick misfortune, but resign oneself to it with good grace.321 
In the same passage two lines later, the πάθημα gains a sexual sense in the violent (or 
comic) alignment of the male homosexual as ‘passive’ (i.e. receptive) sexual partner in its 
opposition to the privileged λόγος: 
καὶ μὴν σύ γ᾽, ὦ κατάπυγον, εὐρύπρωκτος εἶ οὐ τοῖς λόγοισιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς παθήμασιν. 
You certainly got your wide asshole, you faggot, not with words but in the spirit of 
submission!322 
An early association of πάθος with language arose in Aristotle’s Poetics who identifies 
πάθος as one of the three components of plot alongside reversal and recognition. πάθος is 
defined as ‘a destructive or painful action [ἡ πρᾶξις], such as public deaths, physical agony, 
woundings, etc’323. Aristotle also uses πάθος to describe an alteration of words: poets, being 
imitators, must represent things in language which includes strange words, metaphors and 
‘various modified forms of words [πάθη τῆς λέξεώς].’324 
Aristotle also makes an interesting remark on the difference between tragedy and epic: 
epic is more able to create wonder [τὸ θαυμαστόν] because it has ‘more scope for the 
irrational [τὸ ἄλογον]’ which is the chief cause of wonder. The ‘irrational’ gives more scope 
                                               
318 Aristotle, Physics, III.III.23-25. 
319 Aristotle, e.g. Generation of Animals, V.V. 
320 Plato, Sophist, 248b. 
321 Aristophanes, Thesmophoria, 199. 
322 Ibid., 200-1. 
323 Aristotle, Poetics, 1452b11-13. 
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for wonder because ‘we do not actually see the agent [τὸν πράττοντα]’ and, presumably, are 
left to wonder who or what caused the actions. But although a source of wonder, this can also 
be a source of falsehoods if, for example, we assume the absent agent to be the same as the 
one involved in similar, previously witnessed events.325 If, as Plato affirms, wonder is the 
beginning of philosophy and this wonder is a πάθος, we should link πάθος to the ‘irrational’ 
and absence of agent that gives the possibility of philosophy and error. And perhaps not 
translate ἄλογον as irrational but, if its root verb λέγειν means also to gather, or collect, then 
perhaps a disorganization where action and agent are not yet gathered together?326 
ΠΑΘΟΣ AS GRAMMATICAL VOICE: MIDDLE OR PASSIVE? 
The connection between πάσχειν and τίθημι in the Greek metaphysical system that persists 
in the choice of afficio to translate πάθος as well as its use by Aristotle to describe word 
changes is perhaps one reason why πάθος was chosen by Stoics and Alexandrine 
Grammarians to define one of the two grammatical ‘voices’ [διάθεσις from δια +τίθημι]: 
ἐνέργεια and πάθος. Whilst this division seems to suggest the division between ‘active’ and 
‘passive’ voice, we must be wary of projecting existing linguistic structures onto earlier 
systems. Contemporary linguistic understanding, as Benveniste makes clear, recognises that 
originally there was the active [ἐνέργεια] and middle [μεσότης] voice with the passive 
emerging from the middle: 
In the general development of the Indo-European languages, comparatists long ago 
established that the passive is a modality of the middle, from which it proceeds and 
with which it keeps close ties even when it has reached the state of a distinct category. 
The Indo-European stage of the verb is thus characterised by an opposition of only 
two diatheses, active and middle, to use the traditional terms.327 
But in a study of the difference between ancient grammars and modern grammars of 
Classical Greek, Codoñer makes the point that modern understandings of Greek grammar 
differed from that of ancient grammarians: ‘for ancient grammarians the middle voice 
[μεσότης] was never a regular diathesis in itself on the same level as the active and passive 
voices [ἐνέργεια / πάθος], but rather a formal anomaly only present in specific verbal 
paradigms.’328 Indeed, the middle voice was not considered a separate voice until the 
Renaissance. So how are we to map Benveniste’s claim that first there was active and middle 
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with passive emerging out of middle onto the Greek terms ἐνέργεια, μεσότης and πάθος? We 
will see that the modern active/middle/passive was distributed differently across 
ἐνέργεια/μεσότης/πάθος and what the ancients considered under πάθος actually bore some 
senses of what we today call middle voice. This can therefore help us understand further 
πάθος in senses other than mere passivity. 
One immediate difficulty in studying the middle voice is that morphologically middle and 
passive are the same in the present, perfect and imperfect. In the aorist, middle forms are 
middle only and a new aorist passive was formed from an older intransitive formation which 
had active endings while the future passive is formed by adding future middle endings to 
aorist passive stems. The context is supposed to make it clear which voice is intended. For 
example, passive voice is typically indicated by the presence of prepositions like ὕπο (in the 
case of human agents) or the dative (in the case of things) to indicate the cause or source of 
the suffering (‘suffering ill through the battle din of the Trojans’).329 
Let us take a chronological look at the development of voice in Greek grammar to clarify. 
Stoic Grammar 
The earliest treatment of grammar came with the Stoics. Diogenes discusses Chrysippus’s 
view of dialectic as a ‘doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in 
themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions 
comprising predicates.’330 A predicate [κατηγόρημα] is what is said of something and can be 
‘direct’ [ὀρθός], ‘reversed’ [ὕπτια]331 or neither [οὐδέτερα]. Direct predicates are constructed 
using ‘oblique cases’ (i.e. dative, genitive and accusative), reversed predicates with the 
‘passive part’ [τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ] and the ‘neither’ with neither of these. Examples of direct 
include ἀκούει (he/she/it hears, active voiced), ὁρᾷ (he/she/it sees, active) and διαλέγεται 
(he/she/it discusses, middle-passive). Examples of the ‘reversed’ are ἀκούομαι (I am heard, 
middle-passive) and ὁρῶμαι (I am seen, middle-passive). Neutral are those that correspond to 
neither, such as Φρονεῖ (he/she/it thinks, active) and Περιπατεῖ. (he/she/it walks, active).332 
Diogenes also discusses other predicates which are among the passive part of speech 
called ἀντιπεπονθότα typically translated as ‘reflexive.’ The Greek is from ἀντι + πάσχειν 
meaning to suffer in turn (as suffering good for good or evil for evil done). But Diogenes 
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adds, ‘although in form passive, they are yet active operations.’ He gives the example of ‘he 
gets his hair cut’ [κείρεται, middle-passive – note there is no agent specified here using ὕπο 
or dative]. Diogenes explains this is reflexive because ‘he surrounds himself in the sphere of 
his action’ [ἐμπεριέχει γὰρ ἑαυτὸν ὁ κειρόμενος].333 For the ‘action,’ Diogenes uses the 
middle-voiced articular present participle, ὁ κειρόμενος, literally ‘the hair-cutting’: the event 
itself within which he in-surrounds himself [ἑαυτόν]. This is therefore reflexive as he 
‘suffers’ the effect of the action he causes, he suffers his hair cutting in the hair cutting done. 
Thus in Stoic logic, ‘reflexivity’ was characterised using πάσχειν suggesting it signified not 
only passivity but reflexivity too. 
Dionysius Thrax 
Let us turn next to the τέχνη γραμματική of Pseudo-Dionysius Thrax, considered to be the 
first surviving grammar of the Greek language dating from around 2nd-1st century BC and 
one of the first to mention an active [ἐνέργεια], passive [πάθος] and ‘middle voice’ 
[μεσότης].334 Thrax exemplifies ἐνέργεια by τύπτω ‘I strike’ (modern active) and passive by 
τύπτομαι ‘I am struck’ (modern middle-passive). He then defines the middle voice as 
sometimes signifying ἐνέργεια, sometimes πάθος giving the examples πέπηγα ‘I am fixed to 
the spot’ (modern active voiced), διέφθορα ‘I am ruined’ (modern active voiced), ἐποιησάμην 
‘I made for myself’ (modern middle aorist), and ἐγραψάμην ‘I wrote down for my own 
benefit’ (modern middle aorist).335 Dionysius therefore includes what we now consider active 
voiced verbs as examples of μεσότης confirming this different distribution of 
active/middle/passive. 
Renaissance Grammars 
To complicate things further, active voiced verbs were also treated as ‘reflexive.’ In the 
Byzantine grammar of Planudes (c. 1260 – c. 1305), Planudes discusses reflexive verbs using 
the example λούομαι which signifies in the active to wash another, in the passive to be 
washed and in the middle, to wash oneself. Planudes renders the construction ὁ ἐαυτὸν λούων 
(literally, the washing himself) as a ‘reflexive’ but then labels it active (ἐνέργεια): ‘“because 
it does not happen that the person suffers this action by another.” ’336 Codoñer therefore 
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argues that the ‘active’ voice is interpreted as ‘the absence of an agent other than the 
subject.’337 
In the grammar books of this time, middle forms were not listed as a third column 
alongside ἐνέργεια and πάθος. It was only with Theodore Gaza in 1495 that a third column in 
grammar books, between ἐνέργεια and πάθος was introduced and labelled the middle voice 
mostly out of convenience although he gave no definition of this middle column.338 Then, 
Ludolf Küstler (1670-1716) gave a definition of this third column and the middle voice as 
expressing active and passive at the same time. Codoñer argues this definition arose because 
Küstler probably misunderstood the ancient definitions of middle voice who defined it as 
‘alternatively sharing the active and passive diathetical meanings’ not active and passive at 
the same time.339 This definition then became incorporated into standard Greek grammars and 
a standard concept in modern Greek grammars after the 18th century. 
Modern interpretations 
For Codoñer, the real problem of comparing Ancient and Modern grammars arises from a 
difference in the treatment of direct and indirect reflexive values, which he defines as: 
Direct reflexive applies when the subject of the reflexive verb is perceived at the same 
time, either syntactically or semantically, as the direct object of the action: λούεται / 
λούεται ἑαυτόν / λούεται τὸ σῶμα: He washed himself. 
Indirect reflexive refers to a reflexive verb that has a direct object different from the 
subject or, to put it in other terms, where the agent and the beneficiary of the action 
are identical but other than the goal or direct object: ἐποιήσατο ἄδειαν: He obtained 
immunity for himself.340 
Modern understanding of Greek middle voice incorporates all reflexive usages, both direct 
and indirect, whereas these were distributed differently in Ancient grammars so that ἐνέργεια 
voice included both active and indirect reflexive values and πάθος both passive and direct 
reflexive values; μεσότης then included both ἐνέργεια and πάθος voiced verbs depending on 
paradigms or verbal tenses. In many examples from ancient Grammarians, Codoñer shows 
how, barring one exception, middle forms characterised as ἐνέργεια had an indirect reflexive 
value and middle forms characterised as πάθος a direct reflexive value. Codoñer therefore 
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concludes that ‘under πάθος, the Greek grammarians likely included some reflexive values, 
for in both passive and reflexive verbs the subject is affected by the action’ and that πάθος ‘is 
wholly compatible with the reflexive values we attribute to the middle voice today.’341 Thus 
the term πάθος in relation to grammatical voice not only had a passive meaning of suffering 
an action by something external but a direct reflexive value as well.342 
But we should be wary of characterisations of the modern middle voice as reflexivity as 
this can reintroduce the active and passive by positing an active subject and passive subject-
as-object or splitting entities like the self into an active soul and passive body. This 
simultaneity of active and passive is a problem for Greek metaphysics: Codoñer shows how 
Planudes had compared activity and passivity with hot and cold to argue there is no 
possibility of ‘a compromise between two incompatible concepts.’343. Codoñer expands on 
this argument: 
no grammarian ever conceived of the idea of explaining the meanings of some forms, 
especially aorists like ἐποιησάμην and ἐτυψάμην, in terms of reflexivity, as this 
implied in a certain way the simultaneity of activity and passivity within one single 
verbal form. Such simultaneity was considered an oxymoron by Greek grammarians, 
which followed old philosophical concepts that excluded the coexistence of 
opposites.344 
Yet, describing it as reflexivity using a subject/object distinction raises the problem that 
the Greeks did not know this distinction between subject and object. How are we then to 
understand the sense of πάθος as a simultaneity other than as a simultaneity of active and 
passive or subject and object? 
Let us consider this question further by focusing on the link of πάθος to ‘affect.’ The 
connection of affect with πάθος through translation is reinforced by modern linguists’ 
characterization of the middle voice as depending on the ‘affectedness’ of the subject. For 
example, Benveniste characterises the middle voice as finally coming down to ‘situating 
positions of the subject with respect to the process, according to whether it is exterior or 
interior to it, and to qualifying it as agent, depending on whether it effects, in the active, or 
whether it effects while being affected, in the middle.’345 Codoñer translates παθητικὴ 
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διάθεσις as ‘affective voice’ and argues ‘in both passive and reflexive values the subject is 
affected by the action.’346 Bakker says the specific feature of the middle voice is ‘the 
affectedness of the subject of the verb in, or by, the event denoted by the verb’347. Lyons 
defines the middle voice as expressing events in which the ‘action or state affects the subject 
of the verb or his interests.’348 Meanwhile, Allan argues the middle voice shows that ‘the 
subject is affected by the event’ or, in other words, ‘the subject, in some way or other, 
undergoes an effect of the event.’ 
Does affect then describe this simultaneity of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ of the verb’s action? 
And with ‘effects while being affected,’ is this not an auto-affection? Does πάθος as 
describing direct reflexive values of the middle voice contain an originary sense of auto-
affection or, indeed, auto-hetero-affection? Furthermore, Allan is quick to point out that his 
use of affect is not in ‘a narrower, emotional meaning.’ What is required, he says, is a 
broader definition of affect and affectedness because 
if we are tempted to interpret affect and affectedness in a narrower sense, that is, as an 
equivalent of the ancient term πάθος, we inevitably run into trouble, since the notion 
πάθος pertains to passivity, as opposed to ἐνέργεια which pertains to activity. The 
ancient grammarians, however, are clear in that they consider indirect reflexive 
middle verbs such as ἐποιησάμην, ἐγραψάμην as having an ἐνέργεια-meaning.349 
But perhaps the problem here is that πάθος has been understood in a ‘narrower sense,’ 
reduced to passivity understood as not being ἐνέργεια, activity. Codoñer affirms this 
misunderstanding of πάθος as passivity: he argues this narrowing arose in part because ‘it 
was generally assumed that the ancient πάθος was to be translated as “passivity” in a parallel 
meaning to the meaning the terms “passivitas’ or “passivus” acquired in Latin grammars.’350 
This sense of passivity was further solidified by the three column approach to the voices 
which expelled the ‘middle forms’ of πάθος (i.e. the direct reflexive values). Is there another, 
broader sense of πάθος that can give us the sense of affect Allan seeks? In the same way as 
the passive voice emerged from the middle voice, did the sense of πάθος as passivity emerge 
from an earlier, broader sense of πάθος that would better explain why the Ancient 
Grammarians chose this term to describe passive constructions and direct reflexives? 
                                               
346 Codoñer, Grammars, 83, 81. Emphasis added. 
347 Bakker, Voice, 24. 
348 Lyons, Introduction, 373. 
349 Allan, Polysemy, 17-18. 
350 Codoñer, ‘Grammars,’ 81. 
 4 – Πάθος before ‘passivity’ 
 
Page 103 of 240 
Perhaps we can venture here the wider sense of πάθος as signifying an experience or event 
in which there is no explicit separation between the actor and action or between affect and 
effect. There must of course be implicit differences in this action for the action to take place 
(as in the hair-cutting or Aristotle’s wondrous epics) but we must insist these have not been 
made explicit: there is merely hair-cutting, I have not yet made the distinction that I cut my 
hair. A making explicit would then manifest the split as inside/outside, subject/object or 
active/passive. As Benveniste argues, in the move from middle to active voice, transitivity is 
added, there is a separation between subject and object. When a verb is endowed with an 
active form, the subject moves from being interior to the process to being the agent of it and 
so the middle gets converted into a transitive. We can add that the move to the passive is 
made through the addition of ὕπο or dative constructions. Yet Benveniste also adds that 
middle voice as interior to the process can still include transitivity, for example, λύεται τὸν 
ἵππον, ‘he untethers the horse, thereby affecting himself’ whereby it emerges that the horse is 
his.351 We are reminded of Derrida’s statement on the middle voice in relation to différance: 
‘for the middle voice, a certain nontransitivity, may be what philosophy, at its outset, 
distributed into an active and a passive voice, thereby constituting itself by means of this 
repression.352 
Codoñer’s conclusion is that ‘the term πάθος most probably simply meant ‘affection’ in 
accordance with the primary meaning of the Greek term related to the verb πάσχειν.’353 But 
understanding πάθος as affection does not help us if we are trying to understand affect as 
πάθος! Let us then turn to the verb πάσχειν to understand πάθος and ‘affect’ further. 
ROOT VERB: ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ 
Liddell-Scott identify four main senses of the verb. First is to ‘have something done to 
one, suffer’ that is often opposed to verbs of doing like ποιεῖν or with prepositions, typically 
ὑπό, ‘to be treated so and so by another, suffer at its hands.’ Second, ‘to be affected in a 
certain way, be (or come to be) in a certain state of mind’ or ‘entertain certain feelings’ which 
can also be applied to things ‘this is the case with...’ and of words ‘to be subject to certain 
changes’ or ‘to be passive in meaning.’ Third, with adverbs like κακως (‘bad’) in a negative 
sense, to be in evil plight or unlucky or with the preposition ὑπό, ‘to be ill-used, ill-treated 
by’ or with εὖ to be well off, in a good case, with genitive, to have the good of, enjoy one’s 
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own, receive benefits. Without adverbs, it is used with reference to evil, to suffer anything 
whatever, including death or to suffer punishment in law, pay the penalty. In idiomatic 
expressions τί πάθω; to express perplexity (‘what is to become of me?’ or ‘what can I do?’) 
or τί πάσχεις; ‘what's the matter with you?’ ‘or what are you about?’ Or just to be ill or suffer 
with accusative of the part affected. Finally, in later Stoic Philosophy, πάσχειν is ‘to be acted 
upon by outward objects, take impressions from or have experience of them.354 
Whilst the sense of receiving an action by something external is common, this is typically 
only when the verb is used with prepositions like ὕπο or the dative to indicate the agent or 
cause. Indeed, Boreham argues this sense of πάσχειν as ‘passivity’ understood as to have 
something done to one imposed from outside should not be assumed to be any ‘radical’ or 
primary sense of the verb. Instead, Boreham identifies four main functions of the verb: to 
denote physical hardship or mental distress; as ‘passive’ or pro-verb to verbs of activity; as 
synonym for πράσσω (‘to effect or bring about’) and ἕχω (‘to have’) when used 
intransitively; and in idioms such as ‘τί πάθω;’ to express perplexity. The sense of passivity 
that comes to dominate perhaps most arises with its use as pro-verb or ‘passive,’ although, 
after our discussion of grammar, we should be careful again in deciding what this ‘passive’ 
means. Let us examine its changing uses to attempt an answer. This dominance neglects the 
senses of physical or mental distress, perplexity and intransitive senses of effecting or having, 
effecting or having without any direct object specified. 
Homer (c. 800BC) 
Boreham identifies four restrictions on Homer’s use of πάσχειν: it is never used with a 
non-personal subject only in relation to Gods or humans, never animals or inanimate objects; 
it is never employed with a plural subject used collectively other than proper nouns; it carries 
a sense of suffering mainly mental, sometimes physical, but is always valenced negatively.355 
Finally, it is associated with a limited number of neuter nouns, to indicate what is being 
suffered, including ἄλγος ‘pain,’ πῆμα ‘misery or calamity,’ ἔργα ‘work or deeds wrought.’ 
Only four other words fulfil these restrictions: ἄχθομαι, ‘to be loaded,’ carries a sense of 
burden, a heavy heart; μογέω, used for both physical and mental distress; ὀιζύω, used mainly 
of persons but sometimes of conditions and inclines toward physical effort and toil; and 
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words deriving from the xτλα- root such as τλάω, to suffer or undergo. But these are not 
exactly synonyms and their differences are informative: ἄχθομαι as burden relates to a 
specific occurrence whereas πάσχειν is used in more general situations of indefinite duration; 
μογέω implies an effort or struggle not present in πάσχειν; ὀιζύω inclines only toward 
physical effort and toil, not mental; and τλάω has a connotation of enduring steadfastly or 
bearing a misfortune that πάσχειν does not have. In short, πάσχειν seems to be broader and 
vaguer without explicitly indicating effort or enduring, any response to the indefinite event. 
Homer uses πάσχειν in two specialised, idiomatic uses that will continue throughout 
classical Greek literature to give a sense of circumstances beyond one’s control that is no 
doubt developed from its use as passive to verbs of ‘action’: one in the subjunctive aorist, 
πάθω, with τί to mean ‘what will happen’ or ‘what is being to us that…’ usually with 
negative implications: 
ὤ μοι ἐγὼ τί πάθω; 
Ah me, what will become of me?356 
And one in aorist participle with τί to mean ‘why?’ 
Ἀμφίμεδον, τί παθόντες ἐρεμνὴν γαῖαν ἔδυτε 
Amphimedon, what has befallen you that you have come down beneath the dark 
earth...357 
The sense of being unwitting recipient of an action whose agent or instrument has been 
identified is conveyed using prepositions (most often ὕπο, ‘under,’ but also ἐκ, ‘out of,’ and, 
later πρὸς, ‘toward’): 
ἀλλ᾽ αἰνῶς δείδοικα κατὰ φρένα μή τι πάθωσιν 
Ἀργείων οἳ ἄριστοι ὑπὸ Τρώων ὀρυμαγδοῦ. 
...dreadfully do I fear in my heart that those best of the Argives have suffered some 
harm through the battle din of the Trojans.358 
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The sense that suffering an action at the hands of something is opposed to or different 
from one’s own actions is demonstrated by an early example of opposing πάσχειν to the verb 
ἔρδω, ‘to do’ or ‘to make’: 
ὅσσ᾽ ἔρξαν τ᾽ ἔπαθόν τε καὶ ὅσσ᾽ ἐμόγησαν Ἀχαιοί, 
all that [the Achaeans] did and suffered, and all the toils they endured.359 
Πάσχειν in Homer therefore most generally indicates adverse changes in mental or 
physical circumstances of Gods or humans beyond their control, understanding or expectation 
of indefinite duration that are neutral as to effort or struggle nor signifies any enduring or 
bearing steadfastly. Only with the identification of the agent or instrument does the verb gain 
the sense of being caused by something external or other. 
Post-Homer 
In the Pre-Socratic philosophers (600—440BC), πάσχειν is no longer confined to human 
or divine subjects, but is used with the inanimate and abstract. Whilst Herodotus also 
expanded the application of πάσχειν to inanimate objects like rivers and statues as well as 
animals, e.g. fish, its abstract usage was specific to these philosophers and is not found in any 
non-technical authors of prose or verse with the exception of Xenophon. It continues to 
denote physical hardship or mental distress and its function as ‘passive’ of verbs of ‘doing’ is 
considerably extended. Its pairing with ποιεῖν becomes established as central to Greek 
philosophy. Here is Antiphon (c. 480-411BC): 
ἐλπίδες δ’ οὐ πανταχοῦ ἀγαθόν· πολλοὺς γὰρ τοιαῦται ἐλπίδες κατέβαλον εἰς 
ἀνηκέστους συμφοράς, ἃ δ’ ἐδόκουν τοὺς πέλας ποιήσειν, παθόντες ταῦτα 
ἀνεφάνησαν αὐτοί. 
Hopes are not always a good thing: for hopes of this sort have cast many men into 
incurable misfortunes, and the evil they expected to inflict on others they turned out to 
suffer themselves.360 
In the tragedians, the four restrictions to the usage of πάσχειν in Homer get relaxed further 
such that it is no longer used only with personal subjects, it is no longer confined to a limited 
number of internal nouns and adjectives and is used with a collective plural subject in 
Thrasymachus. It continues to be used of both physical and mental distress and to act as 
passive and pro-verb to an expanding range of verbs, many outside the semantic field of 
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suffering. For example, in Sophocles’s Electra it is used as pro-verb to κλύειν, ‘to hear’ when 
Chrysothemis says he would put up with hearing Electra’s criticism as well as when she 
praised him, Electra replies ‘You will never suffer that from me!’361 Or in Oedipus at 
Colonna as reciprocal passive to δικαίαν χάριν παρασχεῖν, i.e. ‘to give a fair requital for his 
treatment.’362 
As the comic poets utilise more of the vernacular language, Boreham thought it probable 
conventional literary usages of πάσχειν would be relaxed despite, as expected, fewer uses of 
the ‘tragic’ sense of ‘to suffer.’ Indeed, it is more commonly used in a good sense, for 
example: 
ὦ μακάριε τῆς τύχης / ὅσον πέπονθας ἀγαθὸν ἐς τὰ πράγματα. 
Spoilt child of fortune, everything fits together to ensure your greatness.363 
The use with the preposition ὑπό to indicate the instrument continues as well as the idiom 
τί πάθω although it gains a new sense of indifference rather than mere perplexity364. 
The use of πάσχειν as pro-verb continues in Aristophanes’s Clouds, as pro-verb for ‘being 
fined’: 
καὶ προσαπολεῖς ἄρ᾽ αὐτὰ πρὸς ταῖς δώδεκα. 
καίτοι σε τοῦτό γ᾽ οὐχὶ βούλομαι παθεῖν, 
Then you will lose it besides, in addition to your twelve minae. And yet I do not wish 
you to suffer this.365 
A discussion of Plato and Aristotle’s use of this word was given in Chapter 3 in the senses 
of experience, emotion, attribute or state and as binding (in its opposition to ποιεῖν). Boreham 
argues this wide usage may have arisen partly because the freedom of choice for expressions 
of ‘experience, reaction, feeling, behaviour and sensation’ was limited so they found πάσχειν 
appropriate for the expression of many abstract processes of thought and their ‘passive’: 
Greek lacked other words to denote the passive of αισθάνομαι (‘to perceive, feel’) 
(apart from the awkward periphrasis αἴσθησιν παρέχειν), οἶδα, μανθάνω and 
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ἐπιστῆμαι, for example and πάσχειν was admirably suited to fill this gap in the 
semantic mechanics of the language.366 
The use with abstract entities continues, for example to denote the effect of the action of 
an abstract entity (λόγος) again using ὑπό: 
ἐάν τι πάθωμεν πλημμελὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου 
if any false note in the argument does us any harm.367 
It continues to be used in a good sense (four instances in Plato with εὖ, one with ἀγαυά 
and one with ἄλλο ἡδύ).368 But, in both philosophers, Boreham claims πάσχειν is little used 
in the sense of physical or mental distress for which they instead used ἀλγέω, to feel bodily 
pain, ἀνιαομαι to grieve, distress, or κάμνω, to work or labour. 
Thus πάσχειν develops after Homer by becoming both good and bad, applicable to 
animals, inanimate and abstract not just Gods and humans, and by its expanding use as pro-
verb particularly in the analysis of experience by Plato and Aristotle. 
Boreham ultimately describes πάσχειν as a ‘philological paradox’ because of its ability to 
fill specific semantic lacunae as passive or pro-verb to an expanding list of verbs and nouns 
whilst at the same time being marked by syntactic limitations in the words it is compatible 
with.369 Boreham suggests the key to understanding πάσχειν is as metaphor, if metaphor is 
understood as ‘something that is more remote, less concrete, less vivid, is referred to in terms 
of something similar.’ He writes: ‘here perhaps lies the key to the adoption of πάσχειν by the 
Philosophers for metaphysical purposes beyond its simple sense of “suffering.” ’370 Is 
πάσχειν as metaphor a neat symbol of a making manifest, of a ‘carrying across,’ a making 
known by separation of the unmanifest in the adding of transitivity that ‘activity’ adds? 
Πάθος as the perplexing (or indifferent) bindings of implicit differences beyond one’s control 
that precede any separation of action and agent, subject/object, active/passive; πάθος, through 
its use as pro-verb, signifies the vast unmanifest, intransitive realm of that which is 
metaphorized through reference to something known. 
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Boreham suggests that one reason for this paradoxical nature is that, despite its importance 
to Greek, it has few affinities with other languages.371 Let us then examine these affinities 
through discussion of its Proto-Indo-European roots. 
PROTO-INDO EUROPEAN ROOTS OF ΠΆΣΧΕΙΝ: BINDING 
Despite the antiquity and importance of the verb, πάσχειν cannot be definitively identified 
with words in other languages but its origins probably lies in the Indo-European root 
*bhendh- which Pokorny and Boisacq identify with roots meaning ‘to bind’ (bindet), 
‘captivate,’ ‘fascinate’ (fesselt), ‘capture’ (nimmt gefangen), ‘add’ (fügt zus) or ‘entangled’ 
(verstrickt).372 Other derivatives can then be understood through this sense of binding 
connections: πεῖσμα ‘ship’s cable’ or ‘rope,’ πενθερός ‘father-in-law’ or, more generally, any 
connection by marriage. It is from this root we get the English range of ‘band,’ ‘bend,’ ‘bind,’ 
‘bond,’ ‘bundle.’ Beekes in his more recent etymological dictionary of Greek echoes this 
probable etymology and adds that there may have been a semantic shift in the intransitive 
usage from ‘bound’ to ‘suffer.’373 Janda, in a work on the Eleusinian Mysteries, notes that 
words related to ‘to suffer’ or ‘to be ill’ or physical or mental states of stress as well as words 
related to ‘magic’ and ‘spell’ both share an older meaning ‘to bind.’374 Meanwhile, Leumann 
argues that this idea of being bound led to two metaphorical uses even in ancient Indo-
European times: first ‘to the idea of being bound by illness’ and second to ‘the idea of being 
bound by guilt.’375 
Binding in the Rig Veda 
The Proto-Indo-European bhendh- is also the root of the Sanskrit: bandhá or bandhu 
(bond) which is a key term in the Upanishads. Roberto Calasso writes of a notable example 
of its use in the ‘creation hymn’ of the Rig Veda: 
Desire came upon that one in the beginning; that was the first seed of mind. Poets 
seeking in their heart with wisdom found the bond [bandhu] of existence in non-
existence. 
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Their cord was extended across. Was there below? Was there above? There were 
seed-placers; there were powers. There was impulse beneath; there was giving-forth 
above.376 
Calasso argues this ‘bond’ challenges 
the Parmenidean prohibition on conceiving a passage from nonbeing to being. And 
they do so using the most precious word: bandhu, ‘nexus, ‘bond,’ ‘tie.’ Thought, for 
the rsis, was itself none other than a way of ascertaining and establishing bandhus. 
This was the beginning, and the culmination. Thought could offer nothing else. And it 
was clear that the first of these bandhus had to be the one between asat and sat. Here, 
once again, if the two words asat and sat mean ‘unmanifest’ and ‘manifest’ – and not 
‘nonbeing’ and ‘being,’ which are too Greek – then the formula seems far clearer: 
because the manifest must continually draw upon the unmanifest.377 
Calasso discusses the perplexing next verse: ‘the bandhu found by the poets inquiring into 
their heart was a “rope stretched across.” Across what, we are not told. In fact, it is followed 
by the questions “What was below? What was above?” ’378 Prasad, in his reading, lingers 
over the meaning of this ‘rope’ (raśmih) and proposes it be interpreted in line with many 
other verses in the Rig Veda where the universe is described as sacrifice or as warp and woof 
in the metaphor of the loom.379 The common idea is of preparing a ground for work, outlines, 
of both a sacrificial area and the warp and woof which is formed by the ‘stretching of cord or 
thread, which are to be filled up as the work progresses and also because of the similar 
physical movements, forward and backward, both in the performance of a sacrifice and the 
working of a loom.’ This ‘rope stretched across’ therefore represents ‘the warp and woof of 
the universe, and this, in its turn, signifies the divisions of time and space, in which all the 
beings live, move and have their being.’380 
Whilst space does not permit a more detailed comparison of Indian and Greek philosophy, 
it is striking to note here the mention of bonds as ropes stretched that bind manifest to 
unmanifest that precede and prompt questions of what is above and what below. If above and 
below are linked to the Greek ὕπο/ὕπερ as active/passive then we have again a binding prior 
to or producing the active and passive. Furthermore, this rope as ‘stretched’ would link to the 
Greek τείνω root also of Latin tendo and our modern-day intention. Or the Greek ὀρέγειν 
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source also of ὄρεξις, desire or conation. This sense of stretching or reaching out is 
mentioned in Plato’s Phaedo and links us to the sense of affecto as yearning or desire. In 
question is if this binding is prior to or produces the (desire for) active/passive then this 
binding would need to be conceived without the active/passive and cannot therefore be a 
binding and a being-bound, this would merely raise the question of who or what binds. 
Binding in Ancient Greece: μῆτις 
Let us return to Ancient Greece to consider bindings and their relation to πάσχειν. One 
notable discussion of binding is in Détienne and Vernant’s discussion of ‘cunning 
intelligence’ (μῆτις) in Greek culture which, they argue, is expressed by the images of ‘the 
reversal, the bond and the circle.’381 
Relatively little has been written on μῆτις in comparison to philosophical intelligence 
mainly, they argue, because ‘Platonic Truth, which has overshadowed a whole area of 
intelligence with its own kinds of understanding, has never really ceased to haunt Western 
metaphysical thought.’382 The authors hold Aristotle and Plato most responsible for this 
neglect as they rejected μῆτις as unsure, unstable, aligned with the contingent and subordinate 
to true philosophical wisdom. But, through their rejection, they actually help identify two 
major qualities of μῆτις: ἀγχίνοια (alertness, quick-wittedness) and εὐστοχία (a steady eye to 
hit the target). These skills are demonstrated in, for example, sophistry, medicine and politics, 
skills Plato condemns. For example, in Philebus, Plato ‘makes a distinction between human 
achievements which are dependent upon uncertain knowledge and those which are based 
upon exactitude.’ Only the latter can belong to science, ἐπιστήμη. Aristotle, however, is 
perhaps less severe in his condemnation. The Nicomachean Ethics, for example, could be 
seen to be embracing again ‘the traditions of the orators and sophists and the types of 
knowledge which are subject to contingency and directed towards beings affected by 
change.’ Aristotle also admits that ‘there can be a type of knowledge bearing upon what is 
inexact even if, like its subject, this knowledge can itself only be inexact.’383 
To further understand μῆτις, the authors discuss Hephaestus’s μῆτις and his magical power 
of binding that reveals the fundamental features which ensure victory and success for 
μῆτις.384 In a passage from Odyssey, Hephaestus discovers his wife, Aphrodite, is having an 
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affair with Ares. In response, Hephaestus forges a network of fine, invisible chains to bind 
them in flagrante in his wedding bed. Hephaestus’s bonds are described as ‘inextricable,’ 
δεσμοὶ ἀπείρονες.385 Détienne and Vernant ask after the meaning of apeiron here. A key 
concept for Greek philosophy, it is typically interpreted as the unbounded or limitless. A 
linguistic analysis of apeiron, composed of the privative a- and peiron, identifies two main 
interpretations: first, where peiron is understood either as limit, end extremity and bond (it 
can refer to the ends of rope for example). As bond, it is notably used in the Odyssey when 
Odysseus lashes himself to the ship’s mast to evade the sirens.386 These bonds are sometimes 
called peirata, sometimes desmoi. Second, through reference to peiron’s Proto-Indo 
European root, *per, to mean passage or crossing. This sense of path links the apeiron to 
signals, to nautical navigation, to that which constructs a bridge between the visible and 
invisible: 
Greeks call apeiros or apeiritos not because it is without limits or boundaries but 
because it is the expanse that cannot be crossed (perao) from one side to the other, an 
impassable expanse where a path is obliterated as soon as it is made and disappears 
from the everchanging, smooth surface of the waters.387 
These two senses complicate the semantic field of peirar: 
The first depended entirely upon the antithetical complementarity of peirar-apeiron: 
peirar denoted a type of path opened up in a defined area while apeiron meant, by 
contrast, that which cannot be crossed and to which there is no ultimate limit. On the 
other hand the second trend was for the same terms peirar and apeiron to mean 
‘bond’ and to form, not a contrasting pair, but rather a new complementary 
combination conveying the paradoxical image of a peirar apeiron: an impassable 
bond and an inextricable path.388 
To resolve the question, the authors argue for a method similar to that of Benveniste’s 
analysis of τρέφω: 
the ‘meaning’ of a linguistic form is to be determined by the sum total of the ways in 
which it is used. Thus the problem is not to deduce one meaning from another but 
rather to understand what kind of relationship the Greeks may have established 
between a path and a bond and how it is that the sense of ‘binding’ of the word peirar, 
– a meaning which appears quite different from that of ‘journeying’ which is 
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suggested in other contexts – may in fact simply be a variation of the latter 
meaning.389 
In answer, they cite Porphyry as the authority who says that ‘the idea of apeiron refers to 
the power of these bonds which [...] extend on every side, having neither end nor beginning, 
neither péras nor archē.’390 Vernant argues that Homer therefore chooses apeiron to describe 
Hephaestus’s bonds because the bonds are circular, in the form of rings, as circles are 
without beginning or end. Metis is therefore related to apeiron as binding and circularity 
because circular bonds express one of the fundamental characteristics of metis: ‘To exercise 
all its powers the intelligence of cunning needs the circular reciprocity between what is bound 
and what is binding.’391 Key words in this binding are to weave (πλέκειν) and twist 
(στρέφειν): for example, ‘Strophaios is also the name given by the Greeks to the sophist who 
knows how to interweave (sumplekein) and twist together (strephein) speeches (logoi) and 
artifices (mechanai).’392 
But how does this link to πάθος? If μῆτις is expressed by the image of binding, of placing 
someone in circular bonds that entrap them, could we venture it is the skill of μῆτις that binds 
and creates a πάθος? However, there is little evidence of a direct relation between μῆτις and 
πάθος in textual evidence. Two suggestions occur in Odyssey: Odysseus has to endure 
[πάσχειν] his many griefs and submit to the violence of his house guests as part of Athena’s 
cunning plan [μῆτις];393 and μῆτις is twice referred to as a means of ending suffering 
[πάσχειν].394 Furthermore, if μῆτις is opposed to true philosophical knowledge is might also 
then be aligned with the ‘irrational’ of πάθος as absence of agent, or at least ‘ungathered’ 
action and agent. If philosophy busied itself with understanding the coupled opposites as 
separated bindings, is there another knowledge concerned with the bindings themselves prior 
to any separation? If πάθος also describes a direct reflexive where action and agent are not 
separated, where the action is perhaps circular in the binding of action and agent, is this not 
akin to the circular bindings of μήτις? But we must again be careful of bindings that precede 
the active and passive: if they do, it cannot be said that something can make a binding as this 
would imply a passivity. Bindings simply are? Or, μῆτις ‘creates’ bonds as circular 
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reciprocities between active and passive that entrap and ensnare. And μῆτις is required to 
extricate from such bonds. Perhaps μῆτις as creating or releasing active/passive binds is 
therefore somehow ‘outside’ the active/passive? 
PASSIONS BEFORE PASSIVITY: BINDINGS OF IMPLICIT DIFFERENCES 
To summarise, this section attempted to show how affect, as translation of πάθος, is 
implicated in past metaphysics of coupled opposites, particularly the active/passive, mainly 
by how πάθος came to be dominated by senses of passivity in its opposition to activity, as a 
change arising from an external imposition. But the senses of πάθος were shown to have a 
broader significance of bindings of implicit differences prior to any separation between agent 
and action, active and passive. This broader usage is evident in its idiomatic expressions of 
perplexity or uncertainty, as the wonder-making absence of agent in Epic poetry, its choice to 
describe a diathesis that incorporated passive and direct reflexives where the subject is the 
same (and yet not the same) as the object. The argument therefore is that just as the passive 
and middle separated out of a πάθος voice that incorporated both, a similar move happened 
with πάθος where its sense of passivity emerged out of a broader sense of direct reflexive 
bindings, binds which bind across the ἄπειρον in the warp and weft that binds manifest to 
unmanifest. It is in this sense akin to the middle voice which both Derrida and Irigaray evoke 
as a means of overcoming the active/passive. Finally, etymological roots link it to senses of 
binding invoked in physical (ropes and their end as ἄπειρον), empirical emotions and familial 
ties that perhaps explains its extension to ontological and metaphysical bindings. Through a 
discussion of μῆτις we see how these bindings when circular are ensnaring and inextricable, 
requiring μῆτις to free oneself. And in this we are reminded of Berlant’s ‘cruel optimism’ or 
Sedgwick and Frank’s conceptual impasses where ‘it is possible to recognise the mechanism 
of a problem, but trying to remedy it, or even in fact articulate it, simply adds propulsive 
energy to that very mechanism.’ 395 
Viewed diachronically, we can note both a narrowing and enlarging in who suffers, what 
is suffered (from only negative to positive and negative) and the verbs it is opposed or 
passive to. In Homer, only Gods and humans suffer pain which expands to the positive or 
negative suffering of inanimate and animals and then, in philosophy, to the abstract. Is there 
generally a flattening of agency and diversification of causation? No doubt with the intention 
of reducing error but can we also witness a spreading attempt at mastery? What enables such 
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a broad and expanding application of πάσχειν is its sense of the unmanifest or unknown or, at 
least, the implicit, the hidden or non-present, surely the broadest sense there is. In the 
expression pathemata mathemata, it is this unknown that teaches, not the known. And as the 
known expands — in the form of the changing verbs πάσχειν is opposed to — the unknown 
or implicit (πάσχειν) remains the same. 
We could interpret these changes using Irigaray’s identification of conceptions of affect 
arising from masculine auto-affection for the affordances are striking. Originating with grief 
and sorrow, mourning for a lost other, πάσχειν applies only to humans and their Gods. A 
feminine state ἡ πάθη that grammatically is yet active, productive, is neglected with the turn 
to the neuter πάθος. This becomes densely implicated in a metaphysics of coupled opposites 
such that affects can only be viewed as disturbing impositions from an outside and 
possibilities for growth are conceived only in terms of reversals of actions and passions 
(ἀντιπεπονθότα) rather than any mutual differentiation toward other affects. Why does πάθος 
replace πένθος, grief, loss, separation? A grief that is the impetus to the move to a mastery of 
affects through reducing them to coupled opposites, as perturbing impositions that must be 
mastered, diluted, applied to everything (and so nothing) rather than any differentiation of a 
masculine subjectivity from the work of mourning, of separation from the original active 
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5 
ANCIENT NEUROLOGY: MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 
In order to show the conceptual basis of the turn to affect in the neurosciences, we first 
need to understand what this was a turn from. At its most radical, this requires an 
investigation into the roots of contemporary neuroscience in the conflictual relation between 
ancient Greek medicine and ancient Greek philosophy to show how modern concepts of 
neuroscience continue this conflict through a dependence on and differentiation of conceptual 
schemas of past metaphysics, explicitly through the naming of key terms, implicitly through 
conceptual relations. The main source of its dependence perhaps arises from a concept that is 
common to both philosophy and medicine: πάθος meaning, most generally, that which 
happens to a person or thing (and thus senses of passivity) and, in medicine, any ailment or 
disease. This links medicine with a Greek metaphysics of coupled opposites and the concept 
of δύναμις or powers, active and passive capacities of affecting or being affected by 
something other. This chapter demonstrates how these concepts influence early 
conceptualisations and perceptions of the neurological organism as a sensory and moving 
organism so that causation is understood by the brain being source and agent. 
The conflictual relation between medicine and philosophy can already be evidenced in 
early Greek writers with some seeking unity, others strict separation. This separation or 
identity will inform later chapters in the idea of ‘two neurosciences’ that will be exemplified 
by the difference between Hippocrates and Galen: where one rejects philosophy and its 
method as concerned with the super-sensible and seeks a method that is more akin to the 
helmsman and politician (Hippocrates), the other will seek out medicine using Platonic 
philosophy (Galen). In this dispute, we should consider did one emerge out of the other or 
was there a separation from a common ancestor? Which is more originary? The former view 
is supported by Celsus (2nd century CE) in his De Medicina: 
At first the science of healing was held to be part of philosophy, so that treatment of 
disease and contemplation of the nature of things began through the same authorities; 
clearly because healing was needed especially by those whose bodily strength had 
been weakened by restless thinking and night-watching. Hence we find that many 
who professed philosophy became expert in medicine, the most celebrated being 
Pythagoras, Empedocles and Democritus.396 
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Celsus argues it was Hippocrates who was the first to separate medicine from philosophy 
and so we begin with him (i.e. the corpus of writings ascribed to him) before moving to 
Galen and his attempt to combine medicine and philosophy. Galen will therefore require 
some discussion of the Greek philosophy he tries to incorporate. 
THE BRAIN AND NEURON IN ANCIENT GREECE 
The claim to a proto-neuroscience in ancient Greece can be tracked through the Greek 
derivation of the term neuron, νεῦρον, which originally meant sinew or rope. In combination 
it also described a shoe-mender as they who work with laces (νευρορράϕος) or a puppet 
controlled by strings (νευρόσπαστον). This sense of strings is then transferred to the nerve 
and tendon of the living organism. In Latin, this became nervus, which again had the sense of 
strings, cords or wires alongside sinews, tendons nerves.397 The specific term neurology for 
the science of the nerves came into English via Willis’s use of νευρολογίας in the Latin 
Cerebri Anatome (1664) which Pordage would translate into English as neurology: ‘our 
Method demands of us, that...by the cense or numbering of the Nerves, being particularly 
made, we should deliver an exact Neurology or Doctrine of the Nerves.’398 
Pythagoras saw nerves, together with veins and sinews, as the ‘bonds of the soul’: 
The soul of man, he says, is divided into three parts, intelligence, reason, and passion. 
Intelligence and passion are possessed by other animals as well, but reason by man 
alone. The seat of the soul extends from the heart to the brain; the part of it which is in 
the heart is passion, while the parts located in the brain are reason and intelligence. 
The senses are distillations from these. Reason is immortal, all else mortal. The soul 
draws nourishment from the blood; the faculties of the soul are winds, for they as well 
as the soul are invisible, just as the aether is invisible. The veins, arteries, and sinews 
[τὰ νεῦρα] are the bonds of the soul [δεσμά τῆς ψυχῆς].399 
These ‘nerves’ became central to the early importance accorded to the brain. Hippocratic 
writings offers a proto-neuroscience in their understanding of the brain and nervous system 
through these ‘strings’ and were among the early physicians who affirmed the centrality of 
the brain (ὁ ἐγκέφαλος, literally, that which is inside the head). Hippocrates writes: ‘Men 
ought to know that from nothing else but the brain [ἐγκέφαλος] come joys, delights, laughter 
and sports, and sorrows, griefs, despondency and lamentations’ and that ‘the brain is the most 
                                               
397 Celsus uses nervus to translate the Greek τένων in the context of the ‘straight and powerful sinews’ that 
hold up the head. Medicine, 8.13. 
398 Willis, Cerebri Anatome, xix. 230; Willis, Anatomy, xix. 130. 
399 Laertius, Lives, 8.1 30-31. 
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powerful [δύναμιν πλείστην] organ of the human body.’400 Before him, Alcmaeon of Croton 
(5th Century BC) had performed dissections, described the optic nerve, and similarly argued 
the brain was the central organ of thought. 
Systematic human (mainly in Alexandria) and animal dissections (in Greece) yielded 
anatomical knowledge, some of which is still accurate to this day. A follower of Hippocrates, 
for example, wrote about parts of the brain including the cerebellum, cerebrum and ventricles 
and distinguished between tendons and nerves and between sensory and motor nerves. 
Hippocrates gave the name ‘tenon’ [τενων] to the nerves as a whole, root of our ‘tendon,’ the 
band of dense fibrous tissue forming the termination of a muscle by which it is attached to a 
bone or other part. Τένων is from τείνω which means ‘to stretch.’ 
If Pythagoras saw neurons as bonds of the soul, others rejected its relation to the soul and 
to true knowledge, perhaps most notably in Plato’s Phaedo where Socrates describes his 
intellectual training under Anaxagoras. Initially drawn to Anaxagoras’s theory that νοῦς was 
the cause of all things, Socrates believed this meant one should understand ‘in whatever way 
it is better for each one to act and be acted [πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν] upon by these motions that they 
undergo.’401 Anaxagoras would demonstrate, for example, that the earth was flat and round 
because that was the best way for it to be. Socrates hoped Anaxagoras would go on to teach 
the common good for all but his hope was dashed as, actually, Anaxagoras made no use of 
νοῦς but listed causes like air, ether, water and many other ‘strange things’ which 
seemed to me much like saying that Socrates’s actions are all due to his mind, and 
then in trying to tell the causes of everything I do, to say that the reason that I am 
sitting here is because my body consists of bones and sinews [ἐξ ὀστῶν καὶ νεύρων], 
because the bones are hard and are separated by joints, that the sinews are such as to 
contract and relax, that they surround the bones along with flesh and skin which hold 
them together, then as the bones are hanging in their sockets, the relaxation and 
contraction of the sinews enable me to bend my limbs, and that is the cause of my 
sitting here with my limbs bent.402 
But the problem with positing bones and sinews as the true cause is that it confuses the 
‘real cause’ with ‘the thing without which the cause could never be a cause.’403 For it is right 
to say I could not do what I decided to do without them but it is incorrect to say they are the 
                                               
400 Hippocrates, Sacred Disease, XVII. 1 (174-5); XIX. 1 (178-79). 
401 Plato, Phaedo, 98a. 
402 Plato, Phaedo, 99a-b. 
403 Ibid., 99b. 
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cause of what I do. Socrates’s ‘true cause,’ however, must be external to the things which 
enable the cause to be the cause and will be found by investigating the truth of things by 
words and the assumption of the existence of the Forms, of things-in-themselves like the 
Good. Already the problem of agency and causation, whether bindings of the soul or bindings 
of the Good, who or what causes neurons to relax and contract? In answer, a method is 
required to extract an agent from this ‘binding-without-agent.’ This agent will then need to be 
purely active (as Plato’s forms or Aristotle’s unmoved mover) to avoid infinite regress. The 
underlying problem is that any binding, such as those of bones and sinews, can only be 
conceived using active and passive. 
HIPPOCRATES’S SEPARATION OF PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICINE 
Hippocrates rejects the intrusion of philosophy into medicine: 
Certain physicians and philosophers assert that nobody can know medicine who is 
ignorant what a man is; he who would treat patients properly must, they say, learn 
this. But the question they raise is one for philosophy; it is the province of those who, 
like Empedocles, have written on natural science, what man is from the beginning, 
how he came into being at the first, and from what elements he was originally 
constructed. But my view is, first, that all that philosophers or physicians have said or 
written on natural science no more pertains to medicine than to painting.404 
Hippocrates considered medicine more similar to other fields like politics and navigation. 
The art of the doctor (ὁ ἰατρός) avoiding disease was compared with the art of the navigator 
(ὁ κυβερνήτης) avoiding shipwreck: 
most physicians seem to me to be in the same case as bad pilots; the mistakes of the 
latter are unnoticed so long as they are, steering in a calm, but, when a great storm 
overtakes them with a violent gale, all men realise clearly then that it is their 
ignorance and blundering which have lost the ship. So also when bad physicians, who 
comprise the great majority, treat men who are suffering from no serious complaint, 
so that the greatest blunders would not affect them seriously [...] they are not shown 
up in their true colours to laymen if their errors are confined to such cases; but when 
they meet with a severe, violent and dangerous illness, then it is that their errors and 
want of skill are manifest to all.405 
Like the sea, disease was said to be ποικίλος, changeable and unstable, and so the doctor 
must consider all the circumstances attending the disease to inform their judgements: 
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from the common nature of all and the particular nature of the individual, from the 
disease, the patient, the regimen prescribed and the prescriber [...]; from the 
constitution, both as a whole and with respect to the parts, of the weather and of each 
region; from the custom, mode of life, practices and ages of each patient; from talk, 
manner, silence, thoughts, sleep or absence of sleep, the nature and time of dreams, 
pluckings, scratchings, tears; from the exacerbations, stools, urine, sputa, vomit, the 
antecedents and consequents of each member in the successions of diseases, and the 
abscessions to a fatal issue or a crisis, sweat, rigor, chill, cough, sneezes, hiccoughs, 
breathing, belchings, flatulence, silent or noisy, hemorrhages, and hemorrhoids.406 
He is therefore keen to demolish the ascription of any ‘divine’ or origin to diseases instead 
trying to understand their natural causes through careful examination of their patients. He 
writes that people ascribe a divine cause because of inexperience or their ‘wonder at its 
peculiar character.’407 Wonder [θαυμάζω] as absence of agent which leads people to posit a 
divine cause but which Hippocrates, through experience and absence of wonder, is keen to 
shift to the non-divine. 
Hippocrates insists on the importance of the opportune moment in treating patients: ‘if 
diseases that should be treated early in the day are handled at midday’ then they take ‘a turn 
for the worse because their treatment was not opportune.’ This ‘turn’ is also central to 
Hippocrates: the turn, ῥοπή from ῥέπω to incline downwards, sink or fall, is the critical 
moment, the turning point in the course of a disease when a decisive change, a crisis (κρίνω, 
a separating or discriminating, a judgement or decision) occurs and events are turned and 
reversed so that the powers of the doctor can win against those of the disease. 
Hippocrates’s discourse is a discourse of powers (δύναμις) and we would do well to 
consider in the question of whether medicine or philosophy was ‘more originary’ whether 
this concept originally belonged to medicine or philosophy. The discussion of δύναμις is 
framed in terms of mastery and domination: ‘in cases where we may have the mastery 
[ἐπικρατεῖν] through the means afforded by a natural constitution or by an art, there we may 
be craftsmen, but nowhere else.’408 Dynamis was a key concept in Greek philosophy and 
derives from the verb δύναμαι, to be able to, to be strong enough. In its noun form it comes to 
mean force or strength, the capacity or ability to do something. This power framed in terms of 
coupled opposites of a power of ποιεῖν or πάσχειν which will be often translated as a capacity 
to affect something or to be affected by something. It is from the verb πάσχειν we get the 
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noun πάθος or πάθημα (plural πάθη / πάθηματα) that describe that from which the patient 
‘suffers’ or undergoes. The subject of medicine is therefore ‘simply and solely the sufferings 
[τῶν παθημάτων] of these same ordinary folk when they are sick or in pain.’409 And a πάθος 
must be overcome by something stronger but ‘whenever therefore a man suffers [πάθῃ] from 
an ill which is too strong for the means at the disposal of medicine, he surely must not even 
expect that it can be overcome by medicine.’410 
One way Hippocrates tries to separate medicine from philosophy is by firmly rejecting the 
method of ὑπόθεσις that Plato expounds in the Phaedo. Hippocrates argues this method 
belongs to those regions where sense-perception fails us, to the celestial and subterranean 
regions.411 We thus see again the separation of the sensible and super-sensible, metaphysical 
and empirical. For Hippocrates, medicine only has ‘bodily sensation’ as measure and its 
method must concern itself with sense-perception and not the method of ὑπόθεσις that 
properly belongs to the super-sensible. If πάθος is common to both discourses, sensation 
[αἴσθησις] is perhaps what separates them. 
Medicine therefore needs its own method which, for Hippocrates, will be prognosis, 
literally a ‘knowing before,’ a foreknowledge or prediction which comprises three operations: 
reflection on the current situation, comparison with similar past cases and concluding from 
these to predict the development of the diseases. Anticipation, the meeting of dangers in 
advance, seems not have played as central a part in Hippocrates’s therapy perhaps because 
the range of treatments available was limited; it was more about implementing regimens to 
make the patient comfortable and reduce pain as well as removing that part of suffering 
related to the uncertainty of how the disease will unfold. 
But it is insufficient to merely predict the future based on the past, he must also conjecture 
(τεκμαίρεσθαι), ‘infer from a combination of all the symptoms’412. This τεκμαίρεσθαι means 
to fix by a mark or boundary as well as to judge from signs, to conjecture, hence the 
similarity to helmsmen navigating, predicting the future of a safe passage, through reading 
the signs of the stars and the sea, marks or points as pathmarks on a journey. Also required in 
this conjecture is ‘some kind of measure’ which will be bodily sensation: 
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no measure, neither number nor weight, by reference to which knowledge can be 
made exact [ἀκριβές], can be found except bodily feeling [τοῦ σώματος τὴν 
αἴσθησιν]. Wherefore it is laborious to make knowledge so exact that only small 
mistakes are made here and there. And that physician who makes only small mistakes 
would win my hearty praise. Perfectly exact truth is but rarely to be seen.413 
Reinforcing the separation between philosophy and medicine, Plato condemns this inexact 
form of knowledge. In the Philebus Plato distinguishes between achievements based on 
uncertain and certain knowledge: key to true wisdom (sophia) is the very counting, 
measuring and weighing medicine lacks; if we were to remove these from the arts and crafts 
all that remains would be 
to conjecture and to drill the perceptions [αἴσθησις] by practice and experience, with 
the additional use of the powers of guessing [στοχαστικός], which are commonly 
called arts and acquire their efficacy by practice and toil.414 
Yet Aristotle will occupy a place between Plato and Hippocrates, showing how medicine 
and philosophy overlap but how one must be attentive to the differences in method. At the 
conclusion of On Respiration, Aristotle writes: 
As for health and disease it is the business not only of the physician but also of the 
natural philosopher to discuss their causes up to a point. But the way in which these 
two classes of inquirers differ and consider different problems must not escape us, 
since the facts prove that up to a point their activities have the same scope; for those 
physicians who have subtle and inquiring minds have something to say about natural 
science, and claim to derive their principles therefrom, and the most accomplished of 
those who deal with natural science tend to conclude with medical principles.415 
GALEN’S RECONCILIATION 
The next major figure in our roots of neuroscience is Galen (129 AD – c. 200/c. 216) who 
sought not to separate but reconcile medicine and philosophy by demonstrating how 
empirical anatomical evidence could inform philosophy and vice versa. It is also with Galen 
that the centrality of the brain and the nerves which emerge from it becomes further 
consolidated. Galen would, through anatomical dissections of animals trace all nerves back to 
their source in the brain. In this he disagreed with his otherwise beloved Aristotle who 
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believed it was the heart because, ‘not all the instruments of the senses extend to the ear.’ 
Galen responds incredulously: 
Aristotle! What a thing for you to say! Does not a nerve of considerable size along 
with the membranes themselves enter each ear? Does not a portion of the encephalon 
much larger than that proceeding to the ears come to each side of the nose?416 
Anatomy falsifies Aristotle’s claims: Galen also observed that when the beating heart of 
an animal was held with tongs, the animal is observed to suffer no impairment of sensory or 
voluntary movement: ‘when the heart is thus separated off, only the movement of the arteries 
is impaired, and the animal is not otherwise affected.’417 The heart cannot therefore be the 
source of agency. The evidence of anatomy, Galen thought, could enable medicine and 
philosophy to interact with each other to mutual benefit. 
Whilst visible evidence refuted Aristotle, it could also support arguments like Plato’s 
claim for the tripartite division of the soul.418 In his work On the Doctrines of Hippocrates 
and Plato, Galen argues that Plato and Hippocrates agreed in their views on the powers 
(δύναμις) which govern us and whether they have their source in the heart alone as Aristotle 
and Theophrastus believed, or whether it is better to posit three sources for them as 
Hippocrates and Plato proposed. Galen’s answer will be that the brain, heart and liver are the 
sources of the powers and that ‘the seat of the soul’s governing part is enclosed in the brain, 
that of its spirited part in the heart, and that of its desiderative part in the liver.’419 
But there is a mutual influence because it is not purely through empirical observation that 
Galen decides on the rightness of a philosophical view, what he observes is heavily 
influenced by philosophical categories. As we will see, perception is not a passive reception 
of sense-data, but an active interpretation influenced by the conceptual apparatus held. The 
main conceptual schema seems to be that of powers of active/passive, of acting and being 
acted on. Galen makes numerous references to this opposition, favouring ἔργα for the ‘active’ 
side whilst consistently using πάθη for the ‘passive’: 
And by the verses he [Chrysippus] quoted he also indicated adequately the actions 
and affections of the powers [τὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἔργα τε καὶ πάθη].420 
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This pairing establishes the brain as source: 
In Substance the encephalon is very like the nerves, of which it was meant to be the 
source, except that it is softer, and this was proper for a part that was to receive all 
sensations, form all images, and apprehend all ideas. For a substance easily altered is 
most suitable for such actions and affections [εργοις τε και παθημασιν] and a soft 
substance is always more easily altered than one that is harder.421 
Galen will also link the active/passive to the master/slave: ‘for the liver appears not as 
servant [ὑπηρέτης] who prepares suitable material for his master [ἡγουμένῳ], but as the 
master himself, who has the authority to distribute the material (as he pleases).’422 
The influence of philosophy on observation is also evident from Galen’s method. He 
writes that we must first state the definition of the essence of each thing under investigation 
to use as guide for the particulars and so ‘only one argument was formulated scientifically’: 
‘where the beginning of the nerves is, there is also the governing part of the soul.’423 This 
method is based on Aristotle’s teaching that we should look to ‘the action and use [την 
ἐνέργειαν και χρείαν] of every organ [ὄργανον], not to its structure, when we investigate its 
“being.” ’ So, if we were to ask what is ‘being’ for the eye, we would say it is an organ of 
sight instead of describing its structure as ‘moist bodies and tunics and membranes and 
muscles, so many in number, of such and such kinds, and arranged in such and such a way.’ 
What distinguishes each part of the human body is the ‘actions and uses’ of each part.424 
Galen therefore identifies the beginning, the origin, with the governing and active already 
implying a strict linear cause/effect paradigm that is aligned with the master/slave, 
active/passive: 
If, therefore, we are to investigate methodically the number and kinds of faculties, we 
must begin with the effects [τῶν ἔργων]; for each of these effects comes from a 
certain activity [ὑπό τινος ἐνεργείας], and each of these again is preceded by a 
cause.425 
Galen provides a helpful definition of the term action: 
Now, of course, I mean by an effect [ἔργον] that which has already come into 
existence and has been completed by the activity [ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας] of these 
faculties—for example, blood, flesh, or nerve. And activity [ἐνέργειαν] is the name I 
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give to the active change or motion [τὴν δραστικὴν κίνησιν], and the cause of this I 
call a faculty [δύναμιν].426 
Passion (for which Galen uses πάθημα or πάθος) is then defined as that which prevents 
activity, differentiated from the ‘active’ by the difference between voluntary and involuntary, 
passions as circumstances beyond one’s control. For example, ‘I call unforced the inhalation 
of animals in good health and engaged in no violent movement, and I call forced that which 
occurs in certain affections (πάθεσι) and in violent exercises.’427 
But Galen goes on to differentiate two senses of activity and passivity in answering the 
question are desire, anger and the like activities (ἐνεργείας) or affections (πάθη). The first 
sense is that ἐνέργεια is an active motion (κίνησίς δραστική) coming from the object itself 
and πάθος is a motion in one thing that comes from some other thing. The second sense is 
that ἐνέργεια is motion according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν) and πάθος a motion contrary to 
nature (παρὰ φύσιν). This ‘according to nature’ means ‘that which occurs through the agency 
of nature in the first instance’ which in turn means ‘that which nature seeks as an end, and not 
that which necessarily follows on something else.’ An ‘active’ motion is therefore a motion 
that ‘has its beginning within the thing moved’ whereas a πάθος is a motion ‘imparted by 
something else.’428 This means a single thing may be called both an ἐνέργεια and a πάθος 
such as an irregular or excessive pulse of the heart for it is active in the sense of it moves of 
itself but is passive in that it is not in accordance with nature, it being excessive. Or, the case 
of anger: it is an activity in the first sense but insofar as it is immoderate it is a πάθος in the 
second sense. 
Galen also drew on the active/passive and voluntary/involuntary distinction in relation to 
movement by the muscles describing those movements not under our will as ‘natural.’ For all 
voluntary movements, ‘nature has prepared muscles which move the parts by means of 
tendons inserted into them’ and every part that can be moved voluntarily, 
needs at least two muscles set to oppose one another [ἀντιτεταγμένων ἀλλήλοις] and 
capable the one of extending, the other of flexing it [του μεν ἐχτείνειν, του δε 
κάμπτειν δυναμένου], and I have also shown that no muscle can perform both 
movements, because it always draws toward it the part to be moved and, being but 
single itself, has only one position.429 
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This opposition of stretching and contraction is again aligned with the active/passive: 
For, since, each limb, set in motion by muscles – as though by reins – has to divide its 
activity between two sides, has one muscle tense and relaxed alternately. The 
contracted muscle pulls toward itself, while the relaxed muscle is pulled along with its 
part; therefore both muscles move during the performance of each of the two 
movements for activity consists in tension of the part which moves and not in the 
action of obeying; and a muscle obeys when it is pulled in a passive state, just like any 
other part of the limb.430 
Thus the tensing is that which the relaxing muscle obeys and so tensing is the activity and 
the obeying the passive state. It is no surprise that the ‘master’ is therefore aligned with the 
active and the passive with the slave that obeys. This passage is highly illustrative of the 
general argument that a metaphysics of coupled opposites, governed by the active and 
passive, has influenced early conceptualisations of the neurological organism. In later 
chapters, we will see how this conceptualisation is replaced or continues to pervade 
neurobiology. 
Another metaphysical claim that Galen believes can be confirmed through anatomical 
knowledge is the theory of the soul’s divisions. The difference between Plato and Aristotle, 
Galen claims, is that while Plato maintains a tripartite division in the soul Aristotle maintains 
‘there are powers of a single substance [μιᾶς οὐσιας] which stems from the heart.’431 
Division, whether of parts of powers, is necessary again because of an axiom of the 
active/passive distinction on which he undertakes to build his demonstration: 
It is evident that the same thing will not consent to do or undergo [ποιεῖν ἤ πάσχειν] 
opposite things at the same time [ἅμα] in the same respect, and in relation to the same 
object.432 
Similarly, the same thing cannot be at rest and in motion at the same time so if a man was 
standing in one place but moving his hands, we should not say he is both at rest and in motion 
but say that one part of him is at rest, another is in motion. So if the soul is to experience 
actions and passions at the same time, as in the example of anger, then it must also be divided 
into parts. To be, one needs to be split. 
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GALEN’S CRITICISM OF THE STOICS 
But whilst Galen’s book began with the aim of defending Plato’s position on the tripartite 
soul against Aristotle and his cardiocentrism, it is thought that when the first books of the 
work were published, an ‘eminent sophist’ accused Galen of not responding sufficiently to 
the Stoic Chrysippus’s argument that the rational part of the soul is in the heart. So Galen 
added a long refutation of Chrysippus (and Stoicism in general). 
Amongst the critiques, Galen criticises Zeno’s statement that ‘speech passes through the 
windpipe.’ Galen thought this ‘passes’ meant ‘goes out’ or ‘is sent out’ but Zeno denied this 
meaning. ‘Pass’ is χωρεῖν, to make room for another, give way or withdraw. When pressed as 
to what it did mean, however, Zeno was unable to give a definitive answer. Galen then 
substitutes the less obscure phrasing ‘speech is sent out through the windpipe.’ This should 
not be interpreted to mean ‘if it were passing from the brain, it would not pass through the 
windpipe’ because it sophistically hides behind an ambiguity (ἀμφιβολίαν) of the verbal form 
in the hope of escaping refutation: it is unsound because it contains ‘from’ (άπὸ). Chrysippus 
should have used ‘by’ or ‘out of’ (ὑπὸ or ῾ἐξ) for these are unambiguous unlike ‘from’ which 
could mean either ‘by’ or ‘out of.’ Speech through the windpipe is sent by and out of 
something, ‘by the power which sets the container in motion’ [ὑπό τινος δ᾽ὡς δυνάμεως 
κινούσης τὸ περιέχον]. The choice of this ὑπὸ is instructive: ὑπὸ commonly denotes the 
instrument by which something undergoes something in ‘passive’ constructions using the 
verb πάσχειν, to undergo. Galen gives the example of urinating: 
it goes out through the genitals (τὸ οὖρον ἐξέρχεται μὲν διὰ τοῦ αἰδοίου), and it is 
sent out of a vessel (ἐκπέμπεται δ´ἐξ ἀγγείου) which is the bladder that lies above 
them (μὲν τῆς ὑπερκειμένης κύστεως) but by a power (ὑπὸ δυνάμεως) that causes the 
bladder to contract in order to press out the urine.433 
‘From’ would be unclear here because it could mean ‘out of’ or ‘by’ and so these latter 
two are substituted. The agent and source must be unambiguous and exact, an insistence no 
doubt related to Galen’s search for the ἀρχή, for the source of nerves, blood, etc. 
Galen takes issue with Chrysippus for his ambiguity in choice of words: it is as if he were 
saying ‘descending up’ or ‘talking with a stone’ and then justifying it with sophistical 
reasons434. Chrysippus’s liking of ambiguity was manifested in his paradoxes and play on 
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words. For example, Diogenes Laertius begins his account of Chrysippus with one of his 
many paradoxes or amphibolies such as: 
If you say something, it passes through your lips: now you say wagon, consequently a 
wagon passes through your lips.435 
Galen refuses ambiguity: ‘we shouldn’t use words with a meaning other than the usual 
one.’436 For all Galen’s quest to rid medicine of ambiguity, later authors would nevertheless 
judge his writings as tedious, uncongenial, pettifogging, convoluted or full of fanciful 
metaphors.437 This quest for clarity and ridding of ambiguity has always been haunted by 
another intelligence that exploits the ambiguities of language and the inescapability of 
metaphor particularly in describing the mental realm. 
Galen then discusses what is sent out: with the heart, blood, with the brain, pneuma: 
just as the body of the heart, as it alternately dilates and contracts of itself, draws 
matter in and sends it out again, in the same way the brain, when it chooses to send to 
some member a portion of the pneuma contained in its own ventricles, which we call 
psychic, executes the motion suitable to this end and thus sends the pneuma.438 
This introduction of pneuma is worth remark for it represents another change from 
Hippocrates. For Hippocrates, pneuma meant the wind, the external wind of southerlies, 
northerlies, etc. (another factor that the doctor has to consider in the identification and 
prognosis of diseases) whereas pneuma internal to the body was considered as breath (φῦσα). 
Hippocrates nevertheless insisted on the unity of the internal and external pneuma, 
disruptions of which are a cause of disease. But with Galen, the focus and concern will move 
to the internal movement of this pneuma to the neglect of the contingent and unrelated 
movements of the external winds and severs the unity with them. Galen metaphorizes the 
search for the origin by describing the distribution of water in a city: ‘you would not pass 
over its first entrance and find some other point from which to begin the account’439. The 
problem with this metaphor, however, is that this water is lost either in consumption or in 
flowing out of the city whereas pneuma as purely internal, like blood, would circulate in a 
closed circuit. 
                                               
435 Laertius, 7.1.7. Deleuze discusses these paradoxes in Logic of Sense. 
436 Galen, Hippocrates and Plato, 2: 250.4. 
437 See Kuriyama, Expressiveness of the Body, 68-69. 
438 Ibid., Hippocrates and Plato, 1: 231. 
439 Ibid., Hippocrates and Plato, 2: 395. 
 Neuroscience 
Page 132 of 240 
Perhaps something is lost in Galen’s substitution of ἐξέρχομαι for χωρέω that also reflects 
this problem of metaphor. Let us examine χωρέω in Stoic usage. It does not appear in 
Diogenes’s section on Chrysippus but does feature in the Zeno chapter and we can note 
several relevant uses. First, in the sense of becoming: 
By this time he had almost become [ἐχώρησεν] a proverb. At all events, ‘More 
temperate than Zeno the philosopher’ was a current saying about him.440 
Second, in the sense of ‘pervading all’ which links διά (‘through’) to the name for God: 
They give the name Dia (Δία) because all things are due to (διά) him ; Zeus (Ζῆνα) in 
so far as he is the cause of life (ζῆν) or pervades all life [κεχώρηκεν].441 
But, most notably, in relation to ‘a passing through’ that is exemplified by bones and 
sinews: 
The world, in their view, is ordered by reason and providence: so says Chrysippus [...] 
inasmuch as reason pervades every part of it, just as does the soul in us. Only there is 
a difference of degree; in some parts there is more of it, in others less. For through 
some parts it passes [κεχώρηκεν active perfect infinitive of χωρέω] as a ‘hold’ or 
containing force [ἕξις], as is the case with our bones and sinews [τῶν ὀστῶν καὶ τῶν 
νεύρων]; while through others it passes as intelligence, as in the ruling part of the soul 
[ἡγεμονικοῦ].442 
What passes through or pervades is held to be the ruling principle or power of the world 
and acts as a principle of cohesion, a ‘stable state’ [καθ᾽ ἕξιν]. Galen’s ‘sending out’ requires 
an ἀρχή, a master and a slave, active and passive whereas there could be some alternative to 
this model in the idea of χωρέω for example as omnipresent circulating pneuma differing in 
relative intensities, in different parts (like blood oxygen levels differentiation (BOLD) in 
modern day fMRI measures of brain activity – you are using 100% of your brain 100% of the 
time, just that you are using some parts more than others). 
One final point Galen attacks Chrysippus for is his invocation of myth to confirm his 
theory of cardiocentrism. Chrysippus brings up and dismisses the argument of those who 
would say the governing part of the soul is in the head through reference to the story of the 
birth of Athena (who is wisdom and thought) from the head of Zeus. This for Chrysippus 
‘signifies that the governing part is there.’443 Whilst versions of the myth differ, the common 
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important element is that Zeus swallowed Metis who then gave birth to Athena inside Zeus. 
Chrysippus interprets this as showing if Metis is a kind of ‘wisdom and art in practical 
matters’ then these arts must be ‘swallowed and stored up within us’ which then gives birth to 
a daughter similar to its mother.444 This art would emerge most readily, Chrysippus argues, 
through the mouth in speech by way of the head and it is in this way that we are to understand 
this emerging from the head in the myth – wisdom is spoken out of the mouth. 
Galen’s alternative interpretation of the myth, using his concept of sent out pneuma, is that 
wisdom, that is, psychic pneuma, after being conceived in the lower parts, reaches full 
development in the head, especially the top of the head, because that is the location of 
the brain’s middle and most important ventricle.445 
Ultimately, however, Galen believes Chrysippus should have abandoned this myth and not 
wasted his time on explaining their hidden meanings. 
SEPARATION OR UNIFICATION: WHAT REMAINS THE SAME 
Early medicine in its development from Hippocrates to Galen thus already attests to the 
conflictual relation between philosophy and medicine: the Hippocratic writers sought to 
separate themselves from philosophy whilst with Galen and Aristotle this separation seemed 
to have softened. Despite this alternation of separation and combination, we can note several 
fixations that remain relatively constant throughout the alternations over the next two 
centuries. 
First, the move from a concern with external wind and its unification with internal wind to 
the internalisation of this wind as breath, the spiritualization of pneuma from a material 
external phenomenon to an internal, individual breath that will become the immaterial 
spiritus of Christianity. 
Second, the preoccupation with muscle conceived through the opposition of active 
extension and passive contraction that was introduced sometime between Hippocrates and 
Galen. The Greek word for muscle, μύς, is used only once by Homer and does not appear in 
Herodotus, Thucydides or Plato. Plato’s Timaeus, for example, speaks only of flesh [σάρξ] 
and sinew [νεῦρον]. Hippocrates makes sparing reference to muscles for example in defining 
the heart as a ‘muscle’ where muscle is only defined as ‘of flesh which is not cordlike 
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[νεῦρον], but compressed [πιλήματι σαρκός].’446 This focus on muscle, whilst seemingly 
obvious, is actually historically and culturally specific. In his comparative study of Greek and 
Chinese medicine, Kuriyama notes that the preoccupation with muscle is not apparent in 
Chinese medicine. He presents two figures of the human body: one from Vesalius’s Fabrica 
(1543) and one from Hua Shou's Shisijing fahui (1341) and notes also that the Chinese 
doctors lacked a specific word for muscle.447 The preoccupation in the West arose in part 
through the influence of Plato’s teleology in the Timaeus but also Aristotle’s nature as an 
immanent force shaping biological beings. Whereas flesh was therefore concerned more with 
how the body looked, muscles foreground how the body worked. 
Third, is the theory of organs which matured after Hippocrates. Body parts can be 
identified in many ways but what makes a part an organ is its role in some activity like 
seeing, talking, walking. Here is Galen: 
I call an organ a part of an animal which performs a complete function: for example, 
the eye [effects] sight, the tongue speech, the legs walking, and in like manner, an 
artery, a vein and a nerve are both organs and also parts of animals.448 
Underlying all three is an implicit dependence on a δύναμις of active and passive. This 
δύναμις is interdependent with the conception of an autonomous will – muscles are therefore 
required for the active movements of this autonomous agent. This autonomy also marks a 
shift from Aristotle to Galen as Canguilhem has noted: for Aristotle, ‘all movement depends 
on a primal unmoved mover,’ a supernatural act derived from the divine ether that enters the 
human embryo as soul. Whereas for Galen, movement is ‘the expression of an internal 
spontaneity … the effect of a force immanent in the organism.’449 If anatomy and dissection, 
and the focus on organs arose from a Platonic view of teleology, the shift to Galen’s 
spontaneity marks also a shift from divine agency or origin to those of autonomous agents 
and their spontaneous movements. The ‘passive’ is evident with the centrality of πάθος: 
illness is seen as a πάθος, a hidden or obscure disease whose symptoms (from the Greek 
σύμπτωμα a chance occurrence, literally, a falling together used by Galen)450 must be read 
and interpreted by the doctor to establish a path from the external manifestations of the 
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expressive body to its hidden ailment and to effect an alteration in this binding through the 
active δύναμις of the doctor and their medications. 
This is not to criticise this model of medicine. Perhaps the active/passive is necessary for 
the effecting of medical therapies and cures and medicine of course has made great advances 
in the treatment and understanding of the body and its ailments through it. It aims instead to 
manifest the conceptual basis underpinning much of the science from Galen to at least the 
nineteenth century (the subject of the next chapter) and to discuss alternatives through East-
West comparisons to demonstrate whilst the body may or may not be a universal structure, 
everywhere the same, its understanding and therapy is nevertheless strongly enmeshed with 
the way in which it is conceptualised. And if concepts are strongly based on the necessity of 
‘scientific’ language, the removal of ambiguity and rejection of the metaphorical for the 
literal, then science as long as it uses language will be haunted by something other, another 
intelligence, as manifested in the ambiguities and amphibolies of Chrysippus. But also, 
affirming Galen, that through empirical observation, biology itself can affect those 
conceptions. In short, it is to manifest a reciprocity between philosophy and biology where 
neither is master nor slave to the other. Furthermore, that there might be an ‘other’ science 
demonstrated in the different attitudes toward philosophy of Hippocrates and Galen. Whilst 
Hippocrates seems to affirm a practice of uncertain knowledge, more akin to the helmsman 
and sophist, separate from philosophy, Galen, through Plato, condemns these forms of 
knowledge replacing it with the Platonic truth and search for unambiguous language that 
would dominate philosophy as much as neuroscience for the next two millennia. We will see 
in the next chapters how this ‘other neurosciences’ continues to haunt the Galenic model. 
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6 
19TH CENTURY NEUROSCIENCE 
Galen’s influence on medicine was extensive and medical models in the West typically 
continued with similar ideas until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This chapter will 
therefore continue the investigation into the roots of contemporary neuroscience by 
examining this period when the new discipline of neurology overturned Galenic models, 
emerged from a more general ‘medicine’ and attempted to separate itself from overtly 
philosophical foundations to ones from the newly emerging fields of physics. I discuss four 
main aspects to this: first, how the discovery of reflex actions through the spinal cord that did 
not pass through the brain challenged Galen’s notion of the hegemonic brain sending and 
receiving all nerve impulses; second, cell theory and its application to the nervous system that 
gave a new understanding of ‘neuron’ not as sinews or tendons but as a ‘nerve-cell’ of axons, 
cell body and dendrites; third, the transference of the problem of what flows between neurons 
from a spiritualised pneuma to physical principles of energy; finally, how πάθος as linking 
the medical and philosophical is replaced by the concept affect (from the German Affekt and 
its translation as emotion) to link the physical and the physiological. 
Despite the attempt to extricate themselves from philosophy, philosophy continued to 
influence this emerging science via the intellectual climate of 19th century philosophy. 
Specifically, in Germany the influence of a Romantic philosophy of nature (mainly 
Schelling) produced a belief in and search for the synthesis and unity of general laws which 
believed the human organism ‘could not be understood in isolation, but that its relations to 
the rest of the organic world and even with inorganic nature must be discovered if knowledge 
was to advance.’451. In France, a transcendental anatomy dominated led by Étienne Hilaire 
which privileged a priori reasoning that transcended sense experience. Meanwhile, Britain 
saw an eclectic mix of both. The main differences were in how much pure speculation there 
was.  
Yet these philosophies were of course derived from the metaphysics of Greek philosophy 
that had influenced Galen but any δύναμις of active/passive now gets transferred onto the 
physical notion of energy, its constancy and transformations. But the aim of this chapter will 
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also be to demonstrate how early neurobiology yielded an implicit challenge to its inherited 
conceptual system through the resistance of the biological to fit the system imposed on it. 
CEREBROSPINAL AXIS DISPLACES CENTRALITY OF THE BRAIN 
First is the challenge to the Galenic model of the brain as sole origin and centre of the 
nervous system that discoveries of the functions of the spinal cord presented. Microscopic 
studies of this axis, revealed accumulations of grey matter, named ‘ganglions,’ thought to be 
particular centres of action. This led the French physician and neurologist Vulpian, for 
example, to write in 1866: 
we believe that the spinal cord is not only, as Galen believed, and as has been 
reiterated for a great many ages since him, a large nerve gathering together all the 
nerves of the body in order to conduct them to the brain but that it is at the same time 
a true nervous centre endowed with very remarkable functions.452 
The modern nervous system then became viewed more as a unity of multiple centres of 
autonomous activity rather than a hegemonic brain as source and agent of all action, a view 
strengthened by the discovery of the autonomy of the spinal cord in reflex actions (actions 
performed without conscious intention, automatic responses to stimuli like the knee reflex). 
These reflex actions related to the earlier concept of ‘sympathy’ (Latin consensus), an 
‘undergoing together’ (συμπάθεια or συμπαθής) invoked in Galen amongst others, which 
posited a rapport between parts of body to explain involuntary movements such as sneezing 
or yawning, and especially in organs that were not anatomically connected. 453 This rapport 
was said to be effected through nerve or blood vessels by, for example, the movement of 
pneuma through what were thought to be hollow fibres (νεῦρον). Many of these would turn 
out to be reflex actions. 
Hall was the first to use the substantive ‘reflex’ in a biological context in a paper of 
1833.454 Reflex was no doubt chosen as it describes a turning point, a turning back on oneself 
or a reversal. Hall first described the three types of motion well known to physiologists: 
spontaneous voluntary movements that move in a direct line from cerebrum along spinal 
marrow and motor nerves to voluntary muscles and do not require the agency of a stimulus; 
respiration: a spontaneous movement but one which originates in the medulla oblongata (part 
of the brain stem); finally, involuntary movements which depend on the irritability principle 
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that requires immediate application of stimulus to neuro-muscular fibre itself. To these, Hall 
added a fourth: those of reflex actions which are not spontaneous, do not originate in any 
central part and are not direct in their course. Evidence through anatomy and dissections 
provided evidence that the impression travels toward and is reflected back by the spinal cord 
without travelling to the brain. 
This therefore challenged the idea of the brain as origin that actively sends out messages. 
Actions and reactions do not always pass through the brain and parts such as the spinal cord, 
thought to be mere passive conductors of animal spirits, gained a form of agency. But, in a 
move that will be observed throughout history, when the agency of one entity is challenged, 
agency is recuperated by enlarging or transferring the agent rather than challenging the 
active/passive dichotomy itself. Many, including Hall, still relied on an implicit dualist 
assumption of an active immaterial mind affecting a passive nervous system so to reconcile 
this dualism with a decentred brain, people tended to adopt one of two strategies: either they 
posited the existence of a ‘spinal soul’ or they ascribed ‘mind’ to all organic structures 
thereby distributing the soul through the whole organism.455 
CELL THEORY AND THE NEW NEURON 
The establishment of modern cell theory was driven in part by the influence of Romantic 
philosophy that sought a unity in nature through seeking an Urtypus, or Urphänomen. 
Valentin, for example, proposed that the Urform of all tissues was the cell, a theory taken up 
by Schwann and incorporated into his cell theory of animal life in 1839.456 With this, biology 
established a new foundation for itself whereby the unity of living organisms was based, not 
on essences, but on the common composition of cells. 
Cell theory led to the search for cells specific to the nervous system, cells that would, in 
1891, be termed ‘neuron’ by Waldeyer (in an article summarising results of existing research, 
particularly that of Ramón y Cajal). Waldeyer, in choosing ‘neuron’ transformed the Greek 
νεῦρον meaning sinew or rope (as in Galen’s visible ‘ropes’ extending from the brain to all 
parts of the body) to the nerve cell itself, visible under microscopy. Waldeyer described the 
new ‘neuron’ thus: 
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a nerve element, a nerve entity, or ‘neuron,’ as I propose to call it, consists of the 
following pieces: – (a) a nerve cell, (b) the nerve process, (c) its collaterals, and (d) 
the end-branching.457 
Nervous influence continued to take the form of a kind of movement along ‘ropes’: 
something flowed from sensory input to neuron and from neuron to motor fibres, centrifugal 
and centripetal flows. Centrifugal fibres would be called axons and centripetal dendrites. But 
cells were not conceived as merely passive conductors of the nervous system, they had an 
agency of their own in the form of an ‘action potential.’ Gratiolet thus conceived neurons as 
so many: 
intermediaries completing the nervous arcs; but they [cells] are not mere conductors 
of stimulations: each of them is a centre for the generation of impulses. In effect, the 
sensory fibre acts upon the central cell and modifies it in such a manner as to provide 
in the cell a particular activity – a hidden property that sleeps but which a stimulation 
renders manifest.458 
The question then arose of how nerve cells made contact with each other for 
communication and transmission. Disagreement over this led to a significant debate in the 
history of neuroscience: between those who felt the cell formed a network connecting all cells 
(the ‘reticular’ theory proposed by, among others, Gerlach and Golgi) and those who believed 
contiguous but not continuous (the ‘neuronists’).459 It was only after the development of 
electron microscopy post-1945 that the neuron was finally confirmed to be a distinct and 
separate entity and that there was no network. 
One of the difficulties the doctrine posed was how flows happen from cell to cell if cells 
merely touch but do not connect, i.e. if there are gaps between cells. The impulses through 
the axon must somehow bear on the dendrites of another cell. How did energy flow across 
these gaps? And did this lack of continuity between the axon of one cell and dendrite of 
another offer ‘an opportunity for some change in the nature of the nervous influence as it 
passes from the one cell to the other’?460 
A major advance in answering this question was provided when C.S. Sherrington named 
this gapped contact a ‘synapse’ in Foster’s A Textbook of Physiology (1897): 
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So far as our present knowledge goes we are led to think that the tip of a twig of the 
[axon’s] arborescence is not continuous with but merely in contact with the substance 
of the dendrite or cell body on which it impinges. Such a special connection of one 
nerve cell with another might be called a synapsis.461 
Sherrington revealed his reasons for choosing ‘synapse’ in correspondence with Edward 
Sharpey-Schäfer about Sherrington’s contribution to Sharpey-Schäfer’s Textbook of 
Physiology (1900). In these letters, Sherrington expresses the care required when naming new 
discoveries: they should be clear, brief and avoid periphrasis; in short we should avoid 
‘committing barbarisms’ such as impossible adjectival forms or prefixes and affixes with 
false signification.462 
They considered ‘junction’ from the Latin root jungere, ‘to join or unite together, connect, 
attach’ but this presented three difficulties: it implied a union of two into one which 
suggested a continuum rather than a contiguity, it could not suggest making one thing out of 
more than two, and implied ‘the things joined are passive agents in the act of union, i.e. that 
the combination is made of them but not at all by them.’463 Sherrington then considered the 
Greek σύνδεσμος, meaning a co-binding or binding together, but eventually settled on 
synapse after advice a Cambridge Euripidean scholar and Metaphysician.464 Synapse is from 
the Greek συνάπτω, a composition of σύν- ‘with’ or ‘together’ and ἅπτω, to fasten or bind, to 
lay hold of or touch. 
Sherrington provides three main justifications for his choice. First, that it offers a ‘better 
adjectival form.’ Second, that it ‘remotely’ suggests (Sherrington does not specify how) 
James’s ‘law of forward direction.’ This law proposed all paths through the nervous system 
are paths of motor or sensory discharge, through paths of least resistance, that ‘all run one 
way, that is from ‘sensory’ cells into ‘motor’ cells and from motor cells into muscles, without 
ever taking the reverse direction.’465 But the main advantage was the connotation of activity 
inherent in the term. Sherrington was keen to select a word that would not suggest a mere 
passive union – such as ‘the neurons are combined’ (presumably by some other active 
process of binding or joining) – but rather that the neurons themselves combine through an 
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active process of touching together: ‘Synapse, which implies a catching on, as e.g., by one 
wrestler of another—is really much closer to the mark.’466 
Sherrington was perhaps led to this insistence on an active touching-together by the 
contemporary idea that nerve endings were capable of movement, of extension or retraction. 
This view arose partly from the dominance of comparative anatomy and analogies between 
organisms, a post-Darwinian craze which sought to explain structures higher on the 
evolutionary scale through analogy to those lower down. In the case of neurons, analogies 
were drawn with unicellular organisms’ movements, particularly the pseudopods of amoebas, 
which suggested contact between neurons could be increased or decreased by movements of 
retraction or extension because of ‘a veritable amoeboid property of their protoplasm.’467 But 
this view largely faded into oblivion around 1900 due to lack of any experimental evidence. 
Sherrington would have been aware of this theory’s decline and it is interesting to 
speculate its influence on the different reasons he later gave for his choice of ‘synapse’ in 
correspondence with John Fulton in 1937. Sherrington now seems to suggest syndesmos 
would have been a better choice after all: 
‘Synapsis’ strictly means a process of contact—i.e. a proceeding or act of contact, 
rather than a thing which enables contact i.e. an instrument of contact. ‘Syndesm’ 
would not have had that defect, i.e. it would have meant a ‘bond.’468 
The criticism that junction implies the neurons joined are passive agents in an act of union 
also no longer seems to trouble Sherrington. Both terms seem to convey the sense of an 
instrument of contact, something which enables contact and the task is to describe this 
something which enables contact rather than two things which make contact. Perhaps the 
search is for a concept that would describe a process or entity simultaneously active and 
passive or a binding that is apart from activity or passivity. But the name synapse held: 
biology resists the concept science imposes on it yet it proves too difficult to change 
scientific terminology. 
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FROM PNEUMA TO ENERGY 
Conservation of force 
Not only how flows occur, the question also arises of what flowed through these neuronal 
gapped contacts and the answer of  ‘nervous energy’ will be another key foundation of 
modern neuroscience. This concept again arose from a philosophical underpinning, mainly 
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie which argued for a potentia inherent in all matter, a potentia as 
potentiality, a capacity or ability, we can link back to Greek philosophy due to its choice to 
translate δύναμις in the Aristotelian distinction of δύναμις/ἐνέργεια. But δύναμις will also be 
translated as potestas to separate the two meanings of δύναμις: potentiality as the ‘not yet,’ 
the action potential inherent in things (potentia) and the power that results from the activated 
action (potestas). Again, the search is for a unifying principle and an Urkraft was therefore 
sought in nature, a force or energy that manifested itself in different forms and to which all its 
phenomena could ultimately be attributed. 
Key to understanding this development was the 19th century attempt to extend principles 
from physics to physiology. The pursuit of this experimental science had produced a conflict 
with vitalism that, in response to a mechanistic view of organisms, had proposed some extra 
‘vital force’ that differentiated the animate from the inanimate. This vital force had its roots, 
at least terminologically, in the vis viva, the ‘living force,’ a key concept in the philosophy of 
Leibniz who proposed it as the active source of movement. Whilst the physical viewpoint 
could focus on the vis, the vitalist tended to emphasise the vita, the living. But in the early 
19th century, some argued these ‘vital forces’ were purely physical forces. The challenge for 
science was then to account for this force in physical terms and, in so doing, banish vitalism. 
A milestone in this attempt was Helmholtz’s law of the conservation of force proposed in 
a paper of 1847.469 While such a principle had already been expounded in mechanics and 
thermodynamics, Helmholtz sought to extend this ‘to all branches of physics,’ to chemical 
forces, electricity and magnetism.470 Helmholtz began from two principles (that will 
ultimately be shown to be the same): that ‘it is impossible to obtain an unlimited amount of 
force capable of doing work as the result of any combination whatsoever of natural objects’ 
and that ‘actions in nature are reducible to forces of attraction and repulsion, the intensity of 
the forces depending solely upon the distances between the points involved.’ Helmholtz 
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demonstrated their identity and, in so doing, proposed the principle of the conservation of 
force defined as: 
In all cases of the motion of free material points under the influence of their attracting 
and repelling forces, the intensity of which depends solely upon distance, the loss in 
tensional force is always equal to the gain in vis visa, and the gain in the former is 
always equal to the loss in the latter. Hence, the sum of the tensional forces and vires 
virae is always constant.471 
Helmholtz here differentiated between vis visa, the mass times velocity squared (mv2) 
(now called kinetic energy), and the sum of the forces of tension expressed differentially (as 
Helmholtz deals not with magnitudes per se, but with differences between initial and final 
states such as the raising of a weight to a certain height and its falling from that height). In 
this example, the work expended in raising the weight is equal to (in opposite sign) the 
energy produced in its falling. As equal but opposite signs resolve to zero, their sum does not 
vary but remains constant. Helmholtz calls this sum force (Kraft). 
Helmholtz also reflects in this essay on the purpose of science and its relation to 
philosophy. He argues the task of physical sciences is to discover laws according to the law 
of causality, i.e. that every change has a sufficient cause: 
the principle of causality is, indeed, nothing but the presupposition of the lawful 
regularity or uniformity of all natural phenomena. A law considered as an objective 
power, we call force. Cause, according to its original meaning, is the unchanging 
existent (that is, matter) which lies behind the changes of phenomena; the law of its 
effects is force.472 
To find these laws, science makes two abstractions. First the abstraction that matter is 
inert. Only quantitative (mass) and spatial distinctions are made of matter, not qualitative, and 
when we speak of different kinds of matter, we really mean quantitative differences in the 
forces of matter as ‘matter in itself can undergo no change other than spatial one, that is, a 
movement.’473 This sense of ‘inertia’ from the Latin meaning ‘want of art or skill’ or 
‘inactivity’ was introduced into physics by Kepler and taken up by Newton. Whilst Newton 
tried to avoid metaphysical arguments, his explanation of causality led to a dualistic ontology 
of matter and force and where an essential passivity was ascribed to matter. This essential 
passivity would be termed ‘force of inertia’ [vis inertiae] which Newton describes as a 
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‘passive principle by which bodies persist in their motion or rest, receive Motion in 
proportion to the Force impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted.’474 Passive 
principles are opposed to active principles such as gravity and ‘passive’ thus gains its sense 
of ‘Not acting, working, or operating on anything else; not exerting force or influence; inert, 
quiescent.’475 But also, through its tendency to persist in motion, it acquires a kind of moving 
passivity: passivity is not always static. We will see this moving passivity in modern 
neurobiology in their concept of ‘passive transports.’ 
The second abstraction is ‘the capacity to produce effects’ that derives from the fact we 
only know objects through their effect on our sense organs. In this, Helmholtz seems to be 
suggesting that it is objects acted on, the ‘passions,’ that can be productively analysed to 
deduce the actions but not the reverse, i.e. we cannot deduce passions from actions, we 
cannot know the effect of an action in advance of that action unless we have first experienced 
it as a passion: 
The necessity for analysing the forces of bodies into forces of material points can, for 
the masses upon which forces act, be derived from the principle of the complete 
comprehensibility of nature, since complete knowledge of movement is lacking if the 
motion of each individual material point cannot be given. There does not seem to me, 
however, to be an equal necessity for such analysis for the masses from which the 
forces arise.476 
Shift from vital force to energy 
Helmholtz would later change the wording of this principle: Kraft was changed to Energie 
and Erhaltung to Konstanz. ‘Energy’ was first used in physics by William Thomson (later 
Lord Kelvin) in 1849 stating ‘nothing can be lost in the operations of nature – no energy can 
be destroyed.’477 He divided energy into statical (weights at height, an electrified body, 
quantity of fuel, etc.) and dynamical (masses of matter in motion). The term was then further 
developed by Rankine in a paper of 1853: 
the term energy is used to comprehend every affection of substances which constitutes 
or is commensurable with a power of producing change in opposition to resistance, 
and includes ordinary motion and mechanical power, chemical action, heat, light, 
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electricity, magnetism, and all other powers, known or unknown, which are 
convertible or commensurable with these.478 
Rankine replaced Thomson’s statical/dynamical with potential/actual energy and defined 
the ‘law of the conservation of energy’ as stating ‘the sum of the actual [kinetic] and potential 
energies in the universe is unchangeable.’ (In turn, the potential/actual would be replaced by 
the modern terms potential/kinetic beginning with Thomson and Tait’s Treatise on Natural 
Philosophy (1867)). Helmholtz reviewed Rankine’s paper and stated his terms ‘living force’ 
[lebendige Kraft] and ‘tensional force’ [Spannkraft] were synonymous with Rankine’s terms 
‘actual [kinetic]’ and ‘potential energy.’479 
In 1861, Helmholtz argued we should adopt the expression ‘constancy of energy’ rather 
than ‘conservation of force’ because the law: 
does not mean that the intensity of the natural forces is constant; but it relates more to 
the whole amount of power which can be gained by a natural process, and by which a 
certain amount of work can be done.480 
Thus we see how the active and passive continues to structure the conceptions proposed 
where potentia then force then energy takes the place of δύναμις still split into that which 
undergoes changes (passive) with active force, or actual (kinetic) and potential energy which, 
in their togetherness, must sum to zero so that there is a togetherness of equal but opposite 
quantities. 
Extension of theory to the physiological 
In 1861, Helmholtz tried to extend this physical law to the physiological. Helmholtz noted 
that Mayer, mainly a physician, gave the first exposition of the general principle in 1842 and 
Helmholtz wonders why physiology could give rise to such a law speculating that it may be 
because some had thought the body of every living animal was a perpetual motion machine 
wherein motive power was produced without any external mechanical force. But this 
neglected the fact that any force of nature is capable of being transformed, or of bringing into 
action, every other force. They did not consider that nutrition could be such a force that could 
be transformed into motion. If you do, however, ‘if you compare the living body with a steam 
engine, then you have the completest analogy.’481 Animals take in food (flammable 
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substances of fat, starch and sugar) and air just as steam engines take in coal and air and both 
convert this to motion. Further experimentation was required to understand the conservation 
of force in living bodies but the principle of conservation of force, Helmholtz believed, would 
‘probably’ hold good for living bodies as for inanimate ones.482 
Helmholtz drew the main implication of this extension: it rang the death knell for vitalism. 
For if vitalism held there was a ‘vital principle,’ one principal agent which either initiates or 
suspends the physical forces in the living body, the conservation of force only holds in cases 
where the same direction and intensity of forces in action if the circumstances under which 
they act are the same, so this cannot mean any principle, vital or otherwise, can apply or 
suspend the forces of the body. 
With this extension, biology draws nearer to physics and chemistry, ostensibly away from 
philosophy, and the radical separation between the animate and inanimate diminishes as all 
are composed of molecules and subject to physical forces. This means the search for the 
causes of processes in the living body will be equated with the search for causes in the 
inanimate physical or chemical world – the idea of a soul or vital principle, of hollow fibres 
would be discarded and the processes between neurons and the transmission of energy 
instead sought in electrical and chemical processes. 
ΠΆΘΟΣ TO AFFECT: LINKING THE PHYSICAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL 
Where does affect fit into this understanding of the nervous organism as flows of a 
constant energy between neurons and synapses? And, if the Greek term πάθος served to 
connect the philosophy and medicine of Galen’s time, what has become of this concept? 
I argue that πάθος, through its translation into the Latin affectus and on into the German 
Affekt and English affect, continues to offer a unifying concept but this time to unify the 
physical and the physiological and/or psychological. For this I will discuss two main authors 
who represent different approaches to the problem: Freud who, in his early training as a 
neurologist, wrote but did not publish Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) that sought 
to unite his early research on neuroses with a quantitative approach to nervous force and, 
secondly, William James who in What is an Emotion? (1884) questioned why the 
physiological advances of recent years had ignored the question of the emotions and strove 
for a theory that would unite the physiological and psychological. Each in their different 
ways would also represent a split in the study of emotion: whilst one led to psychoanalysis, 
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the other led to (American) psychology. Yet in both authors, the concepts of affect plays a 
central role: in Freud Affekt, in James ‘emotion’ as translation of Affekt. 
The term Affekt was borrowed from German psychology. For example, Wundt dedicates a 
section of his Grundriss der Psychologie of 1896 to Die Affecte (translated as ‘Emotions’ in 
Judd’s English translation of 1896). Wundt distinguishes affect from feeling (Gefühl): feeling 
refers to slower processes of medium intensity whereas affect is a succession of feelings in 
interconnected processes that has a more intense effect on the subject. But there is no sharp 
line of demarcation and ‘every feeling [Gefühl] of greater intensity passes into an emotion 
[Affect].’483 Wundt links the processes occurring in an affect not just to the psychical but also 
to the physical, in the innervation of the heart, blood-vessels, respiratory organs and muscles. 
In this experimental psychology, its psychophysical measurements thus already conceptualise 
affect in its difference from feeling by quantitative intensities and affect as a connection of 
processes that have greater effect on the subject. For this sense of affect, James used the term 
‘emotion’: ‘we may also feel a general seizure of excitement, which Wundt, Lehmann, and 
other German writers call an Affect, and which is what I have all along meant by an 
emotion.’484 
James 
James begins by questioning why the advances in the physiological understanding of the 
brain limited their explanations to cognitive and volitional aspects and neglected ‘the 
aesthetic sphere of the mind, its longings, its pleasures and pains, and its emotions.’485 He 
also asks whether there are separate centres for emotion in the brain or whether emotion 
results from sensory and motor centres. James will argue for the latter, that emotion is 
nothing but various combinations of ordinary motor and sensory processes. This derived from 
his theory of emotion: ‘bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and 
that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion.’ This reversed the 
common-sense view that ‘the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection 
called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression.’486 
For James, reflex circuits are crucial to these bodily changes because emotions have an 
autonomy: 
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An object falls on a sense-organ and is apperceived by the appropriate cortical centre; 
or else the latter, excited in some other way, gives rise to an idea of the same object. 
Quick as a flash, the reflex currents pass down through their pre-ordained channels, 
alter the condition of muscle, skin and viscus; and these alterations, apperceived like 
the original object, in as many specific portions of the cortex, combine with it in 
consciousness and transform it from an object-simply-apprehended into an object-
emotionally-felt.487 
To defend this thesis, James characterises the nervous system as predisposed to react on 
contact with its environment: ‘the neural machinery is but a hyphen between determinate 
arrangements of matter outside the body and determinate impulses to inhibition or discharge 
within its organs.’488 Emotions, then, are nervous anticipations such as a child being 
frightened of an elephant or a woman’s delight in seeing a baby in advance of any experience 
of either. 
But what of cultural influences? Most of the objects we feel emotion with are not objects 
the nervous system could be innately adapted to, they are too new, and many objects are 
culturally specific. Such an objection, James argues, fails to distinguish the idea of an 
emotion from the emotion itself and, moreover, once a nervous tendency to ‘discharge’ is 
established, it may prove useful in many other situations in an environment that originally 
had little to do with it. This idea of discharge will echo Freud’s view on discharge and its 
blockage. James writes: 
Every perception must lead to some nervous result. If this be the normal emotional 
expression, it soon expends itself, and in the natural course of things a calm succeeds. 
But if the normal issue be blocked from any cause, the currents may under certain 
circumstances invade other tracts, and there work different and worse effects.489 
But for James, examples of such worsening are indignation that is not expressed becoming 
vengeful brooding or a turning to stone by those who resist crying. Without a concept of the 
unconscious, James does not go into as much detail on the effect of these blockages that 
Freud will do with their link to neurosis. 
Bodily expression is thus crucial to this view of emotion, but their varieties and 
combination have not been exhausted even by Darwin’s extensive study which characterised 
only what James calls the ‘standard emotions’490. Each emotion would be as varied as all the 
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possible combinations of differences in bodily parts: the heart, the dilation and constriction of 
the arteries, the bladder and bowels, mouth glands, throat and liver, all these are affected in 
emotions and, even in the absence of outward expression, inner changes are ‘felt as a 
difference of tone or of strain.’491 All these changes must be felt and the sheer number of 
parts involved thus makes it difficult to reproduce the integral expression of them all. Feeling 
is also therefore central to James’s conception, this term conveying a sense of indeterminacy 
and vagueness that is flexible enough to describe the binding of emotion with the idea of the 
emotion without innate or determined fixity. 
James goes on to discuss non-standard emotions, ‘moral, intellectual and aesthetic 
feelings’ such as a ‘neat’ act of justice or a ‘pretty’ geometrical demonstration. Whilst some 
argue these are purely cerebral forms of pleasure or displeasure that do not involve the body, 
James argues only rarely do such cognitive acts not involve the body and, even in such cases, 
the absence of bodily changes are felt that gives the experience a ‘dryness … paleness, the 
absence of all glow.’492 Feeling occurs in the absence of emotion because ‘the bodily 
sounding-board, vibrating in the one case, is in the other mute.’493 
Freud 
By 1895, Freud had been in private practice for nine years but had earlier trained in 
neurology and contributed scientific papers on the nervous structure of various organisms. 
Some authors have even claimed either that his neurological works contributed to the 
establishment of the neuron doctrine or that he was himself on the verge of discovering it.494 
Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology written in 1895 was described in a letter to Fliess 
as a ‘psychology for neurologists,’ an attempt at binding the neurological and the 
psychological that has also been read as a ‘moment of transition’495 from one to the other. 
Freud writes: 
I am vexed by two intentions: to discover what form the theory of psychical 
functioning will take if a quantitative line of approach, a kind of economics of 
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nervous force, is introduced into it, and, secondly, to extract from psychopathology a 
yield for normal psychology.496 
Freud abandoned the project in 1896 in part because the neurological view could not 
explain consciousness nor the unconscious and it would remain unpublished in his lifetime (it 
was only published in German in 1950 and in English in 1954). But certain neurological 
concepts from this time remain consistent throughout Freud’s work and often become 
transferred onto the psychical. Notably, a principle of constancy (influenced by, but not 
identical with, Fechner’s principle of a tendency to stability derived in turn from Helmholtz’s 
law of conservation of energy), the principle of neuronal inertia (the discharge of excitation 
by output to the motor systems), the idea of neurons as pseudopods capable of retraction and 
extension and the idea of a free and bound energy. 
Affect (Affekt) again plays a central role in the Project and takes on many evolving 
meanings but generally denotes any state, painful or pleasant used mainly in two contexts: as 
a release or discharge and in the separation of affect and idea.497 Affect as discharge is linked 
to the theory of abreaction in early Freud. Every psychical impression, he argued, comes with 
a certain quota of affect (Affektbetrag) which is discharged through associated motoric and 
psychical activity. In the case of hysterical symptoms, neither of these happen and the affect 
remains blocked and unconscious manifesting itself in hysterical symptoms. Freud’s early 
view of therapy then involved ‘abreacting’ this blocked affect by bringing to conscious recall 
the original event and its accompanying affect and putting this affect into words. The 
importance of discharge is explained in the Project by the principle of neuronal inertia that 
states ‘neurons tend to divest themselves of Q [quantity]’ and is based on the concept of 
reflex action whereby a quantity of excitation received by sensory neurone is discharged 
through motoric output. Freud defines this constancy in Beyond the Pleasure Principle as ‘the 
mental apparatus endeavours to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible 
or at least to keep it constant.’498 This has been read as merely a transferring of the free 
circulation of energy in neurones onto clinical observations of how the free circulation of 
meaning occurs in the primary process.499 
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The second context of affect describes how instincts express themselves in affect and ideas 
(Vorstellungen). But an affect is not necessarily bound to an idea, it can follow different paths 
that give rise to the neuroses. Freud often refers to a ‘quota of affect’ to emphasise the 
economic aspect which ‘corresponds to the instinct in so far as the latter has become detached 
from the idea and finds expression, proportionate to its quantity, in processes which are 
sensed as affects.’500 This separation allows affect to become the qualitative expression of the 
quantity of instinctual energy and its fluctuations, ‘the subjective transposition of the quantity 
of instinctual energy.’ 501 
Instinctual energy can be either free or bound which again derives from the neurological 
idea that in the passage of energy through the nervous pathways, there is a potential energy in 
the neurone and a kinetic energy that moves through it toward motoric discharge. Free energy 
is characteristic of the primary process evident in free association and dreaming and the 
binding of free energy becomes, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, ‘the task of mastering or 
binding excitations.’502 Freud then shows how the preconscious system binds this free 
energy: ‘The processes of the system Pcs. display [...] an inhibition of the tendency of 
cathected ideas towards discharge. When a process passes from one idea to another, the first 
idea retains a part of its cathexis and only a small portion undergoes displacement.’503 In The 
Ego and the Id, life instincts bind, the death instinct unbinds: 
The aim of [Eros] is to establish even greater unities and to preserve them thus – in 
short, to bind together; the aim of [the destructive instinct] is, on the contrary, to undo 
connections and so to destroy things.504 
PERSISTENCE OF ACTIVE/PASSIVE ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ: A CLOSED SYSTEM? 
This chapter has therefore tried to demonstrate the implicit dependence on conceptual 
schemas inherited from Greek metaphysics, notably the active and passive δύναμις, even as 
these were extended to physics. This δύναμις, through ‘free energy,’ then gets transferred 
onto the physiological and on to psychological or psychoanalytic views of affective or 
emotional theories. This leads to several problems in the application of the physical to the 
mental, mainly that a metaphysics of coupled opposites and a law of the conservation of 
energy serves to reduce otherness to the same in closed systems. Helmholtz’s variations 
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between a certain initial state and a certain final state, variations having equal but opposite 
signs, means that, if two magnitudes undergo equal changes of opposite sign, their sum does 
not vary, it remains constant. In the extension of the constancy of energy to the neurological 
and onto the psychical, the brain or psyche is portrayed as a closed system which is no doubt 
derived from Helmholtz’s characterisation of the universe as a closed system: 
the whole universe represents such a system of bodies endowed with different sorts of 
forces and of energy, and therefore we conclude from the facts I have brought before 
you that the amount of working power, or the amount of energy in the whole system 
of the universe, must remain the same, quite steady and unalterable, whatever changes 
may go on in the universe.505 
But the brain is not the universe, it is one part in it and so the principle of the constancy of 
energy must hold that the increase in energy of one nervous system must be at the expense of 
another system. 
In Freud, this therapeutic balance is achieved by understanding the unbalanced alignment 
of opposites through the releasing of repression that allows a better alignment and balance to 
zero or at least reduced tension. Reversals from masculine to feminine, active to passive via a 
manifesting of what was unconscious ensure the flow is no longer blocked. An example is 
provided by the interpretation of Hoffmann’s tale ‘The Sandman’ in Freud’s The Uncanny 
(1919). There, Freud draws on many opposites to counter the seemingly ‘arbitrary and 
meaningless’ details of Hoffman’s story. They become intelligible within a system of coupled 
opposites that alternate under the direction of a pre-existing underlying principle, in this case 
the castration complex. In the story, Nathaniel’s father and the figure of Coppelius come to 
represent the opposites into which Nathaniel’s father figure has split: his own father as ‘good’ 
and Coppelius as the ‘bad’ father. These pair are then transferred onto Professor Spalanzani 
and Coppola the optician. Then, the Professor is called the father of the doll Olympia. Now, 
in a strict concordance, this doll should represent Nathaniel, the son of the father. But 
Olympia is female. A problem? Not if one combines the male/female split with a 
physical/psychical difference: Olympia can then become a representation of Nathaniel’s 
psychic femininity so that Olympia is ‘nothing else than a materialization of Nathaniel’s 
feminine attitude towards his father, in his infancy.’506 The goal of psychoanalytic therapy 
becomes the switching of this vast bank of switches until the flow of energy is released or 
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bound to the correct idea. Releasing the blockage is not with the aim of moving to an 
unknown potential but of confirming a pre-existing hypothesis, in this case, of the castration 
complex. It is to reduce difference (the arbitrary and meaningless) to the same (pre-existing 
theory). 
It is of course a question of what remains the same across change and whether we need 
some pre-existing underlying theory to understand change or whether theory should come 
anew with each change. It is a question of attachment and flexibility to change and the 
relative balance of concept to empirical evidence that will also draw in community cohesion 
and disciplinary boundary policing. Such an ‘attachment’ to a theory or concept in the face of 
biological discrepancies to the theories imposed on it (as with the concept synapse) is 
displayed in the development of Helmholtz’s constancy of energy theory. In Harman’s work 
on the metaphysical underpinnings of 19th century physics, Harman notes that Helmholtz 
refused to entertain any deviations from his constancy principle, even when evidence from 
electrical forces seemed to suggest that Newton’s laws of action/reaction need not hold, 
evidence which might have necessitated a modification of its application to electrical forces. 
Citing Helmholtz’s 1881 notes added to the original conservation of energy essay, Harman 
argues 
Helmholtz emphasised that any abrogation of the central force principle by denying 
‘the established mechanical principles of the equality of action and reaction and of the 
constancy of energy’ would be an abandonment of any prospect of ‘the complete 
solution of scientific problems.’ The acceptance of such theories threatened a 
violation of the principles which were a necessary condition of the intelligibility of 
nature.507 
The stakes for science are high: the unknown, the other, difference that challenges theories 
and concepts might come at the expense of the project of explaining nature. 
IMPLICIT CHALLENGES TO ACTIVE/PASSIVE ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ? 
But, within neurological studies, there lies an implicit challenge to this metaphysics, 
particularly in the evidence of reflex actions and in the doctrine of the neuron that emphasises 
touch rather than immediate connectivity. 
One author who recognised the challenge reflex actions presented to orthodox 
conceptualisations was John Dewey. In 1896, Dewey argued that the concepts which the 
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discovery of the reflex arc claimed to have displaced were not sufficiently displaced and so, 
for example, the dualism between bodily sensation and mental idea merely shifted to a 
dualism between periphery (spinal cord) and central structures (brain) or an active stimulus 
and passive response.508 The traditional way of interpreting the stimulus-response model was 
that a stimulus provoked an activity in the form of an idea which generated the response. The 
response is therefore understood as a response to a stimulus. This relied on pre-conceived 
distinctions between sensation, thought and act and assumed the replacement of one by 
another. To this extent, it conceives stimulus and motor response as distinct psychical 
existences, disconnected experiences adjusted through the intervention of an extra-
experimental soul or a mechanical push and pull, the origin of which is placed in external 
pressure or internal spontaneous variation. One problem with this conception of stimulus is 
that it ignored the status prior to or concurrent with the stimulus and required a superior force 
or agency in the stimulus which served to create the problem of a super-agency in a 
mechanical system. 
Instead, Dewey proposed an alternative economy: the response is not a response to the 
stimulus but a response into the stimulus, a transformation or mediation of that experience, 
the response as a reconstituted stimulus. There is no replacement of one by the other, just a 
change in the system of tensions. A stimulus, sensation/response and movement are not fixed 
existences but distinctions of flexible function only. One and the same occurrence plays 
either or both parts according to shifts of interest and stimulus and response become 
functional not existential distinctions. The identification of the stimulus establishes the 
problem, the constitution of the response marks its solution. 
Dewey discusses an example in the case of a child seeing and reaching for a candle and 
being burnt by it (as given by James in Principles of Psychology509). The traditional 
interpretation would say the sensation of the candlelight is the stimulus which generates the 
response of grasping and the burning a stimulus with the response of withdrawing the hand. 
But Dewey rejects sensation as pure passive receptivity: sensation is also an activity because 
movement is required for the ‘reception’ of the sight so motoric activity must have already 
taken place for it to be seen. So, the real beginning is the seeing, not the sensation of light, a 
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seeing in which ‘seeing and grasping have been bound together.’ Thus an original act of 
seeing gets transformed into a ‘seeing-of-a-light-that-means-pain-when-contact occurs.’510 
But if this interpretation seeks to bind existential distinctions into some whole of separate 
yet bound concepts that get transformed, is the question of agency not merely shifted on to 
who or what transforms? Perhaps Dewey’s answer to this would lie in the distinction he 
makes between whether our experience runs according to expectation or whether we are 
jolted out of our comfort zone by the discrepancy between expectation and result, a 
difference that separates and unsettles. Dewey writes, ‘so long as our experience runs 
smoothly we are no more conscious of motion as motion than we are of this or that colour or 
sound by itself.’511 What decides, then, is not some supernatural agency or spontaneous soul 
but the differences in the matters themselves, the differences inherent in the bindings of us 
and world, a binding that is only manifested in the difference of self and world. 
Secondly, the doctrine of the neuron posed a challenge to simplistic conceptions of active 
and passive flows of energy from start to finish as the lack of continuity between the axon of 
one cell and dendrite of another demonstrated the possibility of changes in the nature of 
nervous influence between cells via properties of the membrane and of the synapse or ‘gap.’ 
Further evidence of these properties was provided later which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. The synapse did not therefore describe an active or passive touching but a ‘process 
of contact’ that seemed to evade simple active/passive conceptions of binding/bound. 
It seems then that at work in neuroscience is both an implicit reliance on past metaphysics 
and an undermining of them that arises from both changes in conceptual frameworks and 
empirical evidence of the senses in the operation of biological organisms. Two 
neurosciences: a more traditional, explicit neuroscience of a unidirectional flowing out, of 
discharge, of the active and passive, beginning and end and another, implicit or marginalised 
neuroscience of an ‘integrative’ nervous system, bindings that seem to undermine the active 
or passive by not positing an active binding and passive being bound, but merely a ‘process 
of binding,’ that precedes, produces or accompanies the active/passive split such that there is 
a binding and there is its split into active and passive, beginning and end, stimulus and 
response, cause and effect, at the same time. 
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Furthermore, if the traditional active is seen as an act of a self-present entity, acting in full 
awareness, Dewey’s recognition of the challenge reflex actions posed to traditional 
conceptions redefined an act as the surprise or the mismatch of anticipations and matter, the 
shock at the failure at the act’s expected result through which the bindings are transformed. 
Not merely a pure movement of an entity, a subject that acts on an object, the active on the 
passive, the active is instead this acting in its entanglement with the environment that 
frustrates or smooths its acting manifesting its intended purpose in its failure. To the extent 
one acts, acting differs with itself in its differing with the world and its (in)difference to this 
difference. Yet agents are nevertheless identified and separated from entanglements but now, 
no longer as a pure entity that precedes this entanglement but as the error, as the malfunction 
in this entanglement. An entanglement in which no entity is purely passive or purely active 
but some admixture of the two. What is agential is therefore difference, a difference that is, at 
least initially, felt rather than cognised. The next chapter will examine the extent to which 
this challenge to traditional, Galenic neuroscience, this ‘second neuroscience,’ continues in 
modern neuroscience through the revolutions wrought by the discovery of the plasticity of the 
brain. 
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CONTEMPORARY NEUROSCIENCE 
The previous chapter identified the continued implication of past metaphysics in the 
nineteenth century foundations of neuroscience mainly through the equal but opposite active 
and passive δύναμις in its transference onto physics. This chapter discusses how this 
constancy of energy principle continues to influence contemporary neuroscience via the 
dominant theory of the ‘free-energy principle’ in contemporary computational neuroscience. 
But also how a ‘second neuroscience’ implicitly challenges this through the discoveries of 
plasticity and the challenge it presents to active and passive flows of constant energy. 
Passivity is now applied to ‘passive transports’ that affects the organism without energetic 
requirement. Activity, extending Dewey’s challenge, is now explicitly conceived as error-
making: the difference between expectation and actuality that manifest implicit bindings. Yet 
the neglect of this ‘other’ neuroscience continues in theories of affect that remain understood 
as quantitative discharges of energy that privilege the mechanistic succession and causality of 
computational models to the neglect of its simultaneity with an essential contingency at the 
heart of the nervous system. In short, the argument will be how the discoveries of plasticity 
demonstrates a radical binding of succession and contingency in the organism that the 
transformed concepts of affect and passive can actually describe in their togetherness. 
PLASTICITY’S CHALLENGE TO THE FIXED BRAIN 
The major paradigm shift in the neuroscience of the twentieth century occurred mainly 
with the discovery of the plasticity of the nervous system. This undermined the view that the 
brain is fixed from birth. Learning through synaptic change was acknowledged and the term 
plasticity was used to describe this. It was first proposed by Jerzy Konorski in his 
development of the work of Pavlov to describe 
a change in response of an organism or its parts (perhaps just nerve impulses and not 
necessarily any overt response) to a stimulus, the change being due only to repeated 
presentation of that stimulus (the n may be as few as one), in combination with other 
stimuli (combination may include a stimulus combined with nothing).512 
But, more radically, plasticity also challenged the idea that localisation of functions of the 
brain were fixed. More specifically, that cortical mapping, as the link between the activities 
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of the organism and the activities of the nervous system, or the interaction of the peripheral 
nervous system (which sends messages from sensory receptors to the brain) and the central 
nervous system (the ‘command-and-control’ centre), were fixed from birth. 
The neuroscientist Merzenich discovered these maps were not universal but varied from 
individual to individual and seemed to be dependent on experience. Mappings were also 
dynamic and could change and rewire in response to changes in the body or even without 
bodily changes. For example, with the removal of a monkey’s finger, the map for that finger 
was lost, and the map for the adjacent fingers enlarged to take its place.513 This challenged 
localizationists like Torsten Wiesel who, through studying the visual cortex, had claimed 
‘once cortical connections were established in their mature form, they stayed in place 
permanently.’ Wiesel later admitted he was wrong: 
the pioneering work by Michael Merzenich and colleagues, showing dramatic 
reorganization in the adult somatosensory cortex through specific patterns of sensory 
deprivation and stimulation, led Charles Gilbert and me to re-examine our views on 
this issue.514 
Neural plasticity as understood today operates in at least three ways: first is the 
developmental plasticity in the embryo and child where the brain forms according to genetic 
instructions. Soon after birth, segregation of neurons takes place under the control of 
homeotic genes to form areas that will become fore-, mid- and hind-brain in the neural 
tube.515 But plasticity is also present here evidenced by the fact that cells transplanted to 
different regions do not always develop according to the genetic program of the homeotic 
genes but sometimes develop according to the properties of the new region rather than the 
old.516 
After early years this genetic plan recedes and plasticity then refers to changes in neuronal 
connections, the ‘activity dependent plasticity’ identified by Merzenich and Konorski and 
others. This change occurs most often through synaptic modulation, epigenetic mechanisms 
or, less frequently, through the development of new neurons in neurogenesis from neural 
stem cells. This plasticity continues, although does decline, throughout life but is always 
challenged by the third kind of plasticity involved in both damage to the brain (through 
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lesions, traumas or strokes or other deficiencies) and its capacity to heal itself after such 
damage through cortical remapping. 
This implies that brains are relatively undifferentiated at birth and experience then serves 
to differentiate them. As LeDoux summarises, the interplay of these three different senses of 
plasticity is the contingent interplay between species and individual, gene and experience: 
Genes thus dictate that we will all have a human kind of brain with roughly the same 
kinds of circuits, but random individual differences will exist, and the connectivity of 
the circuits, selected by synaptic activity, will shape the individual brain.517 
Activity dependent / Hebbian plasticity 
First let us focus on activity dependent plasticity. To understand this requires an overview 
of contemporary understandings of the nervous system. A neuron typically receives inputs 
through its dendrites that moves centripetally to cell body and outputs, centrifugally, through 
its axons. A neuron typically has more than one dendrite which receive inputs from multiple 
other cells, a process called convergence. Most neurons have only one axon but a single axon 
can have many branches allowing the signal to affect many other cells through its multiple 
terminals, termed divergence. Faced with a fork in an axon, a nerve impulse does not have to 
choose but can duplicate itself ‘giving rise to two spikes that can take both branches. By 
doubling this repeatedly, a single spike starting near the cell body becomes many spikes that 
reach every branch of the axon, amplitude undiminished.’518 Paths can mostly be traced from 
origin in sensory receptors through to motor outputs as the final destination of all neural 
pathways is the muscles. They allow the flow of excitatory or inhibitory impulses known as 
action potentials. 
But there is not complete sensory control. Transmission of impulses do not always begin 
with sensory ‘input’ but can also arise by spontaneous firings of the nerve cells. This is 
evidenced partly by the fact there is almost incessant motor activity, an activity essential to 
the regulation of the nervous system. This spontaneity of firings need not be read as evidence 
of some autonomous agency of a nerve cell as firings do not occur at random but seem to 
follow some rhythmic pattern and are also dependent on intrinsic membrane properties. There 
is also reverberatory activity, a term coined by Rafael Lorente de Nó to describe how cell 
assemblies self-sustain an impulse even after its stimulus is gone. 
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Within the neuron, flow occurs as changes in ion balance which spreads rapidly as 
electrical ‘blips’ rather than electrical currents. From neuron to neuron the impulse has to 
cross the synapse which has a high electrical resistance that prevents easy jumping from one 
neuron to another. So an action potential has to cross the gap by chemical diffusion through 
the release of neurotransmitters of which there are four types acetylcholine, amino acids 
(such as GABA, glycine and glutamate), monoamines (such as noradrenaline, dopamine and 
serotonin and neuropeptides (such as endorphins). 
Neurotransmitters are often the target of pharmaceutical interventions. Glutamate and 
GABA are the two main chemicals responsible for most neurotransmission. The over-activity 
of glutamate and the resulting injury to neurons actually plays an important role in stroke and 
other vascular disorders of the brain as well as in epilepsy and possibly Alzheimer’s Disease. 
GABA are thought to play a significant role in the amygdala’s sensing of danger: the 
amygdala receives input from the sensory world constantly but tends to ignore the majority of 
it. GABA is required for this as it prevents projection cells in the amygdala from firing in 
response to meaningless stimuli. Valium is then hypothesised to work by reducing the 
sensitivity of amygdala to fire as it works on facilitating these GABA transmissions. Many 
drugs also alter monoamines. Prozac, for example, prevents the removal of serotonin from the 
synaptic space but the exact means by which the increase in serotonin levels relieves anxiety 
or depression is not known. 
In detail, the flow occurs as follows: the action potential arrives at the end of the axon, at a 
‘synaptic bulb’ where calcium channels open in the presynaptic membrane to allow calcium 
ions in. As they enter, concentration increases and synaptic vesicles containing the 
neurotransmitters move toward the membrane. These vesicles then fuse with the membrane 
releasing the neurotransmitter into the synaptic cleft, a process taking around one 
millisecond, longer than the time it would take for an electrical signal to pass, a delay known 
as the synaptic delay. At the post-synaptic cell, the neurotransmitter binds to receptors at its 
surface membrane and the neurotransmitter is then released. The action potential is then set 
up in the postsynaptic cell. When a motor neurone ends on a muscle, it branches into many 
specialised synapses called neuromuscular junctions that send excitatory or inhibitory signals 
to the muscle to flex or contract. This is the process Sherrington had tried to name. The 
mention of fusing and binding acknowledges the difficulty in whether a reciprocally active 
‘co-fastening’ (synapse) is appropriate or a process of co-binding (syndesmos). As most 
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muscles are made up of opposite pairs, the corresponding pairs receive inhibitory or 
excitatory signals to effect the corresponding movement. 
The transmission from neuron to neuron can occur by the summation of more than one 
pre-synapse releasing their transmitters at the same time. Two types of summation occur: 
temporal and spatial. Temporal requires the summation of two or more impulses that arrive in 
rapid succession down the same neuron. Spatial summation requires two or more impulses 
arriving down different neurons. A neuron can therefore receive input from many others, 
termed synaptic convergence. Spatial summation of excitatory impulses leaves the neuron 
more responsive to the next impulse, a process called facilitation. 
The speed of an action potential varies from 1–3m/s2 in unmyelinated fibres and from 3–
120 m/s2 in myelinated fibres. But the speed also depends on the number of synapses 
involved: the greater the number of synapses in a series of neurons, the slower the conduction 
velocity and so the direction an entering impulse takes may be completely dependent on the 
timing of other excitations. 
This understanding of flow through the nervous system enables a more detailed 
understanding of activity dependent plasticity. The most studied form of plasticity is Hebbian 
plasticity, so named because of its basis on Hebb’s proposition: 
when an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and repeatedly or persistently 
takes part in firing it, some growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or 
both cells such that A’s efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased.519 
This is more commonly summarised as ‘neurons that fire together wire together’ and, 
conversely, ‘neurons that fire apart wire apart’ or ‘neurons out of sync fail to link.’ This firing 
together refers to the firing of the pre- and postsynaptic cells which strictly requires a 
temporal delay for the pre- cell to cause the post-cell to fire. But it has also been invoked in 
summation of firings such that if stimuli W weakly triggers response A, and stimuli S 
strongly triggers response A, if a stimulus triggered both W and S, A will more likely fire and 
the connection between W and A will also be strengthened.520 Repeated firing of synapses 
strengthen and facilitate synaptic transmission, a term called Long Term Potentiation (LTP) 
and, conversely, the weakening of synaptic strength Long Term Depression (LTD). 
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For neurons that fire together to wire together there must be a convergence zone, a place 
where synaptic connections meet. Convergence zones integrate parallel plasticity by 
receiving and integrating inputs from many other brain regions. One site of rich convergence 
is known to be the hippocampus which is key to the formation of memories as it receives 
multi-sensory input from many associative areas of the neocortex.521 Some neurobiologists, 
such as LeDoux, speculate that the cognitive sophistication of a species can be predicted by 
the extent of convergence zones in its cortex. 
But the brain is not connected all to all, a fact which places a limit on the possibilities of 
Hebbian plasticity. This is why remarkable possibilities of therapy enabled by plasticity 
nevertheless have a limit. Remarkable stories like Cheryl Schiltz whose vestibular apparatus 
(the sensory organ for the balance system) was nearly completely destroyed by side effects of 
medication with the result she felt like she was perpetually falling. In response, the 
neuroscientist Bach-y-Rita developed a device that would replace Cheryl’s vestibular 
apparatus by sending balance signals to her brain from her tongue. After she removed it, there 
was a ‘residual effect’ that lasted about 20 seconds, but this residual effect kept increasing. 
Now she does not use the device at all and no longer suffers. Her brain had rewired itself to 
receive these signals from another functional part, her tongue.522 Plasticity is invoked here as 
sensory substitution, ‘cross-modal plasticity’ that means if one sense is damaged, another can 
take over like touch incorporated lost vestibular function. But this can only occur because 
there is a convergence zone that connects the vestibular areas to those of touch. 
Possibilities for Hebbian plasticity are also limited by metabolic sustainability: 
If every area in the cortex were wired to every other area (and to all other regions 
outside the cortex), then equipotentiality might hold without any provisos. Wouldn’t 
the brain be far more versatile and resilient if its wiring were ‘all to all’? Maybe so, 
but it would also swell to gigantic proportions. All those wires take up space, as well 
as consume energy. The brain has evidently evolved to economise, which is why the 
wiring between regions is selective.523 
These limits undermine Lashley’s theory of equipotentiality which assumed ‘every 
cortical area is dedicated to a specific function, but every area also has the potential to 
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assume some other function.’524 Lashley's claim was too sweeping, cortical areas have the 
potential to adopt any other function but only with the necessary connectivity to other brain 
regions. Furthermore, the idea of a convergence zone where all regions would connect to all 
other regions gives rise to what Dennett calls a ‘Cartesian theatre,’ a single site where all 
experience converges: 
While everyone agrees that there is no such single point in the brain, reminiscent of 
Descartes’s pineal gland, the implications of this have not been recognised, and are 
occasionally egregiously overlooked. For instance, incautious formulations of ‘the 
binding problem’ in current neuroscientific research often presuppose that there must 
be some single representational space in the brain (smaller than the whole brain) 
where the results of all the various discriminations are put into registration with each 
other — marrying the soundtrack to the film, colouring in the shapes, filling in the 
blank parts.525 
Rather than any central convergence zone, where everything comes together, Dennett 
proposed a ‘multiple drafts’ model of consciousness, that there are at any one time multiple 
flows or drafts of sensori-motor activities that do not come together in one coherent whole. 
Non-Hebbian plasticity and passive transports 
Hebbian plasticity typically refers to synapses between excitatory neurons that require a 
pre- and postsynaptic connection. But there are also forms of non-Hebbian plasticity that do 
not require this connection. For example, plasticity occurring solely through presynaptic 
facilitation or post-synaptic potentiation;526 or the plasticity localised to one synapse 
occurring through modification of the biophysical properties of a membrane. There is also 
evidence for a cell-wide homeostatic synaptic plasticity which, because of the limit on the 
continued strengthening of synapses in terms of the energy required (the metabolic capacity 
of the neuron), maintains and regulates metabolic balance across many cells whilst retaining 
the relative difference in strengths of individual synapses within that population. There is also 
the rarer case of neurogenesis which introduces structural changes into the nervous system 
through the creation of new neurons. Finally, there are thought to be epigenetic mechanisms 
which derive from Francis Crick’s proposal that ‘a self-perpetuating biochemical 
autoconversion of methylated DNA might serve as a memory mechanism at the molecular 
level, as a specific mechanism that might defeat molecular turnover and stabilise acquired 
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behavioural change.’527 It was thought epigenetic marks like DNA methylation were fixed 
over an organism’s lifetime but it is now clear they are dynamically regulated in the central 
nervous system and can self-regenerate and self-perpetuate. 
One advantage of non-Hebbian plasticity is the possibility of more global state changes 
through membrane properties, neurogenesis, or homeostatic or epigenetic processes which 
depend less on the connectivity of neurons. These more global state changes have often been 
linked to ‘emotional’ states. LeDoux, for example, argues that emotional states monopolise 
brain resources and penetrates the brain widely by perpetuating itself. So, ‘by coordinating 
parallel plasticity throughout the brain, emotional states promote the development and 
unification of the self.’528 Such widespread changes are often achieved through the diffusion 
of neurotransmitters such as monoamines: 
Monoamines produce global state changes in many brain areas simultaneously, such 
as the high degree of arousal occurring through the brain when we encounter a sudden 
danger or the low degree of arousal when we are going to sleep.529 
Diffusion occurs as follows: as mentioned, neurons have resting potentials when not being 
‘fired.’ They must always be ready to transmit impulses and do so by the always polarised 
nature of their membrane. The fluid inside is negatively charged in relation to its outside, an 
unequal distribution of ions termed the electrochemical gradient. Movement between these 
two areas of unequal concentration then occurs through diffusion, one example of ‘passive 
transport’ (the others being facilitated diffusion, filtration and osmosis) that describe 
molecular movement across cell membranes. Unlike active transports, passive transports do 
not require cellular energy; they are driven instead by the entropy of the system. 
Concepts of active and passive thus continue to structure the conception of the nervous 
system but in subtly different formulations. For, whilst passive is still aligned with potential 
energy in distinction to active kinetic energy, ‘passive’ transports can occur through the 
entropy of the system, that effects movement and change that affect the plasticity of the 
nervous system, without the input of energy, without actually ‘acting.’ Are they strictly 
‘passive’ in this case? Perhaps in the sense that Newton’s passivity as inertia persists in 
movement? But inertial movement was originally initiated by something other. Whereas in 
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passive transports this is less the case, change arises from properties inherent to the system 
and its entropy. Or was there a prime mover? Others state they should more properly be 
called ‘facilitated transports’ as they are facilitated by something ‘other’ like gravity or the 
difference of electrochemical gradients. Yet, this passivity is traditionally metaphysical in 
that it echoes the historic privileging of activity over passivity. As passive transports are 
linked to entropy, they continue to be aligned with disorder if entropy is understood as the 
measure of disorder in a system. Perhaps the split between active and passive transports 
evidences a more profound split between an orderly, computational, successive process of 
Hebbian plasticity and a more complex, contingent and disorderly, emotional global state 
changes, a split that continues the suggestion of ‘two neurosciences’ of the previous chapter 
and the difference between a Hippocratic method, its inexact truths, and a Galenic method 
with its Platonic truth. The transformed understandings of active and passive could, in their 
coupling, therefore conceptualise the togetherness of these two neurosciences and the 
contingency and successive. 
PLASTICITY’S CHALLENGE TO CLASSIC CELL THEORY 
Yet this challenge has yet to be drawn out explicitly. One challenge that has, however, is 
the challenge non-Hebbian plasticity and passive transports present to the doctrine of the 
neuron and, by extension, classical cell theory. Specifically, they undermine the view of 
neurons as independent anatomical entities that are always contiguous and not continuous, as 
well as the ‘law of dynamic polarization’ that claims a singular direction of transmission of 
nerve impulses from cell to cell and, within cells, from dendrites to cell body to axon. 
The challenge is presented, first, by the discovery of ‘gap junctions’ between membranes 
of cells, specialised intercellular connections considered small enough to allow the diffusion 
of molecules directly from the interior of one cell to another. If there can be fusions of two or 
more cells, neurons cannot strictly be considered completely separate anatomical entities: 
fusions producing syncytial structures mean these cells would be continuous not contiguous. 
Experiments demonstrated dye molecules dye adjacent nerve cells through small holes in 
these gap junctions. Gap junctions are particularly significant for the function of the heart as 
they allow the electrical signal to contract to rapidly spread between the muscles of the hart 
as ions pass through gap junctions enabling the cells to contract together. Functional links 
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across synapses thereby produce ‘reticular’ structures denied by the neuron doctrine.530 As 
Loewenstein argues: 
The discovery of this form of intercellular communication has meant a sharp 
departure from classic cell theory. It is the coupled cell ensemble and not the single 
cell that is the functional compartmental unit for the smallest cytoplasmic molecules; 
the ensemble inside constitutes a largely uninterrupted interior milieu for somatic and 
genetic processes.531 
Meanwhile, the law of dynamic polarization and James’s law of forward direction are 
challenged by discoveries that a neuron displays two directions, not one, and types of 
movement: simultaneous movements of Na and/or K ions in opposite directions together with 
the transmission of impulses as sequential movements of these ions. Whilst the latter are an 
‘all-or-nothing’ fire rate, the former are relative to the strength of the input. Furthermore, 
impulses have been discovered to begin on axons. Cells like the dorsal root ganglion cell 
have ‘no synaptically activated dendrites associated with the cell body’532. There are also 
cells which lack axons533. If dendrites are postsynaptic and axons presynaptic, serial synapses 
where one synaptic terminal synapses on another, should not occur. These serial synapses can 
yield axo-axonal contacts and also prove a problem because they suggest parts of the nerve 
cell can be independently active534. 
Others, however, have argued that, although these exceptions challenge any strict 
generalization of the neuron doctrine to the entire nervous system, the law of forward 
direction continues to express the overall flow of activity in the majority of neurons. As 
Shepherd argues, it is just that ‘within a region, and within a neuron, this overall constraint no 
longer applies, and synaptic inputs and outputs can occur at any point on a neuron’535. 
Furthermore, whilst such discoveries may pose a challenge to the doctrine of the neuron, it 
need not challenge cell theory because the neuron doctrine did not just apply cell theory to 
nerve cells, it was more restrictive. Neuron doctrine exceeded cell theory because cell theory 
accommodates multinucleate cells and fusions between cells to form syncytial structures and 
                                               
530 Guillery, ‘Relating neuron doctrine to cell theory.’ 
531 Lowewenstein, ‘Junctional intercellular communication.’ Cited in Shepherd, Neuron Doctrine, 277. 
532 Bodian, ‘The Generalised verterbrate neuron.’ 
533 See Shepherd, Neuron Doctrine, 283. 
534 Guillery, ‘Relating the neuron doctrine to the cell theory.’ 
535 Shepherd, Neuron Doctrine, 285. 
 7 – Contemporary Neuroscience 
Page 169 of 240 
does not posit any ‘law of dynamic polarization.’ These discoveries therefore challenge the 
neuron doctrine without challenging cell theory. 
It is interesting to note how the discoveries of non-Hebbian plasticity, passive transports 
and challenges to the neuron doctrine also seem to affect strict connectionist theories of 
consciousness. For example, Seung, who argues ‘you are your Connectome,’ discusses neural 
phenomena that would be incompatible with this statement. One is that neurons can interact 
without the need for synapses, for example, extrasynaptic interactions where a 
neurotransmitter escapes from one synapse and diffuses away to be sensed by a more distant 
neuron, or between neurons that do not even touch each other. Seung’s response is that to 
model this one would have to move to the atomic level and whilst the laws of physics (not to 
mention quantum physics) could generate a simulation of every atom in the brain, this would 
be impossibly complex requiring enormous computational power and require measurement of 
position and velocity.536 So Seung does not strictly exclude the possibility, just that as its 
modelling is (currently) impossible it would not be of any explicatory use.537 Do we see here 
a limit to science in the scientists attachment to explicatory models that would explain nature 
as with Helmholtz’s refusal to entertain challenges of the law of constancy of energy? And 
where the ‘passive’ as disorderly and contingent presents that challenge? Yet to say 
computation is too complex does not mean there is not computation, it has merely yet to be 
made explicit. 
MANAGING INTERACTION: TIME AND SPACE IN THE NERVOUS ORGANISM 
Within such a complex nervous system of leaky and differential spatial and temporal 
flows, and the difference between these flows and the flows of the external environment, the 
problem arises of just how, given this differential simultaneity, the organism can successfully 
interact with its environment and itself. If the course through the nervous pathways, from 
stimulus to motoric response, is largely dependent on the different lengths and properties of 
the nerves involved (the number of synapses involved and whether myelinated or not) and the 
action of plasticity is to bind or separate synapses thus slowing or speeding progress through 
the organism, managing the difference and separation between organism and world and 
organism and itself seems to be a function of plasticity. 
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The coordination of successive events within a differential simultaneity is often referred to 
as the binding problem which has two senses: first, how complex sensory stimuli are 
separated into discrete objects, known as the segregation problem, and secondly, the 
combination problem, how separate experiences and stimuli are combined into a single, 
interactive experience. One solution, neural synchrony, proposes synchronous (simultaneous) 
firing as an explanation of consciousness and plasticity as integrative, bindings of organism 
with world that ultimately has its roots in a brand of associationism or, as it developed into in 
the 1950s, connectionism. 
But criticisms of connectionism were there from its inception. Lashley, for example, 
criticised naive connectionisms such as the stimulus-response model. Lashley’s objection was 
that the brain was omitted from this stimulus-response formula and, when it was introduced, 
was based on a telephone switchboard which implied a ‘linear reflex activity in the spinal 
cord’ that left no room ‘for the psychological categories that require sustained activity such as 
thought, memory, emotion, motivation, selective attention, and the like.’538 Lashley’s 
alternative was to argue for a sustained mechanism that continued after stimuli termination 
which led him to Nó’s reverberatory circuit. Lashley therefore argued not for a S-R model, 
but a S-O-R (Stimulus-Organism-Response), which suggested the stimulus excites the 
organism and the organism incites the response. 
Hebb also criticised naive connectionism. In his work The Organization of Behaviour, 
Hebb argued the main problem with connectionism is how to explain ‘thought.’ It cannot 
simply be behaviour as an interaction between sensory and motor processes, ‘something like 
thinking intervenes.’539 Hebb’s aim is to develop a theory to ‘show how “expectancy” or the 
like can be a physiologically intelligible process,’ how the problem of ‘attention’ can be 
understood not as some supra-neural, mystical process but in terms of neural mechanisms.540 
He proposed a form of ‘connectionism’ but ‘not an S-R psychology if R means a muscular 
response’ and also invoked Nó’s reverberatory circuit in 1949 as a basis for his ‘autonomous 
central process.’541 
The task, as modern neuroscientists seem to see it, is not to fall into a naive connectionism 
that would focus only on simultaneity and connection, but of how succession and 
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simultaneity bind together through connections that facilitate or impede flows and how 
psychological categories such as agency, attention and thought emerge out of this binding. 
With the ever-present caricature of ‘Cartesian dualism’ as the enemy, modern neuroscience 
seeks to explain this binding of simultaneity and succession seemingly without recourse to a 
sequential active and passive for if there is something that binds and something that is bound, 
this merely requires a search for what performs this binding in a super-neural realm and leads 
to infinite regress. 
PREDICTIVE PROCESSING AND FREE ENERGY 
Let us turn now to the dominant and most popular theory of contemporary computational 
neuroscience that seeks to provide answers to many of these problems. The current theory 
enjoying most attention today revolves around a few theories intimately linked: that of the 
brain as a ‘prediction processor,’ the ‘Bayesian brain’ and the free-energy principle. 
The idea of the brain as a prediction processing computer has a long history and dates at 
least as far back as Helmholtz who conceived perception as involving probabilistic inference 
of sensory causes given bodily effects.542 This inference is not so much a conscious, 
deliberative prediction but an unconscious, automatic prediction based on previous 
experience of the world. This theory then went through several developments within 
computational neuroscience and today yields theories of perception and action as hierarchical 
systems of top-down and bottom-up probabilistic processes that try to match sensation with 
predicted results of manipulations of the organism’s environment. 
Key to this predictive action are ‘prediction errors’ defined as the difference between the 
expected and actual sensory effects of enacted motoric manipulations which propagate 
forward in the system to determine action. These hierarchical active inference loops and their 
waves of error are multiple, there is not simply one organismal problem to resolve, it is 
constantly in multiple processes of interoceptive and exteroceptive origin. Multiple motor 
responses are therefore prepared simultaneously which all mutually affect each other. The 
actual action depends on the weight given to each error and may be an awkward movement of 
more than one intended action. As Clark summarises, prediction-error weighting, 
is essentially a means of sculpting patterns of inference and action, and as such it is 
strangely neutral concerning the intuitive difference between increasing the precision 
upon (say) a prior belief or decreasing the precision upon the sensory evidence. What 
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matters is just the relative balance of influence, however that is achieved. For it is that 
relative balance that determines agentive response.543 
Clark calls this theory ‘action-oriented predictive processing’ which involves finding 
predictions that match sensory input and, at the same time, performing actions that make 
those predictions come true.544 The brain so conceived is not then a mere computational 
device, an ‘an insulated inner “inference engine” ’ but ‘an action-oriented engagement 
machine – an enabling [...] node in patterns of dense reciprocal exchange binding brain, body 
and world.’545 
These prediction errors are computationally defined using Bayesian probability theory 
which infers posterior probabilities as a function of prior probability and ‘likelihood 
functions’ derived from statistical models of observed data. It was definitively introduced by 
Friston by computationally defining the cascade of inference loops using hierarchical 
predictive coding. This introduction of computational algorithms was an important addition 
as it allowed experimental testing of hypotheses.546 
Helmholtz remains central to the theory because of its assumption of the constancy of 
energy principle. Clark, for example, argues the aim of the organism is to minimise these 
prediction errors, an aim which is in turn ‘a manifestation of a more fundamental mandate to 
minimise an information-theoretic isomorph of thermodynamic free energy in a system’s 
exchanges with the environment.’547 Meanwhile, Friston argued he ‘advances Helmholtz’s 
agenda to find principles of brain function based on conservation laws and neuronal 
energy.’548 
In this model, the difference between the expected and actual sensation after an action is 
called ‘surprise.’ But surprise cannot be evaluated as it would require knowledge of all the 
hidden states of the environment that cause sensory input. So the concept of free-energy was 
introduced which functions to place an upper-bound on this surprise, a bound which can be 
evaluated because it is a function of sensory data and brain states. Free-energy is therefore 
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defined as ‘an information theory quantity that bounds the evidence for a model of data.’ 549 
The principle underlying perception as active inference is therefore that any adaptive change 
in the brain minimises free-energy. In the case of a biological organism, its data are its 
sensory inputs and its model is the model of the world and organism encoded by the brain. 
The theory, Friston adds, ‘applies to any biological system that resists a tendency to 
disorder,’ that is, that aims to minimise the entropy of its sensory states.550 This entropy is, 
for Friston, a measure of uncertainty as ‘a density with low entropy means that, on average, 
the outcome is relatively predictable.’551 
Meanwhile, Clark states that free-energy ‘emerges as the difference between the way the 
world is represented (modelled) as being and the way it actually is.’ This representation of the 
world should not be understood as some kind of passive ‘mirror of nature’ story about the fit 
between model and world, a correlationist-truth view of concordance of model and world, but 
as an optimal difference which ‘enables the organism to engage the world in a rolling cycle of 
actions that maintain it within a window of viability.’552 
Such an account aims to answer one problem of traditional stimulus-response models: 
given the discussed delay in neural pathways, the nervous system would effectively always 
be living in the past. By the time stimuli pass from sensation to action, the source of the 
stimuli may have radically changed rendering any responsive movement possibly ineffective. 
Perception and action as forward propagating predictions and errors provides an answer to 
this problem by arguing the nervous system partly lives in the past but also in the future. For 
example, in ball sports, experiments show that eye saccades occur not only to where the ball 
is but to where the ball is predicted to be, areas that lack salience. In traditional accounts of 
what stimuli captures attention in an environment, the concept of salience is invoked to 
suggest those features most salient to the organism capture attention. But this account is not 
consistent with such eye tracking evidence that show where and when eye gaze roams across 
a scene. Instead, predictive processing explains salience as expectation-driven: the fact that 
the eye looks at relatively non-salient areas of a scene is explained by the fact it is looking 
into the future in the form of the expected place of where the ball will be. 
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Binding the physiological and neural 
For Clark and Friston, this free-energy principle underlies the computational, the 
neuroscientific and the psychological. Friston, in particular, is explicit in calling this theory a 
‘unified brain theory’: ‘several global brain theories might be unified within a free-energy 
framework.’553 Whilst some might balk at this reduction of the phenomenological to the 
computational and onto the neural, it is more accurate to say Friston and Clark seek not a 
reduction but a reciprocation, the reciprocal causality of each ‘level’ all dependent, 
nonetheless, on this foundation of free-energy. 
The neural level seeks to understand how a computational hierarchical model of predictive 
processing might be implemented in the nervous system. Plasticity plays a central role. 
Friston mentions three such possible mechanisms whereby this theory could be neurally 
implemented. First is the synchronisation of pre-synaptic inputs that result in increased post-
synaptic gain. Thus a psychological concept like attention can be defined by Friston, as ‘the 
process of optimizing synaptic gain to represent the precision of sensory information 
(prediction error) during hierarchical inference.’554 Physiologically, this ‘precision,’ 
corresponds to the postsynaptic gain or sensitivity of cells reporting prediction errors 
(currently thought to be large principal cells that send extrinsic efferents of a forward 
type, such as superficial pyramidal cells in cortex).555 
Secondly, the precision-weighting of prediction errors, which is this control of post-
synaptic gain, can be explained through the activity of neurotransmitters like acetylcholine or 
dopamine556 Or, finally, synchronous interactions by adjacent neuronal populations such as 
may be achieved through frequencies of oscillation: 
it seems possible that bottom-up signalling (which in predictive processing encodes 
prediction error and is hypothesised to originate in superficial pyramidal cells) may be 
communicated using gamma-range frequencies while top-down influence may be 
conveyed by beta frequencies.557 
In one of the many applications of the theory at the psychological level, Clark discusses 
how such a theory might explain pathologies like schizophrenia. Clark notes how a 
misattribution of agency is often invoked in accounts of some schizophrenic symptoms. For 
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example, Edwards et al. describe how eye-tracking dysfunction, one of the most often 
reported deficits in schizophrenia, a usually autonomous and nonconscious action that is felt 
to be generated voluntarily, is felt as involuntary with the result that a ‘misattribution of 
agency’ occurs that shifts this agency from self to something other with the concomitant 
feeling of being controlled or manipulated.558 This misattribution is hypothesised to arise 
from malfunctions within this complex hierarchical model, perhaps rooted in abnormal 
dopaminergic functioning, that 
yield wave upon wave of persistent and highly weighted ‘false errors’ that then 
propagate all the way up the hierarchy forcing, in severe cases (via the ensuing waves 
of neural plasticity) extremely deep revisions in our model of the world. The 
improbable (telepathy, conspiracy, persecution, etc.) then becomes the least 
surprising, and—because perception is itself conditioned by the top-down flow of 
prior expectations—the cascade of misinformation reaches back down, allowing false 
perceptions and bizarre beliefs to solidify into a coherent and mutually supportive 
cycle.559 
Evidence from the phenomenological affects the neural affects the computational in a rich 
literature of psychological, neural, mathematical, psychiatric and even psychoanalytic or 
neuropsychoanalytic. It is not so much a reduction of one to the other as the transformation of 
a single principle into different modes of explanation. We might therefore ask, is free-energy 
now the unifier that affect was in previous years? 
Affects in predictive processing theories 
If so, what is the role of emotion within this framework? Several relevant mentions of 
emotional concepts suggest themselves. First is the use of the apparently emotive term 
‘surprise’ to describe the mismatch between prediction and actuality. But apparently this is 
not to be taken as surprise in the ordinary sense, surprise as an affect. To avoid this 
confusion, Clark argues it would be better to use Tribus’s concept of ‘surprisal.’560 
there seems to be an initial disconnect between neural-surprise (‘surprisal’: the 
implausibility of some sensory state given a model of the world) and agent surprise. 
This is evident from the simple fact that the percept that, overall, best minimises 
surprisal (hence minimises prediction errors) ‘for’ the brain may well be, for me the 
agent, some highly surprising and unexpected state of affairs.561 
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Yet Clark goes on to say ‘the appearance of a radical disconnect here is, however, illusory’ 
and suggests the ‘feeling of surprise’ [...] might be a way of preserving useful information 
that would otherwise be thrown away—the information that, prior to the present evidence-led 
bout of inference, the perceived state of affairs was estimated as highly improbable.562 Friston 
also echoes this ambiguous status of surprise when he says ‘a “fish out of water” would be in 
a surprising state (both emotionally and mathematically).’563 Feeling or emotion then 
becomes a difference, a difference between previous expectations and modified expectations 
in the light of predictions made and acted on. For Clark, the purpose of these ‘felt emotions’ 
may be to ‘integrate basic information (e.g., about bodily arousal) with higher-level 
predictions of probable causes and preparations for possible actions.’564 
Second, is the concept of ‘affective gist,’ rapidly retrieved, initial predictions about the 
‘gist’ elements of a scene or event that are based on previous experiences of how external 
sensations affected internal sensations in similar circumstances and which determine whether 
we like or dislike the scene or event.565 These global impressions of attitude toward a scene 
can occur in the relative absence of conscious recognition of objects in peripheral vision and 
suggest an implicit, yet to be unfolded, binding of self and world that affects. 
Most importantly, however, Clark provides a brief outline of how a theory of emotion 
would look in a PP model. He extends the James-Lange model by adding a necessary 
‘predictive twist’ because their theory ‘seems to require a one-to-one mapping between 
distinct emotional states and distinctive ‘brute-physiological’ signatures, and it seems to 
suggest that whenever the physiological state is induced and detected, the same emotional 
feeling should arise.’566 Clark instead draws on recent work which adds a match or mismatch 
between top-down predictions of interoceptive states and forward-flowing information 
contained in sensory prediction error. Whilst this seems to subsume emotion under prediction 
processing and suggest emotion is not the unifier it once was, what Clark identifies as 
missing from James-Lange ultimately is feeling as the feeling of difference, a difference that 
must affect the organism. Perhaps affect still has a place as unifier. 
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Critique 
This theory has been criticised from a number of angles. First for its reliance on Bayesian 
accounts of probabilistic inference, specifically the requirement of prior probabilities for its 
computation of risk. These ‘priors’ are an expression of a current state of belief pertaining to 
a situation prior to any evidence. The question then arises where these priors come from? Are 
they innate? Or transcendental: Clark suggests that there may be ‘hyperpriors,’ ‘priors upon 
priors’ that embody ‘systemic expectations concerning very abstract (at times almost 
‘Kantian’) features of the world.’567 Biological systems, he adds, ‘may be informed by a 
variety of learned or innate ‘hyperpriors’ concerning the general nature of the world. One 
such hyperprior might be that the world is usually in one determinate state or another.’568 
In answer, Clark and Friston respond with an ‘empirical Bayes’ (Robbins, 1956) which 
suggests that, within a hierarchical scheme such as predictive processing, priors can be 
provided from the estimates of one level to the level above; again, a succession of prior-
posterior is collapsed into a simultaneity of hierarchical prior with posterior: 
In predictive processing architectures, the presence of multilevel structure induces 
such ‘empirical priors’ in the form of the constraints that one level in the hierarchy 
places on the level below. These constraints can be progressively tuned, using 
standard gradient descent methods, by the sensory input itself.569 
The neurological level might confirm this: ‘such multilevel learning procedures look 
neuronally implementable courtesy of the hierarchical and reciprocally connected structure 
and wiring of cortex.’570 Again, it is a question not of cause and effect, a succession whereby 
past priors would affect present probabilistic inference but their simultaneity in a reciprocal 
causality. 
A related question is what accounts for the bindings of organism with itself and its 
environment, i.e. why does one thing affect one organism more than another? Given the vast 
diversity in possibilities of reciprocal affections in the organism and its environment, what 
aspects does it focus on its perceptual predictions? And how can this be explained without 
recourse to a supra-neural agency? Previous attempts, as previously discussed, tried to 
explain perceptual attention through ‘salience,’ that the organism turns toward the most 
                                               
567 Clark, Surfing Uncertainty, 174. 
568 Ibid., 188. 
569 Ibid., 303. 
570 Ibid., 303. 
 Neuroscience 
Page 178 of 240 
salient aspects. But, as we saw with the ball game example, attention is often given to non-
salient parts of a scene which are actually the predicted future path of an object. So, 
predictive processing appeals instead to ‘affordance,’ ‘the possibilities for action and 
intervention that the environment makes available to a given agent.’571 This concept was 
introduced by Gibson who defined it as ‘the affordance of anything is a specific combination 
of the properties of its substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal.’572 
Affordances of the environment are ‘what it offers animals, what it provides or furnishes, for 
good or ill.’573 Thus what binds is largely conceived as some reciprocal causal relation 
between what an organism seeks to enact and the perceived match an aspect of the 
environment affords. Just as there are multiple predictions and planned motoric responses, so 
too will there be multiple affordances and so an ‘affordance competition hypothesis’ applies 
that gives ‘multiple possibilities for organism-salient action and intervention.’ With 
prediction-error weighting, the requisite affordance is then selected. 
The opportunities the environment presents deeply influence organismal behaviour to the 
extent an organism’s intentionality is part world, part itself, ‘extended’ throughout the 
flattened inanimate and animate it finds around it, opportunities themselves influenced by the 
sensory predictions it makes so that it only sees, in a way, what it expects to see. Indeed, the 
focus on expectations and avoidance of surprise means that 
Our expectations here ‘cause the sampled environment,’ as Friston and Ao put it, but 
only in the metaphysically innocent sense of driving actions that selectively disclose 
predicted sensory stimulations. It is in this way that the agent by action calls forth the 
very world that she knows.574 
This causing the environment arises from an avoidance of difference. But whilst this may 
resemble an active organism causing or shaping its passive outside, the key difference is that 
this ‘outside’ is already an implicit binding of inside and outside, part organism, part world, a 
model of the outside that will be confirmed or rebutted in enacted movements, a model only 
manifested in its error. 
Furthermore, if an organism merely sought out in its environment what it already knows or 
needs, the problem arises of explaining novelty, learning, development and growth. Does the 
organism aim at perfect prediction of motoric responses, of perfect attunement between its 
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priors and those of the environment? This might suggest, as Clark highlights, that the best 
predictive coding strategy would be of ‘finding a dark corner and staying there, correctly 
predicting immobility and darkness until all bodily functions cease.’575 
Not so, Clark and others argue, because this would neglect the biological or evolutionary 
level required for the integrity and persistence of the organism (the most error inducing states 
are ones where activity ceases and hunger and thirst come to dominate) as well as the cultural 
levels which encourage what Clark calls ‘human flourishing’ against which the multiple 
processes of prediction error minimization resolve themselves, ‘an equally transformative 
backdrop of slowly accumulated material structure and cultural practices: the socio-
technological legacy of generation upon generation of human learning and experience.’576 
Active-inferring agents are not trying simply to correspond with world but producing 
choreographies as sensed-errors to act appropriately with its environment. And the world is 
changing independently of the organism’s attempts to match it; the world is thus accorded 
agency too. As Feldman argues, ‘one would be unwise to fit one’s prior too closely to any 
finite set of observations about how the world behaves, because inevitably the observations 
are a mixture of reliable and ephemeral factors.’577 
ERROR AND IMPLICIT MODELS REPLACES ACTIVE AND PASSIVE? 
We can summarise the developments computational neuroscience approach brings to the 
question of affect and the challenge to active and passive δύναμις. Notable is the challenge it 
presents to the traditional understandings of stimulus-response, action-consequence and the 
active-passive. Perception, for example, is now conceived as incessantly active, not merely 
passive; perception is collapsed into action such that they are both ‘locked in a kind of 
endless circular embrace.’578 The brain, as Clark and Friston and others now conceive it, is 
incessantly active or pro-active: 
The image of the brain as a probabilistic prediction machine places context and action 
centre stage. It requires us to abandon the last vestiges of the ‘input-output’ model 
according to which environmental stimuli repeatedly impinge upon a richly organised 
but essentially passive system. In its place we find a system that is constantly active, 
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moving restlessly from one state of expectation to another, matching sensory states 
with predictions that harvest new sensory states in a rolling cycle.579 
Indeed, activity seems to be so privileged that there is little mention of passivity which 
seems to no longer have a place in the organism. Passivity is only mentioned by Clark  in 
terms of ‘passive dynamics’: ‘the kinematics and organization inhering in the physical device 
alone.’580 One such passive dynamic is gravity which, in its co-occurring with active 
energetic movements, produces a more efficient and complex movement to achieve broader 
aims such as when walking is conceived as ‘controlled falling.’581 Or the diver who, whilst 
gravitationally falling, activates muscles to enact the dives. But the predictive brain is 
nevertheless also a lazy brain: ‘a brain vigilant for any opportunity to achieve more by doing 
less.’582 This economy is achieved precisely through its active exploitation of its own ever-
present passive dynamics. Thus it is perhaps more correct to say that the predictive organism 
is always active and passive at the same time although most attention is given to the active 
side, repeating the historical neglect of the passive. With the earlier mention of passive 
transports arising from the entropy of the system, should we not add these to the list of 
passive dynamics, like gravity, with which activity cooperates? Does Hebbian plasticity 
exploit its non-Hebbian passive transports or do the two work with each other? The active 
works with its implicit bindings. 
But, more significantly, we should also note that the understanding of action and agency 
within this model has been radically redefined. Even though, in Friston’s account, various 
entities are grammatically afforded agency, it is again mainly the brain as agent: ‘the brain 
will minimise free-energy,’ ‘model is encoded by the brain’ or ‘the brain is suppressing free 
energy.’583 Now this may be merely a limitation of a grammar that requires subject-object but 
Friston also refers to the agent thus: ‘an agent can avoid surprising exchanges with the world 
if it minimises its free-energy because free-energy is always bigger than surprise.’584 If action 
minimises free-energy and action depends on the difference between prediction and error, 
surely it is better to understand difference as the agential component here rather than any 
entity or being? If free-energy is the difference between expectation and actuality, it is this 
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difference which motivates action not a brain or subject. The notable change from previous 
accounts of action is thus that agency need not be ascribed to some supra-neural, external or 
transcendental pure activity, an ego or soul but an effect of the difference between error and 
prediction, complexity and uncertainty that is located firmly in the difference between 
neuronal flows and the difference between these differences and the organism’s world. 
Yet this is not to deny that agents are posited nor that events are not split into active and 
passive, cause and effect. Such a move would merely place us back in a naive connectionism. 
Clark writes, perception as an inferential process ‘cannot help but interpose something (the 
inference) between causes (such as sensory stimulations or distal objects) and effects 
(percepts, experiences).’585 But such splits arise again not through the agency of any entity 
but from the difference between predicted sensation/movement and the error-generating 
actual sensation/movement. We should therefore be attentive to the different agencies 
different bindings effect. 
This transformation in active/passive is mirrored in the changes it effects in conceptions of 
causality. For example, Pezzulo noted how, in the ideomotor view of action, a theory which 
is extended by Predictive Processing: 
causality, as present in the real world, is reversed in the inner world. A mental 
representation of the intended effect of an action is the cause of the action: here it is 
not the action that produces the effect, but the (internal representation of the) effect 
that produces the action.586 
Predictive Processing takes this one step further: cause and effect are not merely reversed 
but are made simultaneous and reciprocal. A response does not merely follow a stimulus as 
output follows input but is ‘a neat and efficient way of selecting the next input, driving a 
rolling cycle.’587 
The predictive brain also seems to challenge the law of direction of thought through its 
implicit reliance on a simultaneity of forward and backward movement, where connections 
carry predictions of expected activity ‘backward’ to explain current sensation at the same 
time as predictions carry and shape future motoric action. There must then be a bidirectional 
network and Clark will give some theories as to how this could be neurally implemented in 
vision: 
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In the visual cortex, such a scheme suggests that backward connections from V2 to 
V1 would carry a prediction of expected activity in V1, while forward connections 
from V1 to V2 would carry forward the error signal indicating residual (unpredicted) 
activity.588 
Although passivity continues to be aligned with disorder, entropy and contingency this 
actually has positive effects in its challenge to over-deterministic computational models as 
that which evades computation, being too complex and uncertain. Activity is reconceived as 
error, the difference between sensation, model and movement, an error arising from 
uncertainty from an ever-changing world and self. Activity thus manifests world and model 
in the model’s errors. Moreover, agency is now not substantial or identity-based but 
differential. Agency as error manifests a passive, implicit model at the same time as active 
kinetics work with passive dynamics in rolling, reciprocal transformations. This is how an 
active and passive δύναμις is being challenged by contemporary computational neuroscience 
by reconceiving the very notion of active and passive: not as a coupled opposite of acting on / 
being acted on but as a simultaneous action as error with implicit models that together 
motivate can compel as the evolving difference between organism and world. 
But the extent to which affect and emotion remains within a computational model 
depending on traditionally conceived active and passive (fear causes me to do something / 
something causes fear in me) is the extent to which this past metaphysics has not yet been 
fully overturned.589 For if it is the feeling of surprise, the feeling of prediction error that binds 
the active manifesting of passive models, this vague experience of feeling is itself the 
difference and as such does not strictly belong in a computational, mechanistic account that 
would reduce it to succession. Instead, an affect is this binding, a non-causal co-touching that 
is neither active nor passive (one does not bind, the other bound) but precedes, accompanies 
or produces the successive active-passive, cause-effect, etc and begins as a vague feeling of 
the difference between expectation and actuality that can manifest the implicit model we used 
to predict our actions. Thus this feeling of difference is a route to novelty, learning and 
change, disturbing no doubt but necessary to avoid the quiet, dark room. Let us turn now to 
affective neurobiology and its challenge to a more computational neuroscience to see if this 
affect as difference, as binding can be further manifested. 
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8 
AFFECTIVE NEUROBIOLOGY 
This final chapter turns to affective neuroscience for the difference it produces to the more 
computational theories of the previous chapter. We will see a similar focus on plasticity but 
this time with a specific focus on ‘emotional circuits’ and their possibilities for change 
through interaction with evolutionary newer parts. Affective neuroscience continues to affirm 
a contingency in the organism but this is now explicitly conceived using concepts of emotion, 
feeling and affect as discrete, finite, qualitative states. Feeling describes the experience of 
differences between emotional and other more ‘cognitive’ circuits whilst affect describes this 
differential binding of organism with its environment and itself in its affecting of the 
organism. The specificity of affect manifested in affective neurobiology is thus that affect is 
implicitly auto-affection: affects are only affects to the extent they affect the organism in its 
interaction with its environment. 
ORIGINS OF ‘AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE’ 
The term ‘affective neuroscience’ was coined by Jaak Panksepp in 1992.590 The need to 
create and name a separate discipline arose from Panksepp’s felt need for something that 
would synthesise behavioural, psychological and neurological perspectives. Ethology had 
come close but had not taken into consideration brain mechanisms whilst behaviourism did 
not deal with the innate sources of behavioural variation susceptible to modification via 
contingencies in the environment.’591 Meanwhile, cognitive science tended to ignore the 
emotions. What was missing in all these disciplines, and what affective neuroscience sought 
to combine, was: 
a neurological understanding of the basic emotional operating systems of the 
mammalian brain and the various conscious and unconscious internal states they 
generate.592 
This perceived neglect of emotion was of course specific to Panksepp’s time. Emotions 
had been a topic during the period 1890s to 1930s during which science tended to view the 
emotions as physiological, non-intentional or non-cognitive processes such as William 
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James’s essay What is an Emotion? although not all agreed with this view.593 Scientific study 
of the emotions then diminished in the period post 1930s, a marginalization some link to a 
post war rationalization that associated Nazism with ‘excessive emotionalism’ such that 
emotions ‘appeared largely as symptoms or causes of political and social pathologies.’594 For 
example, Wehler, writing in 1980, argued, ‘for those generations who had experienced the 
Second World War, flight, and the postwar period, the control of affects was an indispensable 
precondition of physical and psychological survival.’595 
Behaviourism then arrived in the 1960s which many saw as dealing the death blow for the 
scientific study of emotions. Skinner, for example, described emotions as ‘excellent examples 
of the fictional causes to which we commonly attribute behaviour’ and ‘as a particular state 
of strength or weakness in one or more responses induced by any one of a class of 
operations.’596 It tended to treat emotions as conditioned responses to external stimuli, not as 
causes: it is not helpful, Skinner argues, to say someone’s behaviour is due to frustration or 
anxiety, ‘we also need to be told how the frustration or anxiety has been induced and how it 
may be altered.’597 
There were exceptions to this narrative of course. Hebb, for example, discussed emotions 
in his 1949 work The Organisation of Behaviour. Hebb argued emotion, in its traditional 
significance, is not a particularly useful term as ‘it does not refer to a special kind of event in 
consciousness,’ ‘an immaterial awareness’ that should not be attributed causal agency.598 
Instead, Hebb sought a materialist account of emotion as ‘the neural process that is inferred 
from and causes emotional behaviour, with no reference to consciousness.’599 Hebb paid 
particular attention to the inherent organizing and motivating nature of emotions and their 
capacity to integrate or disintegrate, a difference mostly determined again by quantity of 
emotion. Moderate emotion generally integrates, extreme emotion disorganises and disrupts: 
‘strong emotional disturbance tends to prevent the repetition of any line of thought that leads 
up to it, and to eliminate the corresponding behaviour.’600 Hebb therefore believed we should 
separate those emotions which tend to maintain or increase the original stimulating conditions 
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(‘pleasurable or integrative emotions’) and those which tend to abolish or decrease the 
stimulus (‘rage, fear, disgust,’ disintegrative).601 
The study of emotions returned notably with Silvan Tomkins and the publication of his 
series Affect Imagery Consciousness beginning in 1961. Tomkins argued that both 
behaviourism and psychoanalysis had neglected the study of consciousness as well as grossly 
underestimated the role of affect: 
we might speculate that the phenomena of consciousness might possibly never have 
been so neglected had the problem been restricted to determining what another human 
being thinks. It is rather knowing how he feels that has been most strikingly 
avoided.602 
Tomkins sought to build on Darwin’s theory that there were evolutionary, basic emotions 
with their expression which could be scientifically studied. He splits the organism into two 
systems: a primary affect system, ‘the primary provider of blueprints for cognition, decision 
and action,’ and a secondary drive system. Tomkins sees duplication as the primary 
characteristic of living systems, ‘a transformation process in the service of a specific aim, the 
rebuilding of an identity’ giving examples of the replacing of old information about the ever-
changing environment, injured cells or tissues which must be regenerated.603 This ability to 
duplicate and reproduce itself is then guaranteed ‘not only by a responsiveness to drive 
signals but by a responsiveness to whatever circumstances activate positive and negative 
affect.’604 
Tomkins influenced another researcher, Paul Ekman who similarly claimed a set of 
discrete, ‘basic’ emotions universally expressed in similar facial expressions which was also 
a reaction against anthropologists like Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson who argued for a 
more relativist position that emotions and their expressions varied from society to society.605 
This debate, arising within different disciplines with different approaches, will doggedly 
haunt the field as a claimed difference between essentialism and constructionism. This 
chapter, however, will focus on the turn to affect in the 1990s in the specifically 
neurobiological sciences focusing on the neurobiologists Damasio, LeDoux and Panksepp. 
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AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE’S CLAIMS 
Defining terms: emotion, feeling and affect 
We begin first with the problem of how the key concepts affect, emotion and feeling are 
understood in each thinker. Damasio expends most effort on repeatedly and consistently 
defining his terms. Throughout his work the key distinction is between emotion and feeling 
where feeling is the experience or perception of emotional changes. These emotional changes 
are complex collections of chemical and neural responses forming distinctive patterns; 
automatic responses to ‘emotionally competent stimuli’ that can be objects or events in actual 
or mental recall. The result of these changes are a change in the state of the body and in the 
state of the brain structures that map the body: ‘a feeling is the perception of a certain state of 
the body along with the perception of a certain mode of thinking and of thoughts with certain 
themes.’606 In essence, feeling is an idea of the body: ‘a feeling of emotion is an idea of the 
body when it is perturbed by the emoting process.’607 One difficulty of understanding 
Damasio’s distinction between emotion and feeling is that names for emotions typically refer 
to both the emotion and the felt emotion: 
the felt experiences of emotions are unfortunately known by exactly the same name as 
the emotions themselves. This has helped perpetuate the false notion that emotions 
and feelings are one and the same phenomenon, although they are quite distinct.608 
Affect for Damasio, drawing on Spinoza, is also differentiated from feeling and emotion: 
‘Spinoza saw drives, motivations, emotions, and feelings—an ensemble Spinoza called 
affects—as a central aspect of humanity.’609 Emotion and feeling therefore describe different 
events in the process of ‘being affected’ and, once studied separately, can be re-joined as 
affect. Damasio’s definition of terms is therefore, in part, to enable a research intention: ‘in 
order to understand the entire set of affective phenomena, it is helpful to break components 
apart, study their operations, and discern how those components articulate in time.’610 And 
so, ‘the unified and apparently singular process of affect, which we often designate casually 
and indifferently as emotion or feeling, can be analysed in parts.’611 
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Panksepp does not discuss definitions at great length but they can be interpreted from his 
use of the terms. Similar to Damasio, affect for Panksepp is differentiated from emotion and 
feeling. Panksepp clarifies the difference between emotion and feeling in functional terms: 
The core function of emotional systems is to coordinate many types of behavioural 
and physiological processes in the brain and body. In addition, arousals of these brain 
systems are accompanied by subjectively experienced feeling states that may provide 
efficient ways to guide and sustain behaviour patterns, as well as to mediate certain 
types of learning.612 
Panksepp’s problem with behaviourism becomes apparent in his concept of affect in its 
difference to emotion and feeling. He emphasises that the brain affects itself and argues that 
behaviourism would have treated this auto-affection as a black box. Instead, he insists, we 
must find evidence of this self-affection for this is key to emotional behaviour. For Panksepp, 
there are emotional affects, homeostatic affects (like hunger and thirst) and sensory affects 
(like sweetness and bitterness).613 We can therefore say an affect is an affect to the extent 
emotion, homeostasis or sensation affects the organism. 
LeDoux defines emotions as ‘biological functions of the nervous system,’ brain processes 
that determines the value of a stimulus. 614 A feeling then follows as we become aware that 
we are in an emotionally arousing situation and have taken action: ‘emotional actions, in 
other words, occur when emotions motivate us to do things.’615 LeDoux gives a recent 
summary of his view on the difference between emotion and feeling: 
emotions are feelings, and feelings are cognitively created conscious experiences. The 
other factors that contribute to feelings, such as arousal, body feedback, and so forth, 
are non-emotional ingredients that are neither necessary nor sufficient for an 
emotional experience.616 
One of these ‘emotions’ (which LeDoux will later rename ‘survival circuits’) is the fear 
system, understanding of which is perhaps what LeDoux is most known for. He had traced 
the fear response from sensory inputs through to motor outputs, the contribution it makes to 
the construction of conscious experience and, through seeking the essential plasticity in this 
circuit, the extent to which it can be moderated. 
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LeDoux does not seem to differentiate affect and emotion, often using the terms 
interchangeably.617 But he does, like Panksepp, use the verb affect to describe the brain 
affecting itself, for example: ‘there are many subtle ways in which disruptions in electrical 
and chemical functions can adversely affect a brain region, with lesions being just an extreme 
example of this.’618 
It seems that all three authors share a common conceptual apparatus that is perhaps 
radically different to prior scientific understanding. Emotion is conceived as discrete circuitry 
in the brain, relatively hardwired and innate although the plasticity in these circuits is sought 
through their coexistence (and not absolute separation) with the rest of the brain. Feeling is 
then the experience of these (and other) changes, the experience of self-difference. Affect 
itself, whilst often seemingly synonymous with emotion, feeling, sensation or homeostasis 
differentiates itself through its capacity to act as both noun and verb enabling the authors to 
draw out their critique of previous theories by insisting affect is only affect to the extent it 
affects the organism. The conflation of affect with emotion thus arises from affect’s capacity 
as noun and verb, and the rarity of emotion’s verb ‘to emove,’ to construct such phrases as 
‘emotion affects the organism.’ This contributes to the understanding that emotion is an affect 
which it is, but so is sensation and homeostatic functions. Likewise, feeling as noun and verb 
describes the organism’s feeling this affecting itself prior to any more explicit, conceptual 
understanding of these affections. Damasio makes repeated use of the verbs: ‘the 
representations known as feelings are felt, and we are affected by them’;619 and: 
Objects and events do ‘play,’ in the sense that they, as distinct entities within the 
organism’s mind, can act on certain neural structures of the organism, ‘affect’ their 
state, and change those other structures for a passing moment.620 
Similarly, Panksepp insists that emotional processes affect the processes they participate 
in: 
A central, and no doubt controversial, tenet of affective neuroscience is that emotional 
processes, including subjectively experienced feelings, do, in fact, play a key role in 
the causal chain of events that control the actions of both humans and animals.621 
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If affect describes this affecting, their concept of affect is therefore implicitly auto-
affection. As we will see, this implicit auto-affective sense will often be neglected in other 
psychological, constructionist or anthropological critiques. 
Basic emotions and their circuits: are basic emotions plastic? 
The conception of emotions as circuits that affect the organism required first naming the 
phenomena of emotions then seeking evidence for their existence through experimentation 
utilising the neurobiologist’s specific understanding of brain anatomy and, more importantly, 
the connectivity and plasticity between regions. This also required a conceptual view of the 
brain mainly derived from evolutionary principles. Panksepp, for instance, argues for the 
‘triune brain’ model that sees the brain as three in one, a trinity in unity: the neomammalian, 
old mammalian, and reptilian brains which are hierarchically organised: higher functions can 
only operate on the basis of lower functions but these lower functions can operate 
independently of higher functions.622 This split is necessary for the study of how the brain 
differs from itself, how evolutionary or instinctual processes in the brain interact with the 
tertiary, higher, cultural parts of the brain that are more adaptable and mostly learned. 
Panksepp believes there are primitive emotional affects below neocortical areas, the cultural 
centre where all is learned. But the naming of these emotions that they seek in the brain will 
be much criticised with accusations of conflating cultural and biological categories. 
Panksepp, for example, insisted on evidence that there exists in ancient subcortical regions 
of mammalian brains at least seven basic affective systems – ‘at least’ because more will be 
discovered, or existing ones qualified. Panksepp names these: SEEKING, FEAR (anxiety), 
RAGE (anger), LUST (sexual excitement), CARE, PANIC/GRIEF and PLAY. He uses the 
upper case to signify he is using the terms ‘in a scientific rather than simply a vernacular 
way.’623 Yet they nevertheless bear a relation to the vernacular usage and Panksepp defends 
his choice of cultural terms: ‘the common emotional words we learned as children—being 
angry, scared, sad, and happy—can serve the purpose better than many psychologists are 
inclined to believe.’624 This leads Panksepp to claim: 
At the empirical level, we can presently defend the existence of various neural 
systems that lead to the limited set of discrete emotional tendencies [...] I will argue 
that a series of basic emotional processes arises from distinct neurobiological systems 
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and that everyday emotional concepts such as anger, fear, joy, and loneliness are not 
merely the arbitrary taxonomic inventions of noncritical thinkers.625 
Panksepp defined six criteria for defining a circuit as emotional: 
The underlying circuits are genetically predetermined and designed to respond 
unconditionally to stimuli arising from major life-challenging circumstances. 
These circuits organise diverse behaviours by activating or inhibiting motor 
subroutines and concurrent autonomic-hormonal changes that have proved adaptive in 
the face of such life-challenging circumstances during the evolutionary history of the 
species. 
Emotive circuits change the sensitivities of sensory systems that are relevant for the 
behavioural sequences that have been aroused. 
Neural activity of emotive systems outlasts the precipitating circumstances. 
Emotive circuits can come under the conditional control of emotionally neutral 
environmental stimuli. 
Emotive circuits have reciprocal interactions with the brain mechanisms that elaborate 
higher decision-making processes and consciousness.626 
These neatly convey the main tenets held by all three neurobiologists: that emotion circuits 
are the more evolutionary determined and genetically programmed parts of an organism that 
dictates innate responses to its environment but which, due to their co-existence with newer, 
more adaptive systems, create the conditions for cultural change and moderation of these 
circuits through a plastic auto-affection that is reciprocal and ongoing. 
But evidence for the triunal brain is controversial. LeDoux, for example, considers the 
emotional brain from an evolutionary perspective but disagrees with the triune model because 
so-called primitive creatures do have areas which meet functional and structural criteria for a 
neocortex: 
it is no longer possible to say that some parts of the mammalian cortex were older 
than other parts. And once the distinction between old and new cortex breaks down, 
the whole concept of mammalian brain evolution is turned on its head. As a result, the 
evolutionary basis of the limbic lode, rhinencephalon, visceral brain, and limbic 
system has become suspect.627 
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LeDoux does, however, maintain an internal difference in brain systems that underlie 
certain emotional behaviours which have been preserved through many levels of brain 
evolution. Circuits in the brain may also have been conserved across species. Each neural 
emotional system evolved to face an ancestral survival behaviour. Despite the trillions of 
possibilities of connection, very systematic patterns of interaction exist between neurons 
which can determine which areas receive inputs and which give outputs. For example, 
LeDoux concentrated on a ‘fear system.’ He tested things like damage to the auditory cortex 
which, if it prevented the flow of fear, was deemed to be essential to that system. His study of 
the pathways in fear revealed a ‘low,’ ‘quick and dirty’ path from the sensory thalamus to the 
amygdala that can trigger rapid action in the face of a threat, and a second ‘high’ road 
through the sensory cortex that allows more considered reactions. It is important to note that 
these two happen at the same time yet are of different speeds, one faster, the other slower. 
In regard to the problem of naming these phenomena, LeDoux prefers to name special 
adaptive behaviours that would mirror the basic emotions. He is not, however, interested in 
coming up with a list but is concerned with drawing a line between biologically derived and 
socially constructed behaviours with this distinction between social and biological stemming 
from differences in relative plasticity, i.e. activity dependent (social) or homeostatically 
determined (biological), differences ultimately in speed, adaptability and capacity for change. 
Despite their hardwired, evolutionary intact systems, each author admits these circuits are 
part of the organism, not a whole, with the whole arising from interaction between these 
systems and more adaptive parts through the plasticity of the brain. This will be something 
their many critics in the humanities neglect: a pars pro toto error. The question is providing 
evidence for interaction and the extent of their plasticity, something that can only be done by 
first naming and studying these circuits, a possibility because brains develop initially from 
homeostatic genes that dictate similar brain structures and connectivity. Here is Panksepp: 
Although emotional circuits, as many other brain systems, exhibit considerable 
plasticity during the life span of organisms, the initial issue is identification of the 
genetically dictated emotional operating systems that actually exist in the brain.628 
Similarly, LeDoux argues: 
Genes give us the raw materials out of which to build our emotions. They specify the 
kind of nervous system we will have, the kinds of mental processes in which it can 
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engage, and the kinds of bodily functions it can control. But the exact way we act, 
think, and feel in a particular situation is determined by many other factors and is not 
predestined in our genes. Some, if not many, emotions do have a biological basis, but 
social, which is to say cognitive, factors are also crucially important. Nature and 
nurture are partners in our emotional life. The trick is to figure what their unique 
contributions are.629 
Finally, Damasio: 
the idea of a ‘brain module’ that would cause the emotive responses that lead to the 
feeling of delight, while another module would produce disgust, is no more correct 
than the idea that there is an emotive control panel with buttons for every emotion. 
The idea that the delight or the disgust would be a replica of each other at every new 
instantiation is also incorrect. On the other hand, the nature of the delight and the 
machinery that underlies its appearance are sufficiently comparable from instance to 
instance that the phenomena are easily recognizable in everyday experience and are 
traceable, albeit not rigidly, to certain brain systems, planted there by the grace of 
natural selection with the help of our genes and with more or fewer jitters from the 
environments of the womb and infanthood. To say that emotivity is fixed, however, 
would be an exaggeration. All manner of environmental factors can modify the 
emotive deployment as we develop.630 
Again it is a question of what remains the same across change, what relatively fixed 
standpoint to choose from which to observe difference. Where some focus on time or space 
as the unchanging, here it is emotion as the more hardwired or slow to change parts of the 
nervous organism. Its relation to change is then affect. Affect thus conceptualizes possibilities 
of bindings to effect change, of what can affect what to what effect. Panksepp believes there 
is little evidence about these interactions as the newer levels are hard to study in animals and 
because ‘specific cognitions do not have the clear-cut neural pathways that primal emotions 
have.’ 
Synthesis: integrating emotion, reason and the ‘self’ 
This question of interaction between emotional circuits and their other is often described 
as the question of the relation of emotion to cognition or reason. Damasio will notably 
challenge the idea that reason is clouded by emotion although such a view is not necessarily 
new to him; the cognitive function of emotions had been argued already by many others.631 
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But what was new was the attempt to provide specifically neurobiological evidence for this 
view. 
Damasio’s argument is that reason is not purified of emotions: ‘emotions and feelings are 
not intruders to reason but enmeshed with it.’632 His view arises from his theory that ‘the 
essence of a feeling may not be an elusive mental quality attached to an object, but rather the 
direct perception of a specific landscape: that of the body.’633 It is therefore the state of the 
entire body, its tensions, relaxations, stresses, in being affected by an object that influences 
decision-making not some impartial reason evaluating the object in separation from the body: 
That the body, as represented in the brain, may constitute the indispensable frame of 
reference for the neural processes that we experience as the mind; that our very 
organism rather than some absolute external reality is used as the ground reference for 
the constructions we make of the world around us and for the construction of the ever-
present sense of subjectivity that is part and parcel of our experiences.634 
The ‘implicit model’ of Prediction Processing theory is echoed here in the idea that an 
organism’s representation of reality rather than reality itself drives action. Damasio’s terms 
his theory the ‘somatic marker hypothesis,’ evidence for which comes mainly from an 
experiment in which six patients with prefrontal brain damage and ten ‘normals’ performed a 
gambling task during which behavioural, psychophysiological, and self-report measures were 
recorded.635 The gambling task, called the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), involved giving 
participants a loan of $2000 and asking them to select a card from one of four decks 
differently advantageous, some incurring large rewards and large losses, some small wins, 
small losses. Only two packs resulted in an overall gain. Participants were required to realise 
that, despite large gains in two decks, their larger penalties would eventually lead to an 
overall loss. Participants had no way of predicting when a penalty card would come, no 
means of calculating the overall net gain or loss, and no advance knowledge of how many 
cards they would turn over (play was eventually stopped after 100 cards). 
Performance on the game in terms of how many cards taken from the good and bad decks 
was monitored, skin conductance responses (SCRs, theorised to be a measure of autonomic 
and emotional arousal) were recorded and, after 20 successive card turns, subjects were asked 
to report the basis for their decisions and how they conceptualised the game. The aim of the 
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experiment was to determine whether subjects were choosing from the advantageous decks 
before or after they had conceptualised the nature of the game. 
Progress in the game was then split into four phases based on the results of these tests. The 
first, termed pre-punishment, was before subjects had sampled from each of the four decks 
but had not suffered any loss. No anticipatory SCRs were found. After experiencing a few 
losses, normal subjects started to generate anticipatory SCRs to the riskier decks. This phase 
was called the pre-hunch. Third, came the hunch phase – arriving at around card 50 for non-
patients – where they expressed a hunch which decks were riskier. By around card 80, 7 non-
patients expressed knowledge of why two decks were good or bad, termed the conceptual 
phase. No brain-damaged patient generated SCRs at any point during the game. The most 
surprising finding, though, is that the three patients who reached the conceptual level and 
correctly identified the good from the bad decks nevertheless continued to choose from the 
disadvantageous deck. The patients’ behaviour failed to reflect their correct conceptual 
knowledge. 
The authors interpret these results by proposing a theory of decision-making that involves 
two parallel but interacting events. Firstly, sensory representation of the situation triggers 
nondeclarative knowledge arising from an individual’s prior emotional experience in similar 
situations. Memory of the losses sustained when sampling from bad decks is recalled each 
time the individual goes to sample from the bad deck. These memories activate autonomic 
and nonconscious signals which act as covert biases on the parallel process of cognitive 
evaluation of relevant, conscious facts and the application of decision-making strategies 
based again on prior experience of similar situations. The experiment, particularly the SCR 
results, showed that in non-patients, this covert bias operated before overt reasoning took 
place (measured by the subjects’ reporting of their conscious awareness of the best strategy) 
and influences the decision that is taken. As the patients with lesions did not generate SCRs 
their behaviour on the task failed to operate in accord with their cognitive evaluation. It 
theorises the manifesting of implicit ‘hunches’ that are somatic and felt into consciously 
conceived understanding. Whilst this feeling precedes cognition, it nevertheless accompanies 
it as parallel but interacting events in the move of manifesting implicit bodily knowledge. 
LeDoux similarly stresses the importance of emotion to decision making and to protect 
emotion from being ‘consumed by the cognitive monster.’ He again treats emotion and 
cognition as ‘separate but interacting mental functions mediated by separate but interacting 
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brain systems.’ 636 He draws this conclusion from several key findings: that brain damage to 
animals or humans prevents their ability to appraise the emotional significance of a stimuli 
whilst leaving the perceptual capacity to recognise the object intact; that an emotional 
meaning of a stimulus can be appraised before the perceptual systems – we can know 
something is good or bad for us before we know exactly what it is; and that ‘emotional 
memory’ is stored differently to cognitive memories and damage to the former prevents 
previous, emotionally experienced stimuli triggering present emotional reactions whilst 
damage to the latter reduces the ability to locate where and when and how we last saw the 
stimulus.637 
Meanwhile Panksepp asked whether affects and cognitions are totally conflated. In 
response he insists on looking not just from the ‘top-down’ perspective of most philosophers 
and psychologists who believe they are totally conflated but from the perspective of an 
evolutionary ‘bottom-up’ view that insists on the possibility that ‘primary-process affects 
have an independent existence that goes back much further in MindBrain evolution than the 
brain processes typically subsumed by the concept of cognition.’638 Panksepp’s view arises 
from his insistence on the necessity of studying these primary-process affects. 
It is a question of the simultaneous distinction and union of emotion and cognition. Some 
critics (often in the humanities) will claim the three neurobiologists make an absolute 
separation between emotion and cognition, clearly a misreading of a more nuanced position 
given their conception of an organism as a unity of differential, affective bindings of emotion 
and cognition that are felt. This no doubt arises from the biological requirement of separating 
the organism into parts for research purposes. But, given the neurobiological understanding 
of brain anatomy and plasticity, how could they legitimately claim any absolute separation in 
a nervous organism, any analysis without synthesis? 
Indeed, this analysis of parts is brought together in various theories of synthesis of 
emotional circuits with the rest of the organism. The question of synthesis asks how a 
coherent, agentive, conscious self arises from such a fragmentary and differential structure 
and emotions play a key role in this integration. LeDoux writes, emotional states monopolise 
brain resources and emotional arousal penetrates the brain widely, and perpetuates itself.’639 
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This integration is achieved first through the plasticity inherent in the connectivity of these 
emotional circuits with memory formation but also in the form of bodily sensations from 
responses that give the ‘felt’ aspect of the emotion that further affects synaptic activity via the 
hormones released over a larger time scale than mere neuromodulators. So, ‘by coordinating 
plasticity throughout the brain, emotional states promote the development and unification of 
the self.’640 For example, 
monoamines produce global state changes in many brain areas simultaneously, such 
as the high degree of arousal occurring through the brain when we encounter a sudden 
danger or the low degree of arousal when we are going to sleep.641 
Panksepp similarly views the core function of emotional systems to ‘coordinate many 
types of behavioural and physiological processes in the brain and body.’ Arousals of these 
systems are ‘accompanied by subjectively experienced feeling states that may provide 
efficient ways to guide and sustain behaviour patterns, as well as to mediate certain types of 
learning.’642 Emotional systems, he adds, are ‘evolutionary tools to promote 
psychobehavioural coherence.’643 
This integration also plays a key role in the creation of an autobiographical self. LeDoux 
states ‘you are your synapses’ – ‘your “self”, the essence of who you are, reflects patterns of 
inter connectivity between neurons in your brain.’644 For Panksepp, primary-process 
consciousness will be defined as ‘that ineffable feeling of experiencing oneself as an active 
agent in the perceived events of the world.’645 This feeling arises from ancient foundational 
emotional circuits that give neurosymbolic affective representations of a self critically linked 
to primitive motor representations in the brain stem. These ‘ancient and stable motor 
coordinates’ may provide a ‘self-referential coherence’ that is ‘the very foundation for the 
unity of all higher forms of consciousness.’646 Similarly, in The Feeling of What Happens, 
Damasio argues for a nonconscious or automatic processing level, a ‘proto-self’ consisting of 
the nonconscious, homeostatic processes of the organism, ‘the ensemble of brain devices 
which continuously and nonconsciously maintain the body state within the narrow range and 
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relative stability required for survival.’ These processes ‘continually represent, 
nonconsciously, the state of the living body, along its many dimensions.’647 Damage to these 
simple biological phenomena demolish the entire edifice of consciousness. The next level of 
consciousness, the core self, arises ‘when the brain’s representation devices generate an 
imagistic, nonverbal account of how the organism’s own state is affected by the organism’s 
processing of an object’ in the form of a feeling. The final, autobiographical self, the 
conscious ‘you’ then develops as a feeling of ‘the re-representation of the nonconscious 
proto-self in the process of being modified within an account which establishes the cause of 
the modification.’648 This self is therefore ‘a feeling of a feeling.’649  
But we are not conscious of all our feelings: many remain non-conscious, never to be 
conscious, such as homeostatic affects. Nor are feelings unequivocally correlated with 
conscious experience – feelings of anxiety or uncomfortableness, for example, may not have 
begun at the moment of knowing but sometime before. Feeling itself is a vague, uncertain 
experience that becomes autobiographical in its establishment of a cause of the modification, 
by an imposition or extraction of agent, notably the ‘I,’ but one which is always liable to 
error. 
Differential auto-affection qualifies the computational 
As we have seen, key to these thinkers is the differences in the nervous organism of 
relative evolutionary age of systems, connectivity and plasticity, differences in durations and 
speed of flow of energy through the system. For example, Panksepp argues ‘in terms of firing 
rates of neurons, cognitive-somatic territories are enriched in very highly firing neurons (e.g., 
hundreds of action potentials per second), while the affective-visceral ones abound in very 
slowly firing neurons (e.g., it is hard to find many that fire more than ten times a second).’650 
Damasio discusses the difference between fast myelinated and slow unmyelinated axons: 
perception of the world external to our bodies—what we see, hear, and touch—is now 
in the well-insulated, fast, and secure hands of myelinated axons. So are the skilled 
and rapid movements we make out in the world, by the way, and so are the high-
altitude flights of our thinking, reasoning, and creativity. Myelin-dependent axon 
firings are modern, fast, efficient, Silicon Valley like.651 
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Yet homeostasis is ‘in the hands of the electrically leaky, slow, and ancient unmyelinated 
fibres’ such as fibres in the vagus nerve, ‘the main conduit of neural signalling from the 
entire thorax and abdomen to the brain’ which are almost all unmyelinated.652 Damasio 
ventures to explain why this might be. First, unmyelinated fibres are more open to their 
surrounding chemical environments whereas modern, myelinated fibres ‘can only be acted on 
by a molecule at a few points along the axon.’653 Secondly, there is an older form of 
communication in the nervous system, different to synaptic communication, called ephapsis 
which may ‘alter the recruitment of axons, for example, by amplifying the responses 
transmitted along nerve trunks.’654 Damasio notes how attention to ephapsis is neglected for 
the focus on synapsis yet notes that the in the vagus nerve, the conduit from the thorax and 
abdomen to the brain are almost all unmyelinated. Lack of study of these mechanisms has 
meant aspects of the organism such as the gut and heart have been neglected as peripheral to 
the nervous system but it is actually central and more work needs to be done on this – this 
neglect arises for the same reasons as the neglect of feelings and emotions and the neglect of 
non-Hebbian plasticity mechanism for the safe and secure flows of Hebbian. 
This introduces a spacing between two parallel systems: not only a difference in duration 
such that an emotional circuit continues processing an event beyond the cognitive system but 
also that different forms of communication and firing rates affect the interaction of 
computational synaptic Hebbian plasticity with the more complex ephaptic, diffusional 
(passive) processes of non-Hebbian plasticity. This necessary co-existence of the overtly 
computational aspects with its other is manifested by authors in their discussion of non-
Hebbian with Hebbian plasticity, molecular passive transports with active neural 
transmissions. Or the digital with its other (the analogue?). Damasio writes: 
because neurons can be described as active or not, their operation lends itself to a 
description in terms of Boolean algebra, zeros or ones. This is a core belief behind the 
idea of brains as computers. But microcircuit neural operations reveal unexpected 
complexities that undermine that simple view. For example, under certain 
circumstances, neurons can communicate to other neurons directly without using 
synapses, and neurons and the supporting glia also interact abundantly.655 
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The body also has a say via the chemical molecules circulating in the blood which can 
achieve rapid, widespread modification of the organism and exert an influence at the level of 
the brainstem and cerebral cortices. Damasio recognises that a focus on these aspects 
undermines the dominance of the active-passive: 
If there is no distance between body and brain, if body and brain interact and form an 
organismic single unit, then feeling is not a perception of the body state in the 
conventional sense of the term. Here the duality of subject-object, of perceiver-
perceived, breaks down. Relative to this part of the process, there is unity instead. 
Feeling is the mental aspect of that unity.656 
Yet Damasio recognises the necessity of the co-existence of unity with a split in that unity: 
Duality does come back in, however, at a different point of the complex process of 
brain-body interaction. When images of the body frame and its sensory portals are 
formed, and when images of the spatial positions occupied by viscera are referred to 
that overall frame and placement within it, it becomes possible to generate a mental 
perspective of the organism, a set of separate images that is distinct from sensory 
images of the exterior (visual, auditory, tactile) and from the emotions and feelings 
they provoke. A duality sets in then, images of the ‘body frame and sensory-portal 
activity’ to one side and, to the other, the rest of the images, those of the exterior and 
of the interior.657 
It is again a question of a simultaneous distinction and union, of transmission and blending 
at the same time: 
Does the body really transmit information about its condition to the nervous system, 
or does the body blend in with the nervous system so that the latter can be 
continuously apprised of its status? … each of these two accounts corresponds to a 
different age in the evolution of body-brain relationships and to different levels of 
neural processing. The blending-in account is the only way of describing how the old 
interior, using old functional arrangements, interweaves body and brain. The 
transmission account fits well the more modern aspects of brain anatomy and function 
and how they capture both the old and the not so old interior.658 
These factors, Damasio insists, need to be factored into the scholarship on affect as a 
reciprocity between vague, blended areas of nervous activity co-existing with secure, causal, 
sequential flows. 
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CRITIQUE: ESSENTIALISM VERSUS CONSTRUCTIONISM AGAIN? 
These three affective neuroscientists have been subjected to various critiques from within 
science and, perhaps most stridently, the humanities although the critiques from within 
science seem to have the most effect. Within psychology, Barrett criticises Damasio, LeDoux 
and Panksepp for holding a ‘basic emotions’ view that assumes a discrete set of emotions that 
can be referred to by their cultural names, located in neural circuitry. The problem with this, 
she claims, is they assume fear, anger and the like are ‘natural kinds’: 
Scientists begin with emotion concepts that are most recognizably English, such as 
anger, sadness, fear, and disgust, and search for their elusive biological essences (i.e. 
their neural signatures or fingerprints), usually in subcortical regions. This inductive 
approach assumes that the emotion categories we experience and perceive as distinct 
must also be distinct in nature.659 
Her response is that mental categories rarely reveal the way the natural world works and 
so she claims to ‘turn the typical inductive approach on its head’ and begin not with such 
mental categories but ‘with the structure and function of the brain’ and from there, ‘deduce 
what the biological basis of emotions might be.’ Her alternative will be a theory of 
‘constructed emotion’ based on her division of the entire history of theories of human mind 
into two neat categories: ‘faculty psychology’ and ‘psychological construction.’660 The first 
understands the mind as ‘a collection of separate and independent abilities, or faculties, that 
reflect separate processes, each with its own distinct physical properties that are innate 
(neurons in a brain region, a modular brain circuit, or bodily correlate).’661 It is a form of 
‘psychological essentialism’ whereby categories human name are expected to have a 
metaphysical or biological essence that makes them what they are. This theory has driven 
neuroscience too: ‘for much of its history, neuroscience has used faculty psychology 
assumptions to understand the functional architecture of the human brain.’662 The problems 
of defining emotion and agreeing a list of basic emotions then arose because this approach 
assumed ‘the components (nonverbal expressions, physiological changes, etc.) in an 
emotional episode are caused by and therefore explained by a common agent behind them, 
the essence of each emotion.’663 
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Whereas ‘psychological construction’ eschews essentialism and understands the mind as 
‘an ongoing stream of mental activity, or sequences of mental states, that are caused by a set 
of common or domain-general processes (with physical properties left unspecified).’664 In 
this account, emotional events emerge from more basic processes. She acknowledges James 
as an early constructionist who rejected the ‘common-sense presupposition that each emotion 
word names a physical category, with a physical essence, and a power specifically and 
mechanistically to cause certain predetermined changes in behaviour.’665 James instead 
proposed emotions are ‘like rapids and eddies in a river, to be understood as disturbances and 
agitations in an unbroken stream of thought, which one studies by examining the forces and 
conditions that produce such changes in the flow.’666 Barrett’s core assumption is ‘each 
emotional episode is constructed rather than triggered.’667 
Within humanities, perhaps the most notable critic is Ruth Leys in three much cited 
articles and recent book.668 Hers is mainly a critique of the experimental contributions of 
psychology to affect theory. Leys similarly makes a binary, this time between Ekman (and his 
predecessor Tomkins) as the arch-villain with his proposal of a set of basic emotions such as 
fear, anger, disgust, etc. which are manifested in distinct physiological expressions of 
authentic emotional experience, localised in specific brain areas and seemingly independent 
of or unmediated by cognitive or other intentional states (faculty psychology in Barrett’s 
terms). The hero of the book is Fridlund who had studied under Ekman but eventually 
opposed Ekman’s conclusions. Fridlund instead offered a ‘behavioural ecology view’ that 
portrays emotions as ‘meaningful behaviours that have evolved in order to communicate 
motives in an ongoing interpersonal or interindividual context or transaction.’669 Emotional 
displays cannot then be regarded as ‘readouts of internal states but as intentional movements 
serving various social motives.’670 Instead, Fridlund replaces sets of basic emotions like 
anger, etc: 
there may be one dozen or one hundred ‘about to aggress’ displays appropriate to the 
identities and relationships of the interactants, and the context in which the interaction 
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occurs. The topography of an ‘about to aggress’ display may depend on whether the 
interactant is dominant or nondominant, conspecific or extraspecific, and whether one 
is defending territory or young, contesting for access to a female, or retrieving stolen 
food or property.671 
Leys’s binary of Ekman and Fridlund is then used to divide the whole of affect theory into 
two camps: noncognitivists (Tomkins, Ekman and anyone who uses their methodology or 
stress the importance of bodily changes and subpersonal processes) and cognitivists 
(appraisal psychologists, social constructionists, best typified by Fridlund who stress the 
intentionality of emotions). Leys also describes this as a choice between intentionalism 
(Fridund) and anti-intentionalism (everyone else) and claims anti-intentionalists see affect as 
‘independent of signification and meaning.’672. This view derives from her reading of 
Deleuzian inspired affect theorists like Massumi who, she claims, define affect as 
‘noncognitive, subpersonal, or corporeal processes or states.’673 Although this definition 
might seem to place them at odds with the work of Tomkins, Ekman and Damasio, Leys 
argues ‘there is in fact a deep coherence between the ideas of both groups’: 
That coherence concerns precisely the separation presumed to obtain between the 
affect system on the one hand and intention or meaning or cognition on the other. For 
both the new affect theorists and the neuroscientists from whom they variously 
borrow— and transcending differences of philosophical background, approach, and 
orientation— affect is a matter of subpersonal, autonomic responses that are held to 
occur below the threshold of consciousness and cognition and to be rooted in the 
body.674 
Both Leys and Barrett’s critique make reductive characterisations of the ‘enemy’ in order 
to separate themselves from this other yet actually risk falling prey to the very critique they 
identify. With both, the characterisation of the other is that they claim an absolute separation 
between two entities without any attention to their interaction. With Barrett, ‘faculty 
psychology’ is seemingly only interested in separating out faculties with no attention to their 
integration. With Leys, non-cognitivists absolutely separate affect and cognition. But these 
critiques risk becoming merely another example of the absolute separation they claim to 
abhor: both Leys and Barrett make an absolute separation between two camps without due 
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attention to their interrelation and then attack one side for making absolute separations 
without attending to their interrelation. 
This reductive digitalisation is exacerbated by lack of attention to the differing definitions 
and distributions of the key concepts affect, emotion and feeling. Barrett, for example, treats 
affect as part of the organism, in its influence on a person’s body state. The affective reaction 
is then ‘one component of the prediction that helps a person see the object.’675 And Leys 
claims neurobiologists effect an absolute separation between affect and cognition. Yet, the 
neurobiologists studied here posit emotion, not affect, as opposed to cognition and affect as 
their affective integration; for example, Damasio’s repeated and consistent understanding of 
affect as ensembles of drives, motivations, emotions and feelings, and the ‘unified and 
apparently singular process of affect.’676 Leys seems to ignore this definition and even refers 
to Damasio’s distinction between emotion and feeling as ‘idiosyncratic.’677 Finally, affect and 
feeling in verb form and the sense of affect as auto-affection is neglected. 
Their critiques then proceed to a near exclusion of the other discipline, neurobiology. 
Barrett acknowledges this criticism when she states in a co-edited collection that the aim of 
the collection is to ‘bridge psychological construction to other levels of analysis (and 
countering the mistaken assumption that any biological evidence on the nature of emotion is 
support for a faculty psychology view).’678 The first essay in this collection apparently then 
counters the ‘misunderstanding’ that the goal of psychological construction ‘is to deny 
emotions any biological reality or to define them out of existence.’679 Barrett claims a 
‘construction’ in which physical properties of the mind as stream of activity are left 
unspecified but seemingly leaves little possibility that that construction might be constructed 
out of these physical properties and, at a higher composite level, the faculties, evidence for 
which could be provided by neurobiology. 
Leys is more explicit in her exclusion of neurobiology: 
the answer to the question of how people and nonhuman animals behave is to be 
found by studying their interactions in their natural-social settings without recourse to 
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explanations based on the existence of hypothetical internal causal entities, processes, 
or mechanisms.680 
And further, that 
in the field of emotion research there is no intellectually viable alternative to 
Fridlund’s position, whatever the cost may turn out to be to many of the existing 
‘scientific’ studies of emotion.681 
This exclusion means Leys cannot appreciate that any absolute separation between ‘affect 
and cognition’ would be neurobiologically unsustainable, something a more careful 
consideration of the concepts of plasticity, Hebbian and non-Hebbian, within an organismal 
unity, would show. Indeed, plasticity is mentioned only four times in Leys’ book – twice in 
relation to Fridlund’s cultural expression of emotions as ‘highly plastic social and 
communicative signals’ and twice in relation to neural mechanisms. One mention is in a 
quote from Tomkins that links plasticity of the affective system with ‘“ambiguity and error” ’ 
arising from Tomkins’s ‘“radical dichotomy between the ‘real’ causes of affect and the 
individuals’ own interpretations of these causes.” ’682 This possibility of error will be 
interpreted as anti-intentionalist: ‘the idea of life’s essential errancy informed an explicitly 
anti-intentionalist account of the affects.’683 The second mention of plasticity is in a critique 
of Smail’s On Deep History and the Brain which emphasises plasticity in the interaction 
between LeDoux’s and Damasio’s theory of emotional circuits and cultural norms and 
conventions. But, again, Leys reduces this to anti-intentionalism as it uses terms ‘not unlike 
Ekman’s neurocultural theory of the emotions’: cultural plasticity good, neural plasticity bad 
(anti-intentional).684 
Finally, perhaps the main objection of Leys and Barrett is a perceived essentialism in the 
neurobiologists’ ‘faculty psychology’ with Barrett claiming psychological construction 
eschews essentialism because it does not treat cultural terms as ‘natural kinds.’ But Leys 
ultimately treats even Barrett’s constructionism as Ekman-esque as they end up with the same 
‘confusions and uncertainties regarding what it is they think they are studying when they 
adopt a multicomponential approach.’685 She at least recognises that shifting the focus from 
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‘emotions’ to a set of ‘common or domain-general processes’ merely shifts the same 
problems addressed to emotions to these processes: what is a process, how many are there, 
are there ‘basic’ processes, what do we call them and are these then natural kinds? There will 
always be some admixture of cultural categories binding biological investigations with 
cultural phenomena whether you call that ‘fear’ or a combination of arousal, movement and 
memory. Unless of course you take Leys’s approach and exclude the biological and remain 
purely with the cultural. But, arguably, the same problem would arise with the cultural 
components: how many are there, are there ‘basic’ components, etc. 
Rejecting any discrete set of ‘basic’ processes or cultural phenomena has two problems: 
first it risks a trivializing infinitization. Whilst the fear of this finitely more than two is no 
doubt a fear of biological essentialism, to say there are 2<n<∞ biological systems of different 
evolutionary age and modifiability and that we must study their interaction with newer and 
more quickly changing systems is not to claim an essence as fixed or deterministic. It is to 
locate the slower to change within the quicker to change, not to posit an eternally fixed 
essence. It neglects also that Panksepp admitted that more systems may be discovered, or 
existing ones qualified. Is not taxonomizing merely a ground for disconfirmation and 
surprise? Secondly, it does not overcome the claimed essentialism it sees in the other, it 
merely essentialises different aspects and is perhaps more dangerous as it is not recognised as 
an essentialism.686 One wonders if Leys and Barrett’s critiques have more to do with 
boundary policing and disciplinary cohesion through exclusion rather than any sustained and 
respectful engagement with another discipline or an acknowledgement of the contribution 
other disciplines and other methodologies can make. 
PROBLEMS UNDERLYING DISPUTES: PAST METAPHYSICS 
Ultimately, these disputes arise from the difference between, on the one hand, an 
insufficient manifestation of an implicit dependence on past metaphysics and, on the other, 
the implicit challenge to this metaphysics. Firstly, the question of agency, so crucial to the 
difference in positions often relies on a δύναμις of the coupled opposites active and passive. 
For instance, Barrett portrays ‘faculty psychology’ as granting agency to an emotion, that 
emotion causes a behaviour; or in her characterisation of basic emotions theorists as 
maintaining all instances of fear are ‘caused by a hidden common agent unique to fear (e.g. 
an “affect program” or a neural circuit’).’ A continuing reliance on this form of agency means 
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that even the alternative of processual constructions still necessitates the positing of what 
constructs: for Barrett it will often be the brain or a grammatical ‘I’ as agent: ‘my brain 
constructed my experience of emotion’687; for Leys, it is the intentional cognitivist ego. But 
this merely shifts the problem: what is ‘the brain,’ the ‘I,’ intentionality? And are these not as 
much cultural categories with their own history? To Leys’s distinction of intentionalist or 
anti-intentionalist thinkers, the latter’s diffusion of agency throughout the organism and its 
environment need not be anti- but a differently conceived, differently distributed agency, an 
intentionality not dependent on a traditional, substantial, ego pure to itself. Furthermore, the 
critique itself may arise from a metaphysics of coupled opposites such that one can only 
define one’s own position by what an other is not. 
Yet, for affective neurobiologists, causality in the nervous organism is far more complex 
and contains an implicit challenge to this active/passive. Causality arises from the contingent 
togetherness of the organism with itself and its environment and Damasio in particular 
challenges the primacy of the active/passive for a unity of duality and non-duality, of 
transmission and blending within the organismal unity. Possibilities of combinations, flows 
and change arising from the organismal ensemble is thus less a togetherness of active/passive 
in continuous reciprocation with the contingent, but that the transformed active and passive 
actually convey the togetherness of succession and contingency. 
Secondly is an implicit difference between a dependence on ontologies of identity rather 
than difference. For both Leys and Barrett struggle to acknowledge the radical redefinition of 
affect in Damasio, LeDoux and Panksepp whereby affect is now the binding of differential, 
reciprocally affecting elements and not just one part of the organism. Affect is auto-affection, 
the organism is because of its difference to itself rather than any identity with itself. Feeling 
is the feeling of the unity of this difference. Leys, with her privileging of the cognitive and 
rejection of any attempt to introduce error, uncertainty or a difference within the organism 
seems to wilfully neglect this felt aspect of the organism’s behaviour and any effect on the 
organism of this feeling, any auto-affection, any self-difference, arising from her ontology of 
identity. 
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE’S RESPONSE: DISCARD EMOTION? 
But the critiques (mostly from the sciences it must be said given the lack of citations of 
Leys or other cultural humanities scholars in the neurobiologists’ work), have led to recent 
                                               
687 Barrett, How Emotions are Made, xiii. 
 8 – Affective Neurobiology 
Page 207 of 240 
shifts in focus for both Damasio and LeDoux (Panksepp tragically died in 2017). In 
Damasio’s latest work, there is a shift in focus away from discussion of emotions and more 
toward feelings as the mental expressions of homeostasis defined as ‘the collection of 
coordinated processes required to execute life’s unthought and unwilled desire to persist and 
advance into the future, through thick and thin.’688 Damasio’s homeostasis bridges the 
cultural/biological divide by including application to systems in which: 
conscious and deliberative minds, individually and in social groups, can both interfere 
with automatic regulatory mechanisms and create new forms of life regulation that 
have the very same goal of basic automated homeostasis, that is, achieving viable, 
upregulated life states that tend to produce flourishing. I see the effort of constructing 
human cultures as a manifestation of this variety of homeostasis.689 
Feelings are related to homeostasis as ‘the subjective experiences of the momentary state 
of homeostasis within a living body.’690 The relative goodness or badness of a given state is 
the basis for the good or bad feelings. This homeostasis acting through feeling is ‘the 
functional thread that links early life-forms to the extraordinary partnership of bodies and 
nervous systems.’691 
Panksepp had also posited a link between his emotional systems and homeostasis – for 
example, his SEEKING system relates to homeostasis through management of food. Or 
Separation distress is related to a homeostatic thermal response: when we are lost, we feel 
cold, when together, warm: ‘the roots of the social motivational system may be strongly 
linked to thermoregulatory systems of the brain.’692 
But the more dramatic shift or, strictly, clarification, comes in LeDoux. In 2018, LeDoux 
clarified his position by stating he has not actually been studying emotion at all. Instead, 
LeDoux claims he has been studying ‘survival circuits’ because, 
If you think about what an animal does in a situation of danger, it does something to 
protect itself, either by remaining motionless or moving away from the harm. When a 
person is in that state, they do the same sorts of things. But they also feel afraid. So 
it’s natural to assume that when a rat is doing those things, it’s probably feeling some 
sort of fear as well. But if you follow the logical conclusion of all of this, you will see 
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that even bacteria do these things. They’re in their little petri dish in a lab. If you put 
some acid on one side, they all move to the other side.693 
There remains, however, a link from these survival circuits to emotions: 
emotions are conscious experiences that occur when we find our self in a situation 
where a challenge or opportunity exist. Some occur when a survival circuit is active 
— like fear — while others don’t involve survival circuits — like pride. What defines 
the emotion is not whether there’s a survival circuit that’s active but whether we 
interpret the situation we’re in as either challenging or potentially beneficial.694 
This leads LeDoux to claim: 
I’m putting all the emotions on a level playing field, but I am playing on a different 
field. I’m not studying emotion. I’m studying the function of survival circuits. 
Survival circuits contribute to emotions but are not emotion circuits.695 
Re-conceptualise emotion as basic survival movements and the possibility of cross-species 
comparison is hoped to be less controversial. Any human distinction then is to be found in its 
greater capacity for self-reflection: 
I don’t think these systems are in the brain to create emotions. They’re in there to deal 
with the environment. But when you put one of those systems in a brain that has other 
capacities such as self-reflection and an awareness of its other activities, then you get 
emotions.696 
Whilst these biologists conceive homeostasis, emotions and survival as affects, one 
wonders if the hostile reaction of humanities to their study of emotion is due to a perceived 
ownership of these phenomena in the humanities. It will be interesting to see if the same 
hostile critiques are levelled against homeostatic or survival affects. 
BINDINGS OF THE NERVOUS ORGANISM 
The difference affective neuroscience produces in comparison to a more computational 
neuroscience is the organism as a differential auto-affection, a mutually affective, reciprocal 
togetherness of systems of different speeds, age and adaptability. If mainstream neuroscience 
affirms a contingency within the organism but tends to privilege the successive and 
computational, the co-existence of succession with contingency is affirmed by affective 
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neuroscience precisely through attention to the emotional circuits that utilise more non-
Hebbian plasticity. In the difference between Hebbian and non-Hebbian plasticity, the terms 
active and passive are radically rethought. Passive no longer means merely imposition from 
outside but, with ‘passive transports,’ changes in the organism without requirement of 
energy. Activity then works with this passivity, not against it or coupled to as its opposite, but 
to manifest the implicit bindings of transports within through failed actions. Affective 
neurobiology’s privileging of difference yields a view of affect not as some external 
disturbance that would need to be resisted or returned to homeostatic sameness but as 
ensuring the difference that is vital to feeling, agency and life itself. 
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CONCLUSION: A PRE-PRE-SOCRATIC NEUROLOGY? 
Two turns, two different disciplines. Each, independently, reacting against perceived 
neglects. Whilst Sedgwick, Frank and Massumi did refer to science, this was not originally 
the work of the neurobiologists LeDoux, Damasio, and Panksepp, nor did neurobiology 
engage with Sedgwick, Frank and Massumi. Instead, reacting against the privileged accorded 
to language and essentialised anti-essentialisms, humanities sought to continue the critique of 
philosophies of the subject as self-present, self-certain or purely human whilst seeking a way 
out of conceptual impasses by exploring affects as real-world anchors of signs. While 
affective neurobiology sought to extend ethology’s synthesis of behavioural and 
psychological perspectives on emotions by adding neural evidence after the perceived neglect 
of emotions by behaviourism and cognitive science. Yet, different causes, similar effects in 
the shared themes of a return to the emotional body, the renewal of relations between natural 
sciences and humanities and renewed conceptions of organisms and their immanence in the 
world and thus causality, contingency, agency and identity. 
These turns arose within a traditional, sedimented conception of affects conceived under a 
‘masculine auto-affection’ of quantitative differentiation that produced therapies of defence 
through reversals in coupled opposites to return to homeostasis by the balancing of some 
underlying thing like energy, which must remain constant so that an increase of affect in one 
requires a decrease in another. Affect, through its root in πάθος, became dominated by the 
coupled opposite of activity and passivity where passivity is mainly understood as something 
imposed from without and narrowed to human feeling to the neglect of its wider senses. The 
choice of affect (afficio), given it was cognate with τίθημι (to set or lay down), reinforced this 
neglect of a wider sense of πάθος by privileging its sense of states or a ‘being set.’ Afficio and 
affect, as either active or passive voiced, could then convey both activity and passivity: to 
affect or be affected, whereas πάσχειν had only been active voiced. Later, with the 
disappearance of the verb ‘to emove’ or ‘to passion,’ affect stepped in to fulfil this gap (‘to 
affect with emotion’ rather than ‘to emove’ or ‘to passion’) further reinforcing its narrowing 
to and conflation with passion and emotion as human feeling. 
Both turns challenged this understanding. Most explicitly in philosophy, where a ‘before’ 
or ‘other’ to coupled opposites was proposed that was likened to the middle voice. In 
neurobiology, the sense of affects as ensembles, in which affects are only affects to the extent 
they affect the organism – affect as implicit auto-affection –challenged any binding of 
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organism and world as simply active and passive. As this ensemble comprised bindings of 
conscious, unconscious and nonconscious. animate and inanimate, these bindings often 
remain implicit. 697 
The thesis pursued here, however, was not to posit a ‘before’ or ‘other’ to the 
active/passive but to suggest that ‘active/passive’ never really translated the Greek coupling 
of πάσχειν with ποιεῖν (but also δρᾶν, ἐνέργεια, and then ago, facio, etc.) that is its root. A 
broader sense of πάσχειν was thus manifested as actually signifying this ‘before,’ as a 
binding in which no explicit separation between actor and action, agent and patient, had yet 
been made, akin to the middle-voiced senses of πάθος. This sense of binding then gives 
πάσχειν and affect a broader sense of bindings of implicit differences, bindings before 
transitivity is added in the move to active and passive. As Derrida notes, the repression of this 
nontransitivity and the narrowing of πάσχειν to passivity has significant implications: ‘a 
certain nontransitivity, may be what philosophy, at its outset, distributed into an active and a 
passive voice, thereby constituting itself by means of this repression.’ 698 The affect of the 
affective turn can then be read as a return to this sense of πάσχειν ‘before’ passivity. The so-
called ‘expansion’ of affect and agency to include the inanimate is actually a ‘return’ to the 
πάσχειν of ancient Greek philosophy before its narrowing by Latin translators and the 
philosophy of nontransitivity. 
What then of ‘activity’? The dominant prediction processing theories of computational 
neuroscience place action centre stage by collapsing perception and action so that perception 
is no longer the passive reception of sense-data but the active turning-toward and sampling by 
the organism of itself and its environment. These actions then become ‘predictive,’ future 
oriented, seeking out confirmation or disconfirmation of predictions based on implicit models 
of organism and world, action as differential. Key to determining actions are ‘prediction 
errors,’ the affecting difference between expected and actual sensory effects of enacted 
motoric manipulations of the environment that propagate forward. Activity is then no longer 
the active ‘making’ or ‘doing’ of a purely self-present ego but confirmation-seeking 
explorations and correctives to implicit models: error, uncertainty and implicit difference thus 
replace the self-certainty. As motivation for action depends on the difference between 
prediction and error, difference is agential rather than any entity or being. Agency need not 
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then be ascribed to some supra-neural, external or transcendental pure activity, nor an ego or 
soul but an effect of the difference between actuality and prediction, between organism and 
world. Differences are manifested with the establishment of a cause of the modification, in 
the separation of agent and patient, which yields a self in the extraction of ‘I’ as agent, an 
extraction always liable to error. 
But, to the extent computational neuroscience assumes the aim of the organism is to 
minimise free-energy, conceived as the difference between these models and the way the 
world actually is, it risks remaining in past conceptions of affect where the goal is defence 
against difference through therapies that re-enable flows by removing ‘blockages’ by aligning 
coupled opposites to return to homeostasis by conforming world to the implicit models of 
hegemonic norms. 
Within affective neurobiology, these theories are conceptualised with affect, emotion and 
feeling. Emotion as the slower to change, older parts of an organism’s self-difference. Feeling 
as the feeling of unity of that self-difference, a vague, uncertain experience. Affect as 
implicitly auto-affection, the organism is only to the extent it differs from itself thus better 
opening to the possibility of change and difference. Because the organism feels itself only to 
the extent it is affected and different to itself, error and self-difference thus become 
foundational to the organism’s feeling of agency and animacy within the inanimate. 
But we need to think the transformed activity and passivity together, we need to bind the 
discoveries of the turn to affect in both disciplines. For it cannot be the case of a pure activity 
or pure passivity: if agency is manifested with the difference of implicit models to actuality, 
bindings of implicit models are equally only manifested with activity; their separate existence 
is difficult to conceive. The world ‘as it is’ is only manifested in its difference and error to 
how we expect it to be. How the world is will therefore always evade capture as error is 
always required. And this is perhaps a criticism of much of today’s affect-inspired theory that 
recognises entanglements and bindings but do little with this. They do not go the extra step of 
manifesting these bindings as Sedgwick and Frank tried to do. If their separate existence is 
difficult to conceive, each action (as manifestation through separation in bindings) remains an 
implicit binding of manifest and unmanifest. In the example of πάθος as attribute, the active 
association (an active voiced λέγειν) of Plato’s ‘being is one,’ avoids the tautological ‘being 
is being’ by binding it with another concept which brings with it its own implicit differences 
which need to be unfolded in their difference with that which it is now bound with. These 
differences are not immediately apparent. Such a manifesting reveals a circular binding of its 
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own: one cannot rest with the implicit – the unknown gnaws – yet to manifest it creates other 
implicit bindings. The dream of manifesting without the implicit, a pure making explicit, is 
the dream of pure separation, the purely present ego or the purely active entity. Actions 
merely create two new implicit bindings: perhaps this is the meaning of activity in all its 
various forms of separation, but each ‘active’ verb would need to be analysed for the different 
separations they make – what is the difference between opposing πάσχειν to ποιεῖν or δρᾶν? 
And is this where the difference between inanimate and animate lies? The animate as that 
which is capable of this auto-affection as the manifesting of implicit bindings? 
Binding the two turns could then better overcome past conceptions of affect. Through their 
emphasis on qualitative bindings not quantitative differences, qualitatively differentiated 
‘emotional circuits’ that bind with differently organised, differently adaptive systems 
displaces the idea of affects emerging out of quantitative movements between foundational 
coupled opposites such as joy/sorrow, pleasure/unpleasure and where different affects can 
then only be conceived as combinations with other contraries (self/other, present/absent, 
etc.)699. To be affected is then re-bindings, re-pairings, not some increase or decrease in 
oppositional quantities like pain/pleasure. One can only hope that something remains the 
same across different affects – evidence of brain damage today shows sometimes there is 
not.700 
These bindings allow access to the discrete, limited realm of 2<n<∞. It resists n=∞ 
through the understanding of the early brain structural similarities and limits to connectivity 
through homeostatic genes. It resists n=2 through non-Hebbian plasticity with its older, 
ephapsis that is more complex than a digital fire/don’t fire. The necessary co-existence of the 
two in a nervous organism thus offers a 2<n<∞ without a violent biologism. And each of its 
taxonomies is ground for disconfirmation, as Sedgwick, Frank and Panksepp affirmed. 
Furthermore, the focus is less on a reified Affect that could get transferred to energy and its 
constancy, no Affect as energy that could be turned on or off, bound or unbound, balancing to 
zero, but affects. Qualitative bindings ensure the homeostasis necessary for survival 
cooperates with cultural bindings that promote flourishing and growth, a positive binding of 
biological with cultural. The contingency and uncertainty of Hippocratic, second 
                                               
699 As in Spinoza’s definitions of the affects, Ethics. 
700 See the debate between Malabou and Zizek on this question in Malabou, ‘Post-Trauma: Toward a New 
Definition.’ 
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neuroscience meets Galenic philosophical neuroscience meets nontransitive philosophy in an 
organism of essentialized differential plasticities. 
But, as we saw, the field is subject to many critiques and misunderstandings. What resists 
this alternative understanding? 
First, there is the continued privilege accorded to the computational and mechanism in 
opposition to contingency, a contingency exemplified by the co-touching of neurons and 
passive transports as the contingency inherent to the organism as movements without energy 
too complex to be computed. Contingency thus remains bound to disorder, disruption, and 
with the historical neglect of accidents as errors that disrupt philosophies of substance and 
essence or are too complex to be computed.701 
Second, the privileging of successive flow over the co-touching of contingency, of active 
transports over passive, no doubt stems from the implicit and unchallenged metaphor of 
movement that underlies so much discourse in both philosophy and neuroscience. Whilst 
many have a problem with metaphors of organism as steam engine or brain as computer, few 
question the metaphor of movement that can only conceptualise change in terms of flows of 
something through pathways, beginning to end, agent initiating, patient receiving; 
movements that privilege free flow, discharge and the avoidance of blockages. This metaphor 
is deeply embedded, not only explicitly in concepts like emotion, perturbation but also 
implicitly through etymology in concepts like method, aporia etc.702 No surprise then that 
affect became implicated with physics. What alternative metaphor of binding could be 
conceived that conveys not ‘blocked discharges’ but resistances to separations?703 
Third, some might counter that we cannot escape the active and passive because we 
require language and English, at least, lacks something like a middle/πάθος voice that would 
enable us to express bindings of implicit differences: we have no alternative to speaking in 
active or passive voice institutes the subject as agent and object as patient – for example, ‘the 
brain constructs emotions’ or ‘emotions cause our behaviour.’ But grammatical constructions 
that allow the broader sense of πάθος as bindings without separation are possible without a 
middle voice. Indeed, it may be a distinguishing feature of English that passive constructions 
                                               
701 For example, Aristotle says that, in creating a house, a builder does not create its accidents as they are 
infinite. The study of accidents therefore belongs to the sophist. Metaphysics, 1026b. 
702 Method comes from the Greek literally meaning a pursuit or following after a track or path; aporia 
meaning blockage to a path. 
703 See Détienne and Vernant’s work on μήτις for some examples like the nets of fishermen or Hephaestus’s 
bonds. 
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without agent are possible and frequently used. And, interestingly, such constructions lend 
themselves to constructions with ‘feeling.’ 
In Syntactical Structures, Chomsky showed how certain models for linguistic structure 
could not account for relations between sentences like the active-passive relation.704 
Chomsky points out that the active/passive voice of grammar is not such that a passive 
construction is always a reversal of the active: the assumption that an active sentence and 
corresponding passive are synonymous is often false. For example, quantificational sentences 
like ‘everyone in the room knows at least two languages’ cannot be reversed in the passive as 
‘at least two languages are known by everyone in the room’ because one person might know 
only French and German and another only Spanish and Italian so the former holds but the 
latter doesn’t: no language is known by everyone in the room. Chomsky therefore argues, 
‘this indicates not even the weakest semantic relation (factual equivalence) holds in general 
between active and passive.’705 Nor does the passive always suggest an ‘undergoing’ – for 
example, ‘she was offered a bunch of flowers.’ 
Chomsky also discusses the elliptical transformation that removes the agent that is often 
used with the passive transformation – ‘the boy was seen by John’ / ‘the boy was seen.’706 
Cléro, in his entry on English in Dictionary of Untranslatables, draws out a specific use of 
this loss of the agent (also called recessive diathesis) in relation to a key term for us, 
‘feeling,’ in a discussion of its difference to ‘sensing’ and thus the difficulty of translating it 
into French with sentir: 
‘To feel’ marks a collaboration in a process; it plays along either in an immanent or an 
adherent way, unlike sensation, which is more instantaneous and event-like—so much 
so that ‘to feel’ is often expressed in the passive, without indicating what is doing the 
feeling. ‘Something felt’ is said in English, instead of quelque chose de senti, as it 
must be said in French.707 
Cléro argues feeling’s ability to be used in the absence of what is feeling, the ‘ellipsis of 
the agent,’ means that for English language philosophers, the passive in general becomes ‘the 
privileged form of an action when its agent is unknown, indeterminate, unimportant, or, 
inversely, too obvious.’ This loss of the agent, he adds, has ‘become a characteristic of the 
English language itself’ and he therefore claims the word ‘feeling’ allows an articulation of 
                                               
704 Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, 6. 
705 Ibid., 100-101. 
706 Ibid., 90. 
707 Cléro in Cassin et al., Dictionary of Untranslatables, s.v. feeling, 340. 
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the realm of affectivity in English which is difficult to translate into French.708 An excellent 
example of such a use is in Damasio’s book title The Feeling of What Happens on emotion’s 
role in the making of consciousness. This has been translated into French as Le Sentiment 
Même de Soi. But this introduces a ‘self’ that is absent in the English. It is also interesting to 
note here that the neuroscientist Sherrington, with his concern for the correct name for the 
gap between neurons overburdened by the active/passive, admired Virginia Woolf’s The 
Waves and To the Lighthouse for its frequent style of passive constructions with absence of 
agent: a friend recalled, ‘“I can remember Sherrington praising Virginia Woolf’s two 
masterpieces, The Waves and To the Lighthouse, both extreme specimens of life without will 
and action”’709 (50). 
What this suggests is that passive constructions without agent, particularly those using 
‘feeling,’ can convey some of the senses of the πάθος middle-voice – a vague or 
indeterminate experience that is the beginning of more secure knowledge through added 
transitivity – and so do not always need to grammatically construct agent and patient. This is 
not to suggest we should not use active and passive voice at all: that would be to neglect that 
passivity does not solely mean bindings of implicit difference: this is only its broadest sense. 
There is still room for constructions with an agent to convey the necessary separations, just as 
Greek did using prepositions like ὕπο or dative constructions. 
Furthermore, the challenge to agency and ‘activity’ has also come right from the very 
heart of language. For example, Davidson argued that 
Philosophers often seem to think that there must be some simple grammatical litmus 
of agency, but none has been discovered. I drugged the sentry, I contracted malaria, I 
danced, I swooned, Jones was kicked by me, Smith was outlived by me: this is a 
series of examples designed to show that a person named as subject in sentences in 
the active or as object in sentences in the passive, may or may not be the agent of the 
event recorded.710 
Or in the ‘ordinary language’ philosophy of Austin. In A Plea for Excuses, Austin 
discusses the problem of defining ‘action’: 
There is indeed a vague and comforting idea in the background that, after all, in the 
last analysis, doing an action must come down to the making of physical movements 
                                               
708 Ibid., 258. 
709 The friend is Granit, quoted in Swazey, Reflexes and Motor Integration, 76 
710 Davidson, ‘Action,’ .44. 
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with parts of the body; but this is about as true as that saying something must, in the 
last analysis, come down to making movements of the tongue.711 
An action, he says, is a highly abstract thing that stands in for any almost any verb with a 
personal subject just like ‘thing’ stands in for any noun substantive and ‘quality’ for any 
adjective. The problem arises when we fall for ‘the myth of the verb,’ that is, when we treat 
‘doing an action’ not just as a stand-in for verb with subject but as a ‘self-explanatory, 
ground-level description, one which brings adequately into the open the essential features of 
everything that comes by simple inspection under it.’712 This overlooks exceptions and 
difficulties (is thinking or saying something an action?) and relegates all actions as equal – 
from sneezing to winning a war; we might add: ποιεῖν, δρᾶν, ἐνέργεια, ago, facio, etc. 
Austin argues studying excuses can help classify the vast list of verbs of actions and shed 
light on what an action is because not every excuse can be used with every verb and excuses 
tend to indicate some abnormality in the action that throws light on the normal, successful 
performance of the act. Austin, like prediction processing, therefore introduces error so that 
actions become known in their excused failure. Excuses and error thus do not come after the 
fact but are an essential component of the action. Excuses (and errors) qualify agency and 
reveal in their plurality and appropriateness that and how I am not always the master of my 
actions, nor its subject or author. 
This question of agency is precisely the locus of much criticism of the field, particularly 
between Leys against ‘anti-intentionalists’ or between Barrett and her constructionism versus 
faculty psychology: who or what can be ascribed agency in these bindings of implicit 
differences? And to what extent should an intentional subject and its capacities for binding or 
acting be taken into consideration? But a fourth resistance appears here: the neglect or lack of 
attention to the unknown and unmanifest that arises from the attachment to the 
anthropomorphic, self-present subject that also resists the spreading agency to the inanimate. 
Yet this challenge to agency is not new. The idea of a flattened, diffused agency is actually 
a return to the origins of πάσχειν and its diffusing use in Greek thought. For πάσχειν became 
applied to almost everything – anything could suffer the actions of Gods, humans, animals, 
the inanimate and abstract ideas, an expansion in who or what can act as agent and patient. 
Today, it continues. Why limit agency to the intentional human subject? 
                                               
711 Austin, ‘Plea for Excuses,’ 126. 
712 Ibid. 126-7. 
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Finally, with the identification of ‘two neurosciences’ in the difference between Galen’s 
Platonic medicine and Hippocrates’s medicine as μῆτις that resembles the art of the sophist, 
helmsman and politician, we can see how the resistances can be aligned with a Galenic model 
that privileges secure truths and intentional, human agency. Yet the link between μῆτις and 
bindings suggests there is another knowledge that is precisely the knowledge of circular 
bindings, of conceptual impasses, a knowledge of how to create and escape from them. As 
Sedgwick and Frank’s description of conceptual impasses as where ‘it is possible to 
recognise the mechanism of a problem, but trying to remedy it, or even in fact articulate it, 
simply adds propulsive energy to that very mechanism’ evoked the image of the person 
bound in a net where every movement merely ensnares them further.713 Such a knowledge 
privileges an auto-affection of making explicit implicit bonds: it is not enough to identify a 
critique of another’s position, one must also manifest the extent to which that critique 
remains implicitly bound to its object of critique, as critiques of essentialism that remained 
essentialist or claims to overcome ‘Cartesian dualism’ remain dualist demonstrated. The task 
is to differentiate these circular bonds by identifying the circularity, the internality to the 
action, the way in which action to extricate oneself merely binds oneself further. Only when 
one knows what is the same and how the same sustains itself can difference manifest itself 
and the difficult process of separating to new bindings begin. Help perhaps comes from 
awareness of why one position sounds obvious and the other ‘cockamamie.’ 
Difficult re-bindings because affects are key to this process. We might ask why, for 
instance, grief and depression feature so often in discourses on affect. For example, 
Panksepp's major volume Affective Neuroscience was written after a period of grief and 
depression after the tragic death of his daughter;714 or Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations written 
also after the death of his daughter; or Sedgwick who has written about her own 
depression;715 or Irigaray on the necessity of separation from mother that would require 
mourning the loss. Why does grief drive so many positions on affect? Or what is it about the 
depressive position? Is depression, linked to separation, the affect of the separation of 
bindings? The release of the binding that sustained? As death was the release of the binding 
of soul and body (Plato’s Phaedo)? But the goal is not to aim for or remain with depression 
or death: philosophy does not have to be a practice for dying. One could instead aim for 
                                               
713 Sedgwick and Frank, ‘Shame,’ 635. 
714 See preface to Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience. 
715 Sedgwick, ‘Teaching/Depression.’ And on Klein’s ‘depressive position’ in ‘Klein and the Difference 
Affect Makes.’ 
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circular bindings that are positive in their sustaining. We could mention here Irigaray’s work 
on meditative practices that bind one to oneself through breath and re-touch.716 One always 
writes from where one is. The goal is not only to write the affect but to understand how the 
writing is itself a manifestation of the affect if theory is to offer more than just distraction. 
The necessity of affirming ‘two neurosciences’ would better open the question of possible 
bindings of organism with itself and environment rather than solely computational models of 
flow and difference in a Bayesian framework. Just as attention to passive transports and their 
use by pharmaceutical therapies enlarged the limits of a purely activity-dependent Hebbian 
plasticity of flow, by facilitating or impeding connectivity and binding, perhaps the 
combination of the two would permit the most radical transformations. But as contingent 
bindings of indeterminate effect and ambiguous language, such knowledge will always be 
insecure in relation to Platonic truth. 
With the possibility of affects understood through a binding of the two turns to affect with 
two neurosciences, radical new therapies could be posited in the conjunctions afforded by 
such combinations as neuropsychoanalysis. One example of this is provided by the 
neurobiologist and psychoanalyst Ariane Bazan in a case study of a patient with psychosis, 
‘Hervé’ who had suffered profound trauma. 717 Bazan listens to Hervé intently and his 
descriptions of his ‘psychotic’ actions not merely to place them within a pre-existing 
psychoanalytic interpretation of psychosis as an ‘absence of repression’ but that this failing 
repression may, in part, also be due to the effects of trauma on the developing brain: ‘the 
proposition therefore is that the failing repression in psychosis then is instantiated as this 
failing sensorimotor inhibition.’718 Bazan demonstrates that trauma does not merely affect a 
psyche but also the physical – in all its forms including homeostatic and autonomous 
functions – as well as the binding of the physical and psychical to suggest a limit to 
psychotherapeutic cures and possible alternatives in the form of physical interventions. Just 
as few would disagree that hysterical blindness can be most affected by psychotherapy, 
physical blindness by neuroscience. 
But perhaps it is not so much a question of what can affect what, perhaps this must remain 
unknowable in advance. A better emphasis might be on the question of what agents can be 
assigned in active separations of implicit bonds: animate, inanimate, abstract, biological, 
                                               
716 See Irigaray, To Be Born. 
717 Bazan, ‘Sensorimotor Inhibition to Freudian Repression,’ 1–2. 
718 Ibid., 7. 
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cultural. The question then becomes not a tendentious dispute between disciplines policing 
boundaries but how to affect phenomena for the better where this affecting is understood as 
separating-bindings through establishment of cause. Why can this question of agency not be 
extended unaffected by a boundary policing that can only conceive engagement and critique 
as active and passive, as imposing on or being imposed on that only leads to a struggle for 
dominance and mastery? 
But a major question still remains: are bindings active and passive? Is there a togetherness 
of a binding and being bound? Does something bind something other? Who or what binds? Is 
it the work of an agent? A human ego? But if it is a case of binding or being bound, how 
could bindings ‘precede’ the separation of active and passive? 
Perhaps such a non-causal, contingent binding has been evidenced in the very turns we 
have been studying; manifested, for example, in the biological observation of the function of 
the neurons where Sherrington experienced great difficulty in naming the gap where two cells 
touched, a difficulty no doubt because he was overburdened by the alternative between the 
active/passive. What he sought was a name for a ‘process of contact,’ a middle voiced 
binding if you like. In question is a binding that results from flows developing independently 
that, at a certain indeterminate point, touch, to combine and collapse flows of independent 
successions although one did not make the other touch nor was made to touch. Two things 
developing in isolation from each other, unaffected by each other, but develop in such ways 
that they can then touch and bind. Is this not also the situation of the turn to affect in both 
philosophy and neurobiology? Each were reacting against different with different methods, 
different disciplines. Did one make the other turn? Or did they turn independently and yet 
combine with their common concept of ‘affect’ and common themes? Their binding is 
revealed not only in their common concept of affect but their remarkable parallels. All this 
thesis tried to manifest were the dependencies and overcomings of an implicit enmeshment of 
medicine, metaphysics and language. Such a binding might also exemplify a different relation 
of culture and biology to active concept / passive biological and critiques other than those 
arising from affects of shame or depression. 
What then binds two turns, two flows? A concept? An orientation? Shared implicit roots? 
A mutual turn toward a transformation in activity and passivity: to a time before passivity’s 
domination by metaphysics of coupled opposites and activity after the critique of the self-
certain subject. Manifestation of such bindings might effect dramatically new bindings like 
that of a strange time and place: that of a pre-pre-Socratic Neurology. 
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